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 The local language production strategy (LLP) emerged in the early 1990s and 
developed into a key practice for major media corporations operating in Latin America, 
Europe, and Asia. This dissertation analyzes where Sony’s international production 
strategies intersect transformations in the Brazilian and Spanish film industries during the 
mid-1990s to 2010. The LLP strategy, widely perceived as a corporate product of 
globalization and market power of Sony, is simultaneously viewed as a culturally specific 
media product intended for local Portuguese or Spanish-language audiences using 
national tax incentive policies and talent. This project provides a multi-layered history of 
Sony’s trans/national practices, Latin American and European regional industries, 
Brazilian and Spanish national policies and conditions, and the creative agency and 
power of local film production companies. Adapted from Timothy Havens, Amanda D. 
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Lotz, and Serra Tinic’s critical media industry studies approach and Paul du Gay’s 
“circuit of culture,” I conducted archival research and on-site field interviews in Rio de 
Janeiro, São Paulo, Madrid, and Brussels with local producers, distributors, 
policymakers, lobbyists, and Sony executives. The study is grounded equally in box 
office data, co-production financing specifics, and cultural policy as well as first-hand 
accounts and industry discourse. Instead of labeling the LLP another all-powerful 
strategy of Global Hollywood, I explore the everyday practices, power relations, and 
complex negotiations involved in local and national agents working alongside large 
transnational media company to produce commercial films like Chico Xavier (2010) or 
Salir Pitando (2007). Sony’s local operations have to balance the global corporate 
strategy and logic with changing local conditions, policies, practices, technologies, and 
partnerships. Each location study illustrates a unique strategy and situation ranging from 
the quasi-autonomous operation in São Paulo to the short-lived, highly micro-managed 
Sony European operation in based in Madrid. I challenge traditional theoretical and 
industrial understandings of national cinema, media imperialism, media convergence, and 
the classification of Sony Pictures Entertainment as solely an American or Japanese 
company. What results is a close institutional analysis exploring issues such as what 
defines “local” media industries, the flexibility of the nation, and the position of 
transnational media companies outside the U.S.  
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Over the past three decades, the large sweeping effects of globalization have 
resonated through regional, national, and local media systems, markets, and audiences. 
Significantly, the year 1989 marks a turning point in major geo-political, economic, and 
cultural movements that signals increasing global integration and deterritorialization. 
1989 marks a transformative moment that reflects the growing decentralized position of 
the nation-state, the flexibility of borders, and increased mobility of people, capital, 
ideologies, technology, and media. Specifically, three key events illustrate this moment. 
They also offer the cultural-industrial context for my location-based analysis of 
contemporary film industries through Sony Pictures Entertainment’s local language 
operations co-producing films in Brazil and Spain.  
In September 1989, the Japanese media company known for making the Walkman 
and home audiovisual hardware such as television sets and the failed Betamax acquired 
the American film and television company Columbia Pictures Entertainment. Sony’s 
purchase marks one of the first in a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the 1990s that 
would fold the Hollywood film studios under the umbrella of larger transnational media 
conglomerates. In the following years, this entertainment division reorganized into Sony 
Pictures Entertainment, a transnational film, television, and home entertainment company 
within the parent Sony Corporation.  
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In Europe that November, a long process towards the democratization of Eastern 
Europe culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall. This event symbolically marked the 
subsequent descent of Eastern European Communist “Iron Curtain” rule and reintegration 
of the region. The following years witnessed opening up of European borders not only for 
financial markets but also for the movement of people and media across national lines. 
The formation of the European Union (EU) in 1993 and pan-European media policies and 
support systems worked to strengthen regional integration and redefine media audiences 
beyond national borders. The infamous Uruguay round of GATT debates raised questions 
about whether media should be protected under cultural policies as argued by the EU or 
flexible under free market policies as suggested by the U.S. This period defines 
contemporary European cultural policies and industries for the following decades. 
Finally, in December of 1989, Brazil had its first democratically elected President 
after more than a twenty-year military dictatorship. Yet, governments across Latin 
America witnessed economic collapse signaled by hyperinflation, high unemployment, 
and government cut social and cultural programs. In Brazil, this restructuring included 
dismantling the state-run film industry that resulted in zero local films produced the 
following year. Marking the end of the state-supported film enterprise, Embrafilme, 
neoliberal policies characterized this period and restructured the Brazilian cinema around 
a privatized, market-driven, and more internationalized industry. 
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My dissertation begins at 1989 in order to ground my project in waves of 
conglomeration and media convergence, battles over de/regulation, and redefinitions of 
local media through cultural policies washing simultaneously over North America, Latin 
America, Europe, and Asia. In all three of these situations, larger political, economic, 
cultural, technological, and ideological forces altered media institutions, industries, 
practices, and markets. The opening events serve as my historical starting point to 
interrogate the post-1989 period and how larger forces of globalization have altered 
geographical mapping and cultural-industrial conditions around and practices within 
media industries.  
Larger theories of globalization provide the context for my dissertation. Terms 
such as mobility, flexibility, deterritorialization, fluidity, and interconnectedness have 
come to represent and drive the contemporary period. A slippery and abstract term, 
globalization is understood as unified global time or simultaneity, increased emergence of 
transnational institutions and agencies, destabilized nation-state, development of further 
forms of global communication and change in standards of citizenship across local, 
national, regional, and transnational spaces.1 Arjun Appadurai describes: “the new global 
cultural economy . . . a complex, overlapping, disjunctive order, which cannot any longer 
be understood in terms of existing center-periphery models (even those which might 
                                                
1 Mike Featherstone, “Introduction” in Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity 
(London; Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990): 6.  
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account for multiple centers and peripheries.”2 A disjunctive relationship between five 
dimensions of cultural flow—ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, and 
ideoscapes characterizes the post-1989 period.3 My understanding of contemporary 
media flows and globalization that runs through this project is defined through these 
notions of mobility, flexibility, space/place, and disjuncture. I define globalization as 
increased transnational “complex connectivity,” the collapse of earlier separations of time 
and space, and destabilization of the nation-state through local, regional, and 
transnational forces.4  
Charles Acland asks: “what exactly is this globalization that we have agreed is 
occurring and whose certain existence guides so many of the practices of producers of 
filmed commodities?”5 Whether operating in increasingly open and interconnected 
European markets, investing in newly privatized Latin American media productions, or 
simultaneously releasing English-language films in thirty territories worldwide, today 
media companies and their products flow faster, more easily, and farther than ever before. 
In turn, industry professionals and academics are forced to reimagine notions of media 
texts, industry practices, institutions, and audiences within these shifting dynamics and 
                                                
2 Arjun Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy” Public Culture Vol. 2, 
No. 2 (Spring 1990): 6. 
3 ibid, 6-7. 
4 John Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999): 2; David 
Harvey, The Condition Of Postmodernity: An Enquiry Into The Origins Of Cultural Change (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1989): 284; Roland Robertson, “Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the Central 
Concept,” Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity. Mike Featherstone, ed. (London; 
Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990): 25. 
5 Charles Acland, Screen Traffic: Movies, Multiplexes and Global Culture (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2005), 32. 
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processes. In this project, I will interrogate themes of interconnectivity, flexible borders 
and identity, mobility, and cultural geography in relation to political economic forces and 
how they shape Sony’s culture of production/production of culture during this period.  
My project examines one production division within one transnational media 
company—Sony Pictures Entertainment’s international film division and the local 
language production (LLP) strategy. Beginning in the 1990s, a handful of SPE executives 
developed a strategy for expanding production and distribution of local content across 
key territories in Europe, Latin America, and Asia. I trace the origination of the LLP 
strategy and analyze how it operates within local industries through the case studies of 
Brazil and Spain. In each industrial location based in either Madrid or São Paulo, the 
Sony operation has to balance the global corporate strategy and logic with local 
conditions, policies, practices, and specific partnerships. What results is a close 
institutional analysis exploring issues such as what defines “local” media industries, the 
flexibility of national cinema, and the position of transnational media companies. 
Part of my project’s work is to define and deconstruct the theoretical categories of 
local, national, regional, transnational, and global in relation to academic, industrial, 
institutional, and location-specific usage and the case of local language films. I want to 
avoid earlier binary categories related to globalization of the local vs. the global or a 
fixed notion of the nation as static and contained. Instead, I utilize these terms in a 
focused and particular way. Specifically, I interrogate Sony’s discursive use of the terms 
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global and local to describe the “internationalization” of their production and distribution 
strategies within a context of convergence and vertical and horizontal integration among 
Sony Pictures Entertainment divisions. I also explore how Sony’s local language division 
and their Brazilian and Spanish partners imagine and apply categories such as Hollywood 
against notions of national or local media. A comparison of these definitions and 
categories based on industrial and geographical histories reveals contradictory language 
that varies from industry to industry. Yet, I do not intend to apply an overall general 
theory to explain local language films and operations since cultural specificities and 
industrial conditions of both LLP divisions vary. Instead, I consider how this institutional 
production strategy operates differently in each location. I categorize the Brazilian case 
operating as translocally, or what results when a transnational media company operates 
within particular local media industries producing media that is shaped by both processes 
and spaces/places. Therefore, my project explores the interactive nature and intersection 
of a transnational, national, and local partners and cultures of production/production of 
culture. The Spanish case begins and ends due to conflicting cultures of production 
internally within Sony’s global and Spanish operations as well as national and regional 
pressures and conflicting film practices.6 
                                                
6 I borrow the definition of translocal from Patrick D. Murphy and Marwan M. Kraidy’s media audience 
ethnography work and Andreas Hepp’s work on media cultures. In explaining their use of the term 
“translocal,” Murphy and Kraidy emphasize the importance of adding ‘trans’: “lies more in its capacity to 
comprehend the articulation of the global with the local, than its supposed ability to understand the local in 
isolation of large-scale structures and processes” Patrick D. Murphy and Marwan M. Kraidy, Global Media 
Studies: Ethnographic Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 203): 304; Andreas Hepp, “Transculturality as 
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GLOBAL(IZATION) HOLLYWOOD  
In relation to companies like Sony Pictures Entertainment, Thomas Schatz 
suggests the major macro-industrial forces of globalization, conglomeration, and 
digitization mark a new period of “Conglomerate Hollywood.” The formation of six 
major media companies began in  through the acquisitions of Columbia by Sony, Fox by 
News Corp, Universal by GE, and so on. Traditionally American-based film studios 
became film divisions within larger global media conglomerates that incorporate the 
entire entertainment business and transcend geographical borders. Both he and Tino Balio 
identify major transformations of this era including 1) the strategic integration of film and 
television operations and 2) the dominance and dependence on the global marketplace.7  
The integration of film and television is best understood in relation to theories of 
media convergence. On the one hand, Henry Jenkins characterizes the Conglomerate Era 
as driven by new media technologies offering more accessibility, affordability, 
availability, and interconnectivity than ever before among television, film, home 
entertainment, gaming, and new media. On the other hand, the concentration in 
ownership of media companies worldwide has led to the formation of a handful of 
multinational operations dominating cross-media production, distribution, and 
                                                                                                                                            
a Perspective: Researching Media Cultures Comparatively,” Forum: Qualitative Social Research 10:1 
(January 2009): 3. 
7 Thomas Schatz, “The Studio System and Conglomerate Hollywood” The Contemporary Hollywood Film 
Industry Paul McDonald and Janet Wasko eds. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2008): 25-27; Tino Balio, 
United Artists: The Company That Changed The Film Industry (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1987): 58; Tino Balio “‘A Major Presence In All The World’s Important Markets’: The Globalization of 
Hollywood in the 1990s,” Contemporary Hollywood Cinema Steve Neale and Murray Smith, eds. (London: 
Routledge, 1998): 58-77. 
 8 
exhibition.8 Yet, this concentration and convergence does not function in a neat and tidy 
linear fashion. Jenkins argues convergence of technology, divisions, and content within 
media conglomerates operates less as an integrated strategy and more as disjunctive and 
contradictory practices across entertainment divisions. He contends:  
Sometimes media executives are thinking across media; sometimes they can’t 
extract themselves from medium-specific paradigms. Collaborations, even within 
the same companies, are harder to achieve than we might imagine looking at top-
down charts mapping media ownership. The closer to the ground you get, the 
more media companies look like dysfunctional families.9  
 
Similar to the difficulty in mapping the messy processes of globalization, there is no neat 
implementation of media convergence within one company or industry-wide. One of the 
goals of my project is to interrogate both the dysfunctional collaborations across Sony’s 
local language divisions as well as the successful relationships with local independent 
partners. The description of a “dysfunctional family” comes up again throughout my 
research as the implementation of a local production strategy on a global scale results in 
both box office success as well as in-fighting and conflicting visions for local language 
films. This discourse of “failure” arises during the transitional years after Sony’s 
acquisition of Columbia and the widely reported synergy film flops discussed in Chapter 
Three as well as the entire Madrid-based operation in Chapter Five.  
In addition to cross-media strategies, media companies are pushing towards more 
cross-cultural models in order to reach media markets worldwide. Although the 
                                                
8 Henry Jenkins, “The Cultural Logic of Media Convergence,” The International Journal of Cultural 
Studies. 7:1 (March 2004): 33. 
9 Jenkins, 38. 
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importance of the global marketplace coalesced around WWI for both American and 
European film companies, the reliance on worldwide revenue has increased significantly 
in recent decades for media conglomerate entertainment divisions like Sony Pictures 
Entertainment. This situation is referred to as Global Hollywood or “Hollywood Biz 
Without Borders.”10 Traditionally, the media content of these companies has been 
launched in the North American market and drove all subsequent markets from theatrical 
sales to home entertainment. While Hollywood film companies earned more than half of 
their revenue from non-U.S. markets since the 1960s, it has only been the last two 
decades that “international” box office receipts out earn the North American box office 
two to one.11 Furthermore, future growth in non-U.S. markets far outweighs the 
“domestic” market. The Latin American market grew by 25 percent in 2010 whereas the 
domestic, North American box has remained stagnant over the previous four years.  
While “international” or non-U.S. markets are clearly the most profitable for these 
media companies, this data raises a number of questions. First, what do scholars and 
industry professionals mean by the term “international”? Mike Goodridge argues the 
‘foreign’ designation is “a vaguely derogatory term, of course, relegating the 50 or so 
significant territories outside the U.S. with all their different tastes, audience 
                                                
10 Ali Jaafar, “Hollywood Biz Without Borders,” Variety (17 April 2009) accessed online (24 February 
2010) http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118002564?refCatId=2520 
11 According to a MPAA 2010 Market Statistics Report, the “international” box office earned $21.2 billion 
(67 percent) while the North American earned $10.6 billion (23 percent). MPAA, Theatrical Market 
Statistics 2010. http://www.mpaa.org/Resources/653b11ee-ee84-4b56-8ef1-3c17de30df1e.pdf accessed 
online (1 March 2011). 
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demographics, and exhibition landscapes into one lumpen market.”12 This vague 
reference diminishes the scope, span, and intricacies of European, Asian, Latin American, 
and African media markets under a problematic “Othering” dichotomy reminiscent of the 
West versus the rest. While the U.S. is still considered a primary market and production 
center for Sony’s content, the move to capture the larger global audience is forcing Sony 
and other major media corporation to rethink their production and distribution strategies. 
If Sony Pictures Entertainment is truly a transnational media division within a media 
conglomerate with operations expanding a diverse global marketplace, then why does it 
continue to reference the U.S. as the “domestic” market for its film and television 
divisions? Should media scholars ignore the local intricacies and cultural specificities that 
make up the “international” box office by framing our research from a U.S. location 
point-of-view? Only by criticizing these notions of domestic versus international and 
narrowing the perspective on these markets by region or nation can we understand the 
complexities and nuances surrounding how contemporary media is conceived, produced, 
and received.   
Second, historically film studies have focused specifically on English-language 
production practices and film operations of Hollywood studios. Schatz outlines a film-
class tier system of the globalization era including: 1) big budget tentpole blockbusters 
produced by conglomerate film studio divisions and aimed at global audiences, 2) mid-
                                                
12 Mike Goodridge, “Putting the Foreign First,” Screen Daily (18 June 2009) accessed online (15 January 
2011). 
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range budgeted genre pictures produced by film sub-divisions for a more specialized 
audience, and 3) small budget “truly” independently directed and produced films. He 
nods to the Hollywood conglomerates’ relationship to the global marketplace but does 
not fully develop it since this is not the focus of his research. Yet, how do we understand 
the international operations of conglomerates’ film and television divisions in relation to 
this contemporary schema? While the performance of English-language products globally 
is an important characteristic of this period, in reality, film and television operations of 
companies such as Sony, Warner Bros., Universal, Fox, Disney, and Paramount 
increasingly are far more diverse and multi-layered than the big blockbuster and quirky 
indie fare that dominates film industry studies and industry trade journals. Namely, in this 
era of increased media exchange, flexible national borders, and interconnectivity, major 
media companies are turning towards more localized models within Latin America, 
Europe, and Asia. These local language operations cannot and should not be explained by 
earlier scholarship that focused on the international flow of English-language 
blockbusters. Therefore, the focus of my project is to examine how localized film 
operations of companies like Sony function outside of U.S. audiences and English-
language content and intersect with contemporary commercial media in local industries. I 
am interested in notions of “local” media less through the academic perspective and more 
by Sony Pictures Entertainment and its Brazilian and Spanish partners definition of the 
local in relation LLPs. In light of larger forces of globalization, how do these local 
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production and distribution operations develop and operate? In turn, a major contribution 
of my project is to analyze the vague notion of the “foreign” market by examining Sony’s 
international divisions, partnerships, and production from a local industrial context 
outside of the United States. 
 
WHAT/WHERE IS SONY? 
Before moving into a focused summary of my project, I will define a few broad terms. As 
viewed through the lens of globalization, they justify further clarification. Primarily, 
throughout my project, I refer to various divisions of the Sony Corporation. However, it 
is necessary to understand the diverse and multi-layered nature of this media 
conglomerate beyond a vague or universal Sony brand. What does Sony entail? On a 
broad level, the Sony Corporation is a media hardware and software company. In a 
March 2005 Newsweek article, “Sony Is Not Japan,” Sony Corporation’s CEO Howard 
Stringer asserted: “A hardware device is not worth anything without content.”13 
Beginning as a Japanese hardware company developing audiovisual products such as 
Betamax, Walkman, televisions, and Playstation, Sony has transitioned into a “total 
entertainment” model since its acquisition of Columbia Pictures Entertainment (now 
                                                
13 Hideo Takayama, Michael Hastings, Christian Caryl, George Wehrfritz, John Sparks, and Kay Itoi, 
“Sony Is Not Japan,” Newsweek (21 March 2005) accessed online (1 June 2011).  
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Sony Pictures Entertainment) and CBS records (now Columbia Records).14 Sony’s 
position as a media company crosses and extends to all aspects of the entertainment 
industries reflecting Jenkins’s description of media convergence. As of 2011, the Sony 
Corporation consists of a wide variety of subsidiaries from mobile technology, home 
video, and computer hardware to music and screen entertainment as illustrated by the 
Sony Group Organization chart below.15  
 
Fig. 1.1: Sony Corporation Structure 
The Sony Corporation is the only media conglomerate whose filmed 
entertainment operation (Sony Pictures Entertainment) is complemented by both a 
consumer electronics (Consumer Products and Services) and a computer entertainment 
                                                
14 The widely reported story of Sony’s quest for media synergy is discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Three. 
15 Sony Group Organizational Chart Summary, Sony Corporation website. (1 April 2011) accessed online 
(4 April 2011). http://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/CorporateInfo/Data/organization.html 
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group (Sony Computer Entertainment). According to Paul du Gay, et al., Sony’s 
expansion into producing both media technology platforms and content:  
highlights how text and technology, hardware and software, production and use 
are dependent on each other and are interrelated. Sony is not simply a hardware 
company but part of a culture industry. It is producing both technological 
products and cultural forms; cultural products are produced via an industrial 
process and it is also an industrial company with a distinct culture.16  
 
Sony Corporation’s wide participation in producing a vast array of media products across 
multiple industries results in a corporate structure and culture encompassing everyone 
from electrical engineers to film executives. Depending on which part of the company 
analyzed, what sector of the media or entertainment industry, and whether a group is 
located in Los Angeles or Tokyo, Sony signifies many different meanings for a single 
media conglomerate. After the acquisition of Columbia TriStar Entertainment and 
restructuring into Sony Pictures Entertainment, the filmed entertainment group continued 
to struggle financial at a loss for the Sony Corporation during the early 1990s. Yet, over 
the time period of my study between 1989 and 2010, the positions of the hardware and 
software groups switched. By the late 2000s, the consumer electronics group lagged 
behind the rest of the industry such as Apple and Panasonic, while the SPE turned profits 
and was positioned as a leader in the film and television industry.17 
                                                
16 Paul du Gay, Stuart Hall, Linda James, Hugh Mackay, and Keith Negus, Doing Cultural Studies: The 
Story of the Sony Walkman (London: Sage, 1997): 82. 
17 “Sony Profits Rise With Help From Film, TV,” Deadline Hollywood Daily (29 October 2010) accessed 
online (15 November 2010). 
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I consider a particular area of the Sony Corporation, its processes, and production 
of culture/cultures of production.18 Specifically, my project will focus on the subsidiary 
Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE), which produces and distributes all of Sony’s film, 
television, and home entertainment products.19 SPE is organized around the following 
groups and divisions: 
• Columbia TriStar Motion Picture Group (includes Columbia Pictures, Sony 
Pictures Classics, Screen Gems, and TriStar Pictures, Sony Pictures Releasing, 
Sony Pictures Releasing International, and International Motion Picture 
Production Group) 
• Sony Pictures Home Entertainment (includes their film and television catalog, 
DVD and Blu-ray distribution) 
• Sony Pictures Television Group (includes all domestic and international 
production and distribution, such as the various Sony Entertainment Television 
and AXN networks) 
• Sony Pictures Digital Productions (includes Sony Pictures Animation and Sony 
Pictures Imageworks) 
• Sony Pictures Studios 
                                                
18 du Gay argues production of culture cannot be limited solely to economic factors: “processes of 
production are themselves cultural phenomena in that they are assemblages of meaningful practices that 
construct certain ways for people to conceive of and conduct themselves in an organizational context.” Paul 
du Gay, “Introduction,” Production of Culture/Cultures of Production ed. Paul du Gay (London: Sage, 
1997): 7. 
19 See the Appendix for a logo organizational map of Sony Pictures Entertainment and its key divisions. 
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• Sony Pictures Technologies20 
While all of these divisions participate in international operations from various angles of 
production, distribution, and exhibition, the majority of their operations focus on the 
production and distribution of English-language content released worldwide. By 
narrowing my research topic to local language productions, I deal with a focused area of 
the Columbia TriStar Motion Picture Group—the International Motion Picture 
Production Group (IMPPG) and its various local divisions, Sony Pictures Releasing 
International and its local distribution offices, and key SPE executives that oversee these 
operations. It is important to note that SPE’s IMPPG has only existed as a consolidated 
group since 2007. Prior to 2007, the SPE CEO and a handful of other executives oversaw 
all LLP divisions through committees and a loosely structured division. A handful of 
executives from Columbia TriStar Motion Pictures Group, Television, and Home 
Entertainment oversaw all local language territory offices and operations.21  
 The wide scope of SPE’s various groups and their interconnected relationships 
raise my second terminological issue: what defines film today? The structure of Sony 
Pictures Entertainment various divisions and the technologies developed and employed 
by the Sony Corporation as a whole force us to rethink what we mean by a “Sony film.” 
                                                
20 Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. Corporate Fact Sheet, Sony Pictures website, accessed online (4 April 
2011). http://www.sonypictures.com/corp/corporatefact.html#operations 
21 Throughout this project, I may refer generally to the “SPE executives” involved in greenlighting a 
specific LLP or influencing a LLP strategy in a specific location. I use this general term to describe the 
cross-section of executives from the various groups such as Columbia TriStar, Home Entertainment, and 
Television involved in the decision-making process that creates and implements local language 
productions. 
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In this era of globalization, deregulation, digitalization, and convergence, film can no 
longer be defined merely as a celluloid technology projected onto a dark theater screen. 
Film transcends traditional medium-specific categories of technology, practices, 
institutions, and audiences to include motion pictures and telefilm series. For example, 
one of Sony’s recent film releases Eat, Pray, Love (dir. Ryan Murphy, 2010) can be 
watched theatrically, streamed through Netflix, played as a DVD, shown on premium or 
cable television, and played on an iPad or laptop in various locations worldwide. Any of 
these SPE groups and divisions may participate in the development and release of this 
film from Sony Pictures Releasing as the domestic distributor or Home Entertainment 
producing and releasing the DVD. Following this cross-media logic, I utilize a broader 
understanding of film as feature length motion pictures, particularly considering the 
blurring relationship between television and home video groups (both SPE divisions and 
local film and television partners) in the life of any given film project. These cross-media 
relations are important not only for the internal story of Sony’s LLPs but also how 
transforming practices within the industries alter this strategy differently in Brazil and 
Spain.  
From the corporate headquarters in Tokyo with locations across Japan and New 
York City to its Sony Pictures Entertainment headquarters in Culver City, California, 
Sony resembles a major media conglomerate with diverse holdings globally. Another 
question that arises: Where is Sony? As Sony Pictures Entertainment’s diverse operations 
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push the traditional boundaries of film, it also transgresses traditional understandings of 
national borders and media industries. Whether from its brick and mortar offices to the 
flow of its media content, employees, and resources, SPE and its various media divisions 
stretch far beyond the media capital and subsidiary headquarters in Los Angeles. As Janet 
Staiger notes, “any attempt to figure out what 'nation' any major film conglomerate 
belongs is really attempting the impossible—and the unnecessary.”22 As I will argue, this 
is particularly important in a contemporary industry characterized by deterritorialization 
and the increased flexible flow of finance, institutions, talents, technology, and the films 
themselves. SPE media products are developed, produced, distributed, and exhibited in 
scores of countries around the world. From the theatrical release of Eat, Pray, Love in 
over fifty international territories and the film’s international shooting locations to 
territory offices in Latin America, Europe, and Asia, SPE produces content beyond 
cultural linguistic or nation-specific boundaries intended for a global and local audience.  
As my project argues, the company’s “location” shifts depending on the motion 
picture, the production strategy, and Sony’s imagined audience. Since Sony operates 
globally through so many international offices and is consumed by diverse audiences, the 
company is no more solely a Japanese company than an American studio. Trying to 
contain media flows and processes within fixed borders or national space is futile and not 
the aim of this project. Instead, I focus on location case studies where Sony’s 
                                                
22 Janet Staiger, “A Neo-Marxist Approach: World Film Trade and Global Cultural Flows,” Alan Williams 
ed. Film and Nationalism (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 2002): 234. 
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international production offices and LLP strategy operate. This scope allows for 
exploring how transnational practices are imagined within a particular industrial location 
and with local players. I am interested in tracing the paths, practices, positions, and 
partnerships of SPE’s local language film division in key territories in Latin America and 
Europe since the 1990s. How do these film operations challenge our academic theoretical 
debates about space/place and cultural flows across the local, national, regional, and 
transnational? How do these local language film partnerships change our understanding 
of what is Sony, what is film, and where is Sony?  
 
THE ORIGINS AND TRAJECTORY OF MY PROJECT 
 The idea for this project originated from my earlier research on the contemporary 
Brazilian film industry. Since the1990 dismantling of the state-supported film enterprise, 
Embrafilme, Brazilian cinema evolved toward a market-driven, tax incentive supported 
system marked by a commercial rebirth and production boom with the 1994-1998 
retomada (revival, rebirth). One of the key transformations of this post-1998 period is 
increased partnerships of Brazilian independent producers and filmmakers with the local 
offices of transnational film companies such as Sony, Warner Bros., Universal, 
Paramount, and so on. Local media operations like Sony do Brasil now co-produce and 
distribute the majority of local language films within Brazil, including a large percentage 
of the top twenty grossing Brazilian films of all time. Most notably, Sony do Brasil was 
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the first transnational film company in Brazil to pursue a local production strategy based 
on generous tax incentives (as discussed in Chapter Four) beginning around 1994. This 
co-production trend seemed different from the way “international” operations had been 
discussed in earlier academic literature. My early research questions included: How do 
co-productions such as Chico Xavier (2010, dir. Daniel Filho), 5xs Favela: Agora Por 
Nós Memos (2010, dir. Carlos Diegues), and Lope (2010, dir. Andrucha Waddington) 
between Sony do Brasil and independent production companies operate? How does 
creative decision-making and agency of Brazilian producers factor into this relationship? 
How does each partner understand or classify this film collaboration—in relation to 
notions of Hollywood or Brazilian cinema? What is the relationship between Sony do 
Brasil and its parent company, Sony Pictures Entertainment and the other entertainment 
divisions in producing and distributing these films?  
 Upon further investigation, I discovered Brazil was not the only location for these 
co-productions. Beginning in the late-1990s, Sony Pictures Entertainment began a loosely 
structured international film division in order to oversee “local language productions” in 
multiple territories worldwide such as Hong Kong, Germany, Mexico, and Russia. In 
turn, the Brazilian production strategy went from being a one-off national example to the 
foundational case of a full-fledged global strategy for “local language productions” 
operating across Latin America, Europe, and Asia. This discovery took my project from a 
contained national industry context applicable only to Brazil to a broader institutional 
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strategy developed by Sony with wider global implications and diverse, local 
specificities. I knew immediately that I could not examine all of the Sony’s LLP 
operations due to the scope of a dissertation project, my timeline, the resources available 
to conduct transnational research, and particularly my own limited grasp of each distinct 
cultural industry. I choose two of Sony’s LLP divisions—Brazil and Spain.23 Unlike the 
“successful” Brazilian case (early 1990s- ), one of the most distinctive LLP situations 
was that the Spanish operation is widely considered to be a failure and lasted only six 
years (2001-2007). What intrigued me most in pursuing two locations or cases was in 
understanding how these differing local Sony operations adapted or changed the overall 
picture of the local language strategy depending on the national/regional industry and 
conditions.  
In examining these local productions in Brazil and Spain, my initial inclination 
was to theorize this strategy within academic understandings of geo-cultural and 
linguistic media markets. Joseph Straubhaar and John Sinclair emphasize the importance 
of cultural linguistic markets such as the Lusophone, Anglophone, or Francophone 
regions to rethink traditional geographically-bound ideas of media production flows and 
consumption in this increasingly globalized era.24 For example, Ibero-America (Iberian 
                                                
23 My decision to focus on Brazil and Spain was also based on more practical factors such as my previous 
on-the-ground experience in both locations, my knowledge of Portuguese and Spanish, my access to 
industry professionals, and general knowledge of both media industries. 
24 John Sinclair, “Geolinguistic Region As A Global Space: The Case of Latin America” New 
Communications Landscapes eds. Georgette Wang, Anura Goonasekera, and Jan Servae (London: 
Routledge, 2000); Joseph Straubhaar, World Television: From Global to Local (Los Angeles: Sage, 2007). 
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peninsula and Latin America) functions as an important geographical region for the flow 
of Spanish-language and Portuguese-language media. I assumed local actually signified a 
linguistic region. Therefore, my first assumption for Sony’s corporate logic was that local 
language productions were a way to create content that could travel across this geo-
cultural region and open up other Portuguese or Spanish-language markets.  
However, my efforts to map academic theories about contemporary transnational 
media production and consumption onto Sony’s local language strategy did not fit the 
realities of the research, practices, and market.25 What I found in my field research in 
Brazil and Spain could not be explained by broad cultural linguistic regions but needed to 
be understood within the complex contexts of the local Brazilian or Spanish film 
industries, cultural policies, economic conditions, national histories and changing 
identities, and technologies. By approaching my research from the lens of two industrial 
location studies, I found two different and contradictory approaches to how Sony 
imagines the global marketplace through its LLP strategy. At this point, I refocused my 
research questions: What is Sony’s local language production strategy? How is this 
strategy imagined and adapted? How does it operate differently depending on the 
location? What is the international division’s (both from SPE headquarters and the local 
territories) relationship with their local production and distribution partners? What level 
of participation or agency do these partners hold? What negotiations or tensions arise in 
                                                
25 For a more in-depth discussion of relevant theoretical models and academic literature, see Chapter Two. 
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imagining “local” films (such as competing ideas of commercial film, national or 
regional media, audiences, and production practices)? In the case of Brazil, the 
partnerships between Sony do Brasil and local production and distribution companies 
operate through translocal negotiation combining Sony’s corporate culture and strategies 
with Brazilian cultures of production, industry practices, and market conditions. Sony’s 
strategy for adapting LLPs within European regional and Spanish national pressures, 
policies, and practices was created in a different industrial context and less successful 
result for Columbia Español. These focused findings are based on local language 
operations from a more nuanced, on-the-ground cultural industrial methodology 
grounded in cultural studies and media industry studies.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
In an extensive study on the Sony Walkman, Paul du Gay identifies five major 
cultural processes necessary in understanding company culture and practices: 
• representation – how the media product is represented in language or discourses, 
• identity – how various groups and types of people involved are imagined in relation to 
this product, 
• production – how the media object is produced technically and culturally (made 
meaningful), 
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• consumption – how the media product is received, interpreted, and made meaningful 
by audiences, 
• regulation – how institutions regulate production and consumption of the media 
product.26 
These interrelated processes interact as a “circuit of culture” and should be understood 
through Stuart Hall’s theories of articulation or as “a linkage whose conditions of 
existence or emergence need to be located in contingencies of circumstance.”27 While du 
Gay, et al.’s study focuses on the hardware division of the Sony Corporation and the 
Walkman media product, their study is helpful in understanding the complex, 
overlapping processes at play with a distinctly cultural studies approach towards media 
institutions. By exploring the interrelated nature of the “circuit of culture,” du Gay’s 
model avoids the reductionist limitations of a strictly political economic method that 
focuses solely on a top-down perspective of larger institutional and industrial forces and 
the all-powerful driving hand of capital and ownership and controls as the site for 
decision-making. Instead, the Walkman study examines the media product through these 
equally important five processes and articulations of culture, power, and industry 
practices. 
du Gay’s “circuit of culture” method best integrates these overlapping and 
dynamic processes of contemporary media industries, institutions, and partnerships. In 
                                                
26 du Gay, et al. 3-5. 
27 ibid, 3. 
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order to examine Sony’s local language film strategy thoroughly, I apply elements of 
“circuit of culture” method. On the one hand, I consider how larger political, economic, 
cultural, regulatory, technological, and ideological processes shape SPE’s local language 
production strategy within each local, industrial, and cultural context. Key economic 
policies and incentives, legislation, cultural policies, industry trade organizations, 
technological advances, ideas around cultural identity, “local” audiences, and national 
cinema all factor into the complex nature of the Brazilian and Spanish film industries and 
how SPE’s local offices operate within them. On the other hand, I also explore the close-
up human relationships and the internal language that shape these financial and creative 
partnerships between independent producers, local Sony creative teams, and SPE 
executives.  
From a methodological level, how do academics begin to analyze the “circuit” or 
processes that shape and produce these local film co-productions? In turn, I ground my 
research in the area of media industry studies. Timothy Havens, Amanda D. Lotz, and 
Serra Tinic position a critical media industry studies approach through “a ‘helicopter’ 
level view of industry operations, a focus on agency with industry operations, a 
Gramscian theory of power that does not lead to complete domination, and a view of 
society and culture grounded in structuration and articulation.”28 This approach 
compliments du Gay’s methods as both examine media institutions and products as sites 
                                                
28 Timothy Havens, Amanda D. Lotz, and Serra Tinic, “Critical Media Industry Studies: A Research 
Approach,” Communication, Culture & Critique 2 (2009): 246. 
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of negotiation and issues of power relations. What distinguishes this approach from 
earlier industry studies research is a focus on mid-level processes and on-the-ground case 
studies. First, Havens, Lotz, and Tinic emphasize mid-level research as a way to 
understand the business culture and how particular media texts and practices arise from 
and reshape industrial practices. Mid-level research focuses on the media professionals 
such as producers and management making the day-to-day production decisions and 
negotiating relationships with their corporate executives and creative partners. This mid-
level focus illustrates Tinic’s work on runaway productions and the Canadian media 
industries in where she interviewed cultural workers including Canadian producers. She 
suggests:  
the way in which institutional discourses are internalized and acted upon by 
cultural workers is an important missing link between political economy’s 
concentration on larger economic structural forces and much of cultural studies’ 
analyses of end products such as media texts and audience interpretations.29  
 
Institutional discourses and cultural workers’ levels of negotiation and participation are 
vital to analyzing the production process within Sony Pictures Entertainment and are a 
central part of my methodology. 
Second, they argue for “the imperative of case study methods that shed light on 
the ways in which members of the media industries define the conventions of production 
and distribution based on their assumptions of the prevailing cultural values and issues of 
                                                
29 ibid, 247. 
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the time.”30 This perspective greatly impacted the scope and shape of my project. By 
focusing on mid-level Sony local management and creative executives working on the 
ground in a particular local market or case study such as Spain or Brazil, I am able to 
offer a more nuanced analysis of one layer of international film operations that has been 
lacking from previous industry studies. Through a helicopter view of a company working 
in a specific industry, I aim to interrogate the cultural values, power relations, and level 
of agency involved in a local Sony operation partnering with independent production or 
distribution partners.  
While I borrow my industry perspective and where I position myself in the field 
from Havens, Lotz, and Tinic, John Caldwell, Patrick D. Murphy, and Marwan M. 
Kraidy inform my research model in practice. In Caldwell’s study, Production Culture: 
Industrial Reflexivity and Critical Practice in Film and Television, he utilizes an 
“integrated cultural-industrial method” that includes interviews with film and television 
workers and “ethnographic field observations.”31 He suggests this on-the-ground 
approach offers a valuable glimpse into industry workings and logic, but warns this 
‘cultural as an interpretive system’ approach should always be “seen as embedded in the 
play of power and politics.”32 It is specifically this play of power and industry politics 
internally and between Sony’s local offices and their partners that I am interested in 
                                                
30 ibid, 249-250. 
31 John Thornton Caldwell, Production Culture: Industrial Reflexivity and Critical Practice in Film and 
Television (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008): 4; Caldwell examines below-the-line workers, whereas 
I am interested in middle management and creative professionals in each media industry. 
32 ibid, 2. 
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interrogating. Furthermore, Murphy and Kraidy argue for the place of ethnography work 
in global media studies that “is locally based but globally engaged.”33 While I do not 
directly employee the ethnographic practices of Kraidy, Murphy, and Caldwell, their 
methods inform my project. International fieldwork and extensive interviews with media 
industry professionals form the bulk of my industrial analysis. Murphy and Kraidy 
contend the site or place of research has become more fluid, “as the mise en scène of ‘the 
field’ is increasingly loaded with local adaptations of global cultural capital mediated via 
new ‘space’ practices, and imagined communities of media reception.”34 Therefore, the 
value of this type of multi-faceted research is to investigate these new spaces and fluid 
nature of local media industries. By exploring a particular Sony division and strategy 
grounded in specific locations through on-the-ground fieldwork and case studies, my 
project adapts the “circuit of culture” to explore how media globalization operates 
simultaneously across trans/national and local spaces.  
Influenced by the research methods of du Gay, Havens, Lotz, Tinic, Caldwell, 
Murphy and Kraidy, I structure my methodology around three key areas:  
1) archival – box office data, state/cultural policies and financial data, institutional 
records, trade journals, popular press. 
                                                
33 Patrick D. Murphy and Marwan M. Kraidy, Global Media Studies: Ethnographic Perspectives (New 
York: Routledge, 203): 303. 
34 ibid, 5. 
 29 
2) interviews – in-person conversations with producers, distributors, policymakers, trade 
organizations, and Sony executives. 35 
3) general field research – touring production facilities, screenings, observing theatrical 
spaces and local audiences.36 
Utilizing this multi-faceted approach, I conducted fieldwork through a two-month 
research trip to Brazil (Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo) and a five-week research trip to 
Spain (Madrid) and Belgium (Brussels) between 2010 and 2011. What developed is a 
study grounded equally in box office data, co-production financing specifics, and cultural 
policy as well as first-hand accounts, industry discourse, and an oral history of LLP 
operations in both locations. In terms of interviews and ethnography work, the process of 
buildings connections and corresponding with Brazilian and Spanish professionals was 
just as enlightening as what I learned from the interviews themselves. Much of my on-
the-ground work involved understanding the intricacies of the business culture within 
each local cultural context, who was involved with what, and how they participated in 
what LLP.  
My interview and fieldwork serves more as a way to understand the language, 
production of culture/cultures of production, and how Sony and partners imagine their 
                                                
35 A complete list of industry interviews appears in the Bibliography. 
36 Although I do not explicitly discuss my general field observations of Brazilian and Spanish film and 
theatrical facilities within the written dissertation, this research was invaluable in understanding the 
resources and position of the local production companies as well as the cultural practices of the 
professionals and national audiences. This helped to shape my understanding of distribution and exhibition 
practices within major cities in Brazil and Spain. 
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relationship within the local industry during a particular period of time. These accounts 
provide an extra layer of analysis missing from policy, financial, or textual analysis. In 
response to Caldwell’s warning about a reflexive and embedded point-of-view in 
speaking with industry professionals, I approached my interview and ethnographic work 
as oral history and discursive patterns to understand Sony’s LLPs practices.37 As an 
American scholar researching Latin American and European film practices and culture, 
my subject position and academic status undoubtedly distanced me during my interviews. 
This idea of cultural-industrial distance existed at the forefront while conducting and 
analyzing the data. 
Grounded in larger forces of globalization and corporate culture as well as the 
creative and financial decisions and human relationships playing out in each local 
industry, my project proposes the necessity of focused fieldwork and interactions with 
industry professionals to understand the cross-cultural or translocal perspective of these 
relationships and practices. By integrating qualitative interviews with international 
fieldwork as well as traditional archival research and textual analysis, my mid-level 
methodology examines the overlapping processes of the “circuit of culture” that produce 
and shape Sony’s local language films.  
                                                
37 In March 2010, I applied for and received exempt status under the Institutional Review Board because 
my in-person interviews are classified as oral histories and discursive analysis.  
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CHAPTER OUTLINE 
I structure my institutional and industrial analysis around location-specific case 
studies organized as one literature review chapter and three content chapters. My main 
research questions ask: what is SPE’s local language production strategy? how does it 
operate differently in each local industry with various partners? Chapter Two outlines 
earlier academic literature and relevant theoretical models such as media imperialism, 
Global Hollywood, international media flows, and notions of national cinema. The goal 
of this chapter is to outline how previous scholars have addressed the position of large 
media companies like Sony Pictures Entertainment in local industries outside of the 
United States. How would previous and current theoretical models explain Sony’s local 
language production strategy and partnerships? What are the contributions and limitations 
of each school of debate or approach? 
 Chapter Three provides the historical background on Sony Pictures Entertainment 
and how, through various film and television divisions, it expanded and redefined its 
international operations throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Research questions for this 
chapter include: 
• What does it mean for SPE to be “global”? How does the Sony Corporation through 
its SPE subsidiary reimagine itself as a global media company operating across “all 
markets” and media industries? What language or discourses of globalization does 
Sony invoke? 
• How is the Sony Corporation acquisition of Columbia Entertainment symptomatic of 
 32 
discourses and tensions around globalization and national protectionism? 
• Specifically, what international production or distributions strategies are developed 
post-acquisition? 
• What is SPE's LLP strategy?  How and why did Sony develop this strategy?  How is 
the company's position as a co-producer imagined on broad level? How does Sony 
position or describe its relationship with local partners? What are some of the 
criticisms of the LLP strategy? 
I explore how Sony fashions itself as a global media company and plans to operate in 
“all” markets and producing “total entertainment” worldwide as described by Paul du 
Gay.38 This chapter examines SPE’s global expansion in three broad areas. First, I 
recount the acquisition of Columbia Pictures Entertainment by Sony Corporation in 1989 
and the subsequent restructuring into SPE in the context of larger forces of 
conglomeration, convergence, and deregulation. The historical accounts of the Japanese 
company’s acquisition of an American film and television studio are widely known in 
international business and industry circles through discourses of corporate culture clash 
and failed synergy. For example, Sony’s entrance into Hollywood reveals the tensions 
and anxieties around fixed ideas of geography, nation, and cultural identity. Sony 
engages in the corporate language and industrial discourses of globalization during the 
post-acquisition period in the early 1990s.  
                                                
38 Paul Du Gay, Stuart Hall, Linda James, Hugh Mckay, and Keith Negus, Doing Cultural Studies: The 
Story of the Sony Walkman (London: Sage, 1997): 79. 
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Second, after Columbia’s restructuring into Sony Pictures Entertainment’s “all” 
markets and “total entertainment” strategy as part of the television group, it expands 
international operations in Latin America during the mid-1990s. SPE’s strategy in the 
region was to expand regional operations along an “adaptation curve” moving from joint 
ventures and importing English-language programs to establishing Sony Entertainment 
Television and co-producing local content. However, local television production in the 
region was seen as a failure due to conflicting production cultures. This led Sony’s Latin 
America television group to refocus on film production and transition towards local 
language productions.  
Third, I outline a general history of Sony’s development and implementation of 
their local language production strategy. Beginning around 1998, SPE’s international film 
division made a strategic shift towards local co-productions in smaller markets separate 
from English-language operations.39 Described by SPE executives as a “bottom-up 
approach” to filmmaking, the LLP strategy is a film produced within a local industry 
such as Brazil, Germany, or India using local talent and creative professionals but 
financially supported, guided, and sometimes developed by Sony’s local offices.40 I map 
the trajectory and key characteristics, individuals, territories, and criticisms of this 
corporate strategy. Overall, this chapter analyzes the strategies, corporate language, and 
                                                
39 Laura M. Holson, “Hollywood seeks action overseas,” New York Times (3 April 2006) accessed online 
(20 January 2010).  
40 Eric Pflanner, “Hollywood turning to non-English fare” International Herald Tribune (24 May 2004) 
accessed online (15 January 2010); Akemi Nakamura, “Hollywood’s Japan units pursue local 
blockbusters,” The Japan Times (12 December 2002) accessed online (28 January 2010). 
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globalization discourses representing SPE’s expanding international operations and cross-
media ventures over the past two decades. 
In the next two chapters, I look at the different case studies of Sony’s production 
and distribution of local language feature length motion pictures in which approaches and 
interactions vary depending on local conditions. Chapter Four examines the Sony LLP 
operation in Brazil and how it functions around a nationally-centered idea of industry and 
audience. I briefly trace the evolution of the Brazilian film industry since the 1920s and 
its relationship to other industries such as Hollywood. By the 1990s and 2000s larger 
forces of globalization, liberalization, deregulation, and conglomeration shaped key 
policies, financing mechanisms, and institutions leading to the rebirth, restructuring, and 
commercialization of the national cinema. The remainder of the chapter explores the 
history and operations of Sony do Brasil, the SPE local production and division office 
located in São Paulo, in relation to Brazilian industry culture and the language and 
discourses circulating among contemporary practices and institutions.  Today, Sony do 
Brasil operates in a strong film industry characterized by growing film projects, box 
office number, and audiences. My chapter specific research questions are: 
• What is Sony’s LLP strategy for investing in Brazilian co-productions?  Is Sony 
importing Hollywood production and distribution models or adapting to Brazilian 
models?  
• How do the partnerships between Sony and local actors operate? How does creative 
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agency function in relation to financing?  
• How do local producers imagine these projects within the context of industry 
practices and trends?  
• Who are Sony do Brasil’s and their partners imagined audiences? 
Through my fieldwork, I interviewed local producers, distributors, government 
policymakers, former head of the MPA Latin America as well as the General Manager 
and former employees of Sony do Brasil (or “os majors” as they are known in Brazil). I 
investigated the daily, on-the-ground realities and complexities involved in co-producing 
the LLPs Chico Xavier (2010, dir. Daniel Filho), 5xs Favela: Agora Por Nós Memos 
(2010, dir. Carlos Diegues), and Lope (2010, dir. Andrucha Waddington). These filmic 
examples demonstrate the processes and thinking related to raising funds, marketing 
practices, and attracting national audiences. Within the local industry, a production 
mentality emerges around the idea of “Brazil as different” or “Brazil as complicated” in 
relation to the distinct nature of negotiations and creative agency present in trans/national 
partnerships with Sony do Brasil. Yet, the internationalization of distribution and 
exhibition systems reveals the continued controversial position of key financial policies 
that privileges Sony do Brasil and other MPA members. I argue the Sony do Brasil LLP 
strategy functions translocally balancing between its position as a local partner and its 
role within a transnational media company. This case study not only demonstrates the 
disjunctive and contradictory nature of the media companies operating across multiple 
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nations but also the interwoven, complex nature of the contemporary trans/national 
filmmaking processes and the arguably historically globalized nature of the Brazilian film 
industry. 
 Chapter Five finds Sony’s strategy in a different situation with the short-lived 
Spanish LLP operation, Columbia Film Producciones Español, that lasted from 2001 to 
2007. Within the context of a globalizing and growing politically, economically, and 
culturally integrated European region, regional policies and practices shape the Spanish 
film industry as much as its national ones. This chapter explores Columbia Español’s 
position in the Spanish film industry during the 2000s vis-à-vis the key conditions of co-
production practices and financing, role of television broadcasters, online piracy, and 
declining theatrical distribution. Yet, Spanish cinema also reflects a historically 
tumultuous relationship with Hollywood film studios as outlined in my historical 
overview of state regulations and policies.  State film institutions and industry practices 
worked to strengthen a cohesively independent national cinema as early as the 1920s to 
today. Significantly, key regional policies passed by the European Union in the late-
1980s and 1990s shaped the local industry within a regional network of finance, cross-
media practices, and co-production partnerships. My chapter focuses on Columbia Film 
Producciones Español (CFPE) during the 2000s and serves as a distinct example of a 
transnational media company operating within this shifting national and regional media 
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market. Considering the distinct industrial conditions and practices of Spanish cinema, 
my research questions include: 
• How do we understand Columbia Film Producciones Español’s position as a local 
language co-producer and partner in the Spanish film industry? How did Columbia 
Español operate within the Spanish film industry?  
• How did the partnerships between Columbia Español and local actors operate? How 
did creative agency function in relation to financing?  
• How did the relationship between Columbia Español and the SPE international 
production headquarters in Los Angeles function? Did tensions or conflict occur 
between Spanish industry practices and Hollywood production and distribution 
models? 
• Why did the Spanish LLP strategy ultimately “fail” and why did Columbia Español 
close?  
In the end, I argue the nationally-bound LLP strategy proved incompatible with 
the Spanish industry that operates through an interconnected 
national/regional/transnational network of finances, policies, people, and practices. I 
conducted field research in Madrid, Spain, and Brussels, Belgium, interviewing the 
former President of Sony’s LLP division, Columbia Español, other former Columbia 
employees, partners, distributors, trade organizations such as the MPA Europe, 
policymakers, and regional funding entities such as MEDIA and Eurimages. The LLP 
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office, opened in 2001, began as a model of full financing and resulted in the first film, 
Di Que Sí (2004, dir. Juan Calvo). By 2005, the Madrid office expanded to include all 
European LLPs, particularly Spain, France, and Italy. Yet, the division maintained a 
production and distribution model based on categorizations “local” as one language and 
one national territory per Sony’s initial corporate strategy. Columbia Español’s final 
LLP, Salir Pitando (2007, dir. Álvaro Fernández Armero) adapted the strategy towards 
minority financing and co-producing with a local television broadcaster. By the 2000s, 
diminishing local audiences, increased online piracy, and an economic recession forced 
the SPE international production headquarters to stop Spanish LLPs and move its 
European production office to Germany. Columbia Español’s difficulty adapting a 
corporate strategy result from 1) changing national and regional industry conditions and 
2) corporate micro-managing and conflicting cultures of production between the Madrid 
executives and the Hollywood processes of SPE’s international division headquarters in 
Los Angeles.  
 
MAIN THEMES AND IMPLICATIONS 
Companies like Sony Pictures Entertainment with their diverse media holdings 
and far-flung geographical locations are forcing academics to question long held ideas 
about “what is Hollywood?” and “what is a local film?” The LLP strategy reflects the 
implementation (and many times messy results) of SPE’s media convergence. From the 
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1989 acquisition to today, cross-media integration is an important factor in understanding 
the contemporary nature of media conglomerates and their various divisions. The LLP 
strategy in both case studies examines motion pictures beyond the theatrical realm and 
reveals the implications of television broadcasters, home video or DVD markets, and 
online media in how Sony imagines feature length films today.  
As a particular case of contemporary media flows and exchanges, my project 
traces Sony’s local language strategy across multiple geographic locations. With film and 
television operations worldwide, SPE operates within local industries co-producing local 
language films for local audiences from Brazil to India. Older academic binaries between 
commercial, hegemonic Hollywood and a culturally-specific national cinema break down 
here. While my study continues to question and critique the dominant global position of 
Sony and other major film companies, the idea of where Hollywood ends and national 
(non-U.S.) cinema begins is an impossible distinction. Sony’s policies, partnerships, and 
productions are representative of the post-1989 period characterized by flexible notions 
of borders, nation-states, and “local” media. Industry practices such as local and 
international co-productions that involve multiple financial and creative partners across 
various media industries question ideas of the nation-state as the central foundation of 
film production in Latin America and Europe. While national film subsidies and 
incentives still are crucial to the development of a Brazilian or Spanish cinema, regional 
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and transnational relationships are reshaping and influencing categories and practice of 
local media industries.  
One of the implications of my project is to question academic theories and models 
for national cinema or local media. While the nation is still a relevant factor due to 
regulatory, financial, and cultural influences, it is time to move beyond what Andreas 
Hepp and Nick Couldry call “container thinking.”41 Instead of viewing Brazilian or 
Spanish film industries through the container of a fixed and static nation-state, I approach 
the interconnected trans/national and regional nature and players involved in local 
language productions as symptomatic of the nation’s instability due to political, 
economic, technological, and cultural pressures from above and below. Many times the 
financial and creative realities of the film industry force producers and distributors to 
look beyond the nation for material, talent, technology, financing, partners, and 
audiences. Strategies by transnational media companies like SPE and its partners offer an 
excellent opportunity to investigate du Gay’s “circuit of culture” and the intersection of 
local, national, regional, and transnational forces involved. Tension and conflict emerged 
between SPE’s discourses of the global LLP strategy among executives versus the 
resistant ideas and contradictory practices of local Sony workers and their partners 
through their competing notions of an imagined Spanish or Brazilian cinema.  
                                                
41 Andreas Hepp and Nick Couldry. “What should comparative media research be comparing? Towards a 
Transcultural Approach to ‘Media Cultures’” Internationalizing Media Studies ed. Daya Kishan Thussu 
(London: Routledge, 2009): 32, 36. 
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 Furthermore, what I discovered during the research process forced me to rethink 
how academics conceive and conduct industrial analyses. How do levels of accessibility 
to industry professionals and reliability of data shape what projects we undertake and 
complete? My local industry fieldwork offered another perspective for academic 
institutional analyses that have been so heavily based on government, corporate, and 
trade data from a U.S.-location. Although this type of data plays heavily into my 
understanding of industrial and institutional historical context, only after talking with the 
professionals involved in these partnerships and productions did the structure of my 
project take shape. Relying on humans as research subjects whether for their memories, 
expert opinion, or even personal connection is a messy and unpredictable process. Oral 
histories may conflict or directly disagree with one another, particularly in terms of 
institutional language and industry practices. In understanding the diverse, contradictory 
nature of international film operations, particularly for the SPE’s international division, 
my fieldwork allowed me to explore how ideas of local cinema, the LLP strategy, and 
Sony as Hollywood vary greatly depending on whom is asked.  
An important influence to my project theoretically, methodologically, and 
empirically is Michael Curtin’s Playing to the World’s Biggest Audience: The 
Globalization of Chinese Film and TV. Curtin explores the transnational structure and 
cross-media practices of Chinese film industry across mainland China, Singapore, 
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Taiwan, and Hong Kong.42 In the early 2000s, the release of Hollywood co-produced 
Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon (2000, dir. Ang Lee), Hero (2002, dir. Yimou Zhang), 
and Kung Fu Hustle (2004, dir. Stephen Chow) marked a major shift in the way major 
media companies viewed Chinese industries and audiences. Through a media imperialism 
lens, Curtin suggests this film cycle could be understood as further homogenization and 
Americanization of popular culture and Hollywood’s continuous exploitation of creative 
professionals, labor, and local industries worldwide. Yet, he claims the situation is more 
complicated because:  
behind these marquee attractions lies a more elaborate endgame as Hollywood 
moguls reconsider prior assumptions regarding the dynamics of transnational 
media institutions and reassess the cultural geographies of media consumption. 
For increasingly they find themselves playing not only to the Westernized global 
audience but also to the world’s biggest audience: the Chinese audience.43  
 
He approaches this study through both wide-scale industrial as well as local fieldwork 
and interviews within the political, economic, and cultural context of contemporary East 
Asia. In a chapter on Hollywood and Taiwan, he describes conversations with local 
Warner Bros. and United International Pictures (UIP, a joint venture between Universal 
Pictures and Paramount Pictures for international distribution) executives about corporate 
practices, levels of decision-making, and local marketing of their English-language films 
to participate in local language content: 
                                                
42 Michael Curtin, Playing to the World’s Biggest Audience: The Globalization of Chinese Film and TV. 
(Berkeley: University of Calfornia Press, 2007). 
43 ibid, 1. 
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Yet even without quotas, the major Hollywood distributors held fast to past 
practices, keeping the number of prints in check as they tried to exert pressure on 
the exhibitors so as to sustain the premium rental prices to which they were 
accustomed. Interestingly, tensions between the distribution and theatrical 
divisions of Warner Bros. reveal the complex relations within global media 
conglomerates themselves, showing how large-scale organizations can be subject 
to conflicting customs and interests. In an attempt to gain leverage, Warner 
Village managers have made overtures to independent and Chinese film 
distributors, hoping to expand the pool of available titles and to subvert the 
market dominance of Hollywood distributors. Whether this represents a short-
term strategy or a long-term commitment is unclear.44 
 
Looking at the competing activities of the film group’s divisions Warner Village and 
Warner Bros. International within Taiwan, Curtin’s work is important both theoretically 
and methodologically. Through location specific analysis and interviews within the 
context of a transnational Chinese cinema, he not only examines discursive strands and 
perspectives of the local executives but also from other independent producers and 
industry professionals. The study complicates models of national cinema and 
Americanization and challenges assumptions about the position and monolithic practices 
of transnational media companies like Warner Bros. and UIP. Instead, what he finds 
simultaneously is a rigidity about the conceived ideas around a “Chinese” audience and 
how to adapt their distribution practices within the Taiwanese market. Curtin reveals the 
cracks in these local strategies and what happens when Warner Bros. gets it wrong. 
Internal conflict on how to operate within a changing Chinese industry creates the 
                                                
44 ibid, 107. italicized for emphasis by author. 
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contradictory and, at times, dysfunctional nature of media conglomerates that try to 
expand “globally” instead of translocally.  
The objective of this type of translocally focused research, according to Murphy 
and Kraidy, “should be resulting hybrid cultures: that is, the stylistic features of local 
cultural life that emerge materially and discursively as ‘tonalities’ (Geertz, 1983) of 
global culture.”45 My project aims to explore the hybrid nature of Sony local language 
productions in Brazil and Spain through the ‘tonalities’ or conditions transnational, 
regional, national, and local conditions shaping them. In turn, one of the major 
contributions of my project is the close institutional analysis of Sony’s international 
operations through the LLP strategy and its relationships with local producers and 
distributors. In adopting a media industry studies approach, my project challenges earlier 
literature by integrating larger geo-political, economic, and cultural movements with on-
the-ground field research in Brazilian and Spanish/European media industries and 
institutions. My cultural studies approach analyzes Sony’s local language productions as 
sites of negotiation and debate over ideas of local cinema, industry practices, and 
positions of power.  
In general, I argue that Sony’s LLP operations are not a tightly controlled film 
strategy but an uneven, somewhat flexible, and industry-specific model for local co-
productions. The discourse surrounding LLPs illustrate how Sony imagines its 
                                                
45 Murphy & Kraidy, 5. 
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entertainment division as global and ubiquitous. Yet, in practice in both case industries, 
the LLP model functions more as a nationally-bound production and distribution strategy 
that focuses on the Brazilian and Spanish domestic audience. My research positions the 
LLP strategy within SPE as a “dysfunctional family” and its difficulty adapting to 
conditions and practices in the international film market. 
Sony’s local language production strategy does not reflect local industry practices 
or market conditions since it was developed internally and applied on a wide-scale. 
Instead, the story of SPE’s LLP strategy reveals a vision of local media as a largely 
flawed and shortsighted. While this focus may work in the Brazilian case due to generous 
tax incentives, a healthy economy, and growing domestic audiences, the nationally-
contained model did not last beyond two local language films in Spain and one Spanish-
Italian co-production. Due to the success of the Brazilian operation, SPE tried to replicate 
this model in Madrid despite the changing multi-faceted state of Spanish and European 
financing, production, and audiences. Sony’s LLP Madrid office was unable, and the LA 
headquarters was unwilling, to adapt the LLP strategy towards a Spanish film industry 
that relies more heavily on larger European audiences, funding, and general industry 
practices. Ultimately, the LLP represents an industrial logic based on nationally-bound 
production models and English-language distribution practices that could not and should 
not be forced on dynamic and culturally-specific state of the Brazilian and Spanish media 
industries. As illustrated by my field research, the local language film production strategy 
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simultaneously exists as both a success and failure, flexible and static, location-bound 
and deterritorialized picture of the contemporary media industries. My expansive project 
challenges theories of media globalization about and within an organization like Sony’s 
international division. Overall, the case of Sony and local language productions presents 
a multi-faceted story of how transnational media institutions and local media industries 
intersect and shape one another in the age of globalization. 
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Chapter Two  
From Imperialism to Pluralism:  
Debates Across Global Media Industries 
Over the past four decades, media and communication scholarship has sought to 
explain international media processes and flows through a number of theoretical models. 
Annabelle Sreberny identifies two central intellectual paradigms as: 1) cultural 
imperialism of Western values and the dependency and homogenization of Third World 
nations and 2) the ‘global pluralism’ model—“a complex syncopation of voices and more 
complicated media environment in which Western media domination has given way to 
multiple actors and flows of media products.”1 These approaches offer either top-down 
theories grounded in political economy or nonlinear flows considering the local 
articulations and specificities of media industries that decenter the notion of a Western 
media core. Whether viewed as a hegemonic Hollywood film studio operating within 
non-U.S. industries or a borderless and fluid example of the contemporary nature of 
media globalization, a central concern has been the dominance of American media 
industries and the expanding international position of companies such as Sony Pictures 
Entertainment. Exploring the contributions and limitations, this chapter considers these 
two strands of thought. Overall, I will explore what these paradigms can offer my project 
                                                
1 Annabelle Sreberny, “The Global and the Local in International Communication,” in Media and Cultural 
Studies: Keyworks eds. Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006): 
607-8. 
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and how they might explain the expansion of Sony Pictures Entertainment’s local 
language production and distribution strategy. 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MEDIA 
 From the early studies of Thomas Guback and Herbert I. Schiller to more recent 
works by Vincent Mosco and Toby Miller, et al, the political economy tradition has 
served as a foundational approach to studying communication and media industries. 
Michael Curtin identifies Guback and Schiller’s publications in the late-1960s and 1970s 
as two of the earliest studies that aimed to understand and critique the powerful position 
of American media companies worldwide.2 Schiller based his understanding of the global 
economy and his works such as Mass Communications and American Empire (1969) and 
Communication and Cultural Dominance (1976) on Immanuel Wallerstein’s “World 
System Model.” This model categorized the United States and parts of Europe as ‘core’ 
First World developed and industrialized countries located in the Western Hemisphere in 
relation to the Latin America, Africa, and Asia as the ‘periphery,’ a Third World 
underdeveloped and dependent on the West. In the Neo-Marxist tradition that still lingers 
in contemporary political economy of media research, inequalities in global capitalist 
system are related directly to dependency theory. John Tomlinson describes these ideas 
of dependency as “the way in which formerly colonial countries remain dependent on the 
                                                
2 Michael Curtin, “Thinking Globally: From Media Imperialism to Media Capital,” in Media Industries: 
History, Theory, and Method eds. Jennifer Holt and Alisa Perren (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009): 
109. 
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West” due to the centrality of the multinational or transnational corporation (MNC or 
TNC).3 The powerful economic position of TNCs and “their interests in exploiting 
markets, natural resources, and labor forces worldwide has, for many critics, come to 
represent the high point of capitalist development and the major determinant of the 
economies of the Third World.”4 In my work in Brazil, I found many of the professionals 
in the film industry actively discussing these types of ideas and academic theories. 
 
Media Imperialism 
For Schiller, the theory of media imperialism explained American media 
transnational corporations’ position in this First/Third World divide as cultural agents for 
expanding this world economic system. 5 Tomlinson explains the role of the Western 
media from this viewpoint as “vehicles for corporate marketing, manipulating audiences 
to deliver them as ‘good consumers’ of capitalist production.”6 For Schiller and many of 
his contemporaries such as Latin American scholars Ariel Dorfman and Armand 
Mattelart’s ideological critique of Disney cartoons in How to Read Donald Duck (1972), 
Hollywood companies and the exportation of films internationally represent an 
ideological spread of the First World in order to exploit, manipulate, and sedate Third 
                                                
3 John Tomlinson, Cultural Imperialism: An Introduction (London: Continuum, 1991), 37. 
4 ibid. 
5 Herbert Schiller, ‘Transnational Media and National Development’ in National Sovereignty and 
International Communication eds. K. Nordenstreng and H.I. Schiller (New Jersey: Ablex, 1979), 23 as 
quoted in Tomlinson, 37. 
6 Tomlinson, 38. 
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World audiences. However, Schiller’s view of totalizing media imperialism breaks down 
due to the 1) reliance on the nation-state, 2) one-way flow of media from the West (aka 
the United States) to the Rest, and 3) monolithic view of transnational corporations. 
First, Curtin claims: “the basic unit of analysis for media imperialism researchers 
was the modern nation-state, which meant that domination was usually figured as a 
relationship between countries, with powerful states imposing their will on subordinate 
ones, especially in news reporting, cinematic entertainment, and television 
programming.”7 By focusing on the nation-state, this perspective assumes a centralized 
ideological apparatus encoded across a diverse variety of media, traveled without 
consequences or influences, and decoded by these exploited audiences. Second, 
multinational or transnational media companies are presented as one-dimensional and all-
powerful with a centralized goal. But what happens when media strategies fail or 
professionals make mistakes? David Hesmondhalgh identifies “one problem with the 
Schiller [and later adaptations of his method via the work of Robert McChesney and 
others] tradition as a form of political economy analysis is that it provides little sense of 
the contradictions in capitalist media production.”8 Both of these points lack a 
consideration for the enormity of these organizations or governments. The reality in the 
                                                
7 Curtin, 109. 
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lack of systematization and disorganization, as Henry Jenkins describes as a 
“dysfunctional family” unit, is not taken into account.  
Finally, early media imperialism theories are based on research gathered in the 
1960s and 1970s when U.S. media companies had few international competitors nor as 
diversified media operations. This school of thought does not allow for the rise of non-
U.S. conglomerates, local resistance, or the eventual blurring of national boundaries that 
characterizes contemporary media industries. The imperialism theoretical framework 
would classify Sony Pictures Entertainment as an agent of media imperialism and as a 
transnational media corporation systematized and organized around exporting a favorable 
view of the American government, economy, and cultural values abroad. Many of the 
producers and distributors working with local Sony productions I interviewed, 
particularly in Latin America as well as later media studies scholars such as Tomlinson, 
Joseph Straubhaar, and Daya Kishan Thussu, criticized Schiller’s view for being U.S.-
centric and not allowing for individualized audience interpretation and resistance nor the 
powerful position of local media industries in producing their own media.9  
The other major study of this period, Thomas Guback’s The International Film 
Industry: Western Europe and America Since 1945, offers an unparalleled study of the 
relationship between American and European film industries over the same two decades 
                                                
9 Oliver Boyd- Barrett, “Media Imperialism Reformulated,” in International Communication: A Reader, ed. 
Thussu (London: Routledge, 2010): 139-153. See also Tomlinson; Joseph Straubhaar, “Beyond Media 
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Communication 8 (1991): 1-11; Daya Kishan Thussu, “Mapping Global Media Flow and Contra-Flow” in 
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as Schiller’s imperialist argument.10 On a broad level, he examines the “monopolistic 
organization” of the Motion Picture Export Association (MPEA), favorable U.S. foreign 
policy to facilitate film exports, and the growing importance of overseas markets by 
1960.11 Specifically, the study also considers the central position of subsidies and quotas 
in national industries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, France, and Germany. Guback’s 
comparative study still serves as one of the most expansive in size and scope due to his 
extensive interview, market, and policy-based research. 
In an effort to compete domestically and internationally with Hollywood films 
during the post-war era, it is clear that international co-productions and the presence of 
European Economic Community in creating film legislation and stimulating production 
signaled the integration and dependence of European film industries.12 By 1969, the 
author describes the expansion of Hollywood’s international operations specifically in 
Europe as:  
not confined merely to American distribution companies and American films. 
American subsidiaries abroad, and foreign companies in which there is an 
American financial interest, have been making films which, meeting criteria for 
being declared ‘national’ by European governments, thereby have access to 
subsidy funds.13  
 
                                                
10 Thomas Guback, The International Film Industry: Western Europe and America Since 1945. 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969). 
11 During the 1940s, the MPEA was restricted as Motion Pictures Association of America (MPAA) under 
Eric Johnson. By this point, MPAA served as the chief lobby organization for the film industry both 
domestically and internationally, enforced censorship regulation board (later serving as a ratings board), 
and protecting copyright and intellectual property. 
12 Guback 5 &164. 
13 ibid, 6. 
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He aptly identifies the blurring of traditional national borders in terms of financing, 
productions, and audiences and the battles of what constitutes “local” media that 
describes Sony’s current local language strategy. From this perspective, similar media 
environment production practices, funding mechanisms, and culturally policies still exist 
in Europe and shape my Spanish case study as a continuation of the monopolistic position 
of Hollywood studios. 
However, Guback sees the internationalization of European and other smaller film 
industries during his period of study as leading to homogenization and the lost of distinct 
cultures. He argues films aimed at larger international audiences reflect a universal and 
dehumanized “anti-culture, the antithesis of human culture.”14 Making this argument 
today for a transnational media company within a multi-faceted global film industry is 
overly simplistic, generalized, and culturally elitist. It may be easy to make this argument 
today in the context of Hollywood period franchise rebooting and sequelitis resulting in 
films such as the hyperaction-driven, product placement Spiderman (2002, dir. Sam 
Raimi) or CGI, global disaster picture 2012 (2009, dir. Roland Emmerich). Yet, these 
high budget blockbusters only make up a small percentage of the media content SPE 
produces and distributes worldwide per year. As my project illustrates, the content a large 
diverse media company produces and distributes for specific audiences outside English-
language territories may rely on popular, commercial media models but in no way should 
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be dismissed as homogenous anti-culture. A turn towards localization and culturally-
specific media content within transnational media companies like Sony Pictures 
Entertainment cannot be explained by a United States-European cultural and political 
economic focus. The local language film trend relying on localized cultural projects co-
produced by subsidiaries such as Sony do Brasil or Columbia Español complicates the 
old universal homogenization complaint. 
 
National Media Models 
By the 1980s, a cycle of film scholarship revisited questions of national cinema 
and industries. While Hollywood has been understood as an international industry 
existing and operating beyond its twentieth-century Los Angeles origins, many Asian, 
African, European, and Latin American film industries have been viewed through the 
lens of “world” cinema as national industries disassociated or separated from an 
interdependent and interactive history of international cinema.15 From the lens of art 
house aesthetic practices and auteur-centric movements to imagining local audiences and 
national financing policies, many film industries outside the United States traditionally 
have been constructed around an area studies model that constructs a contained national 
cinema. This research model typically follows how key political, economic, 
                                                
15 A recent example of this “world cinema” categorization is Linda Badley, R. Barton Palmer and Steven 
Jay Schneider, eds. Traditions in World Cinema (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2006). 
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technological, and cultural conditions have intersected over time to create a nationally 
distinct “Brazilian,” “Japanese,” or “British” cinema. 
Most notably, Andrew Higson’s 1989 essay “The Concept of National Cinema” 
recommends an “inward-looking process” that conceptualizes a national cinema in 
relation to national, political, economic and cultural traditions.16 While Higson promoted 
a cultural diverse view of the nation, his model was based on a Eurocentric, British idea 
of the nation. National cinema theoretical debates in the following decade included the 
works by Susan Hayward, Stephen Crofts, and Albert Moran that began to interrogate the 
boundaries of the nation, yet much of this was grounded in a Western European, English-
language context and echoed a media imperialist argument.17 Moran’s introduction to an 
edited collection Film Policy focuses on the position of Hollywood inside other national 
film borders such as Ireland or Canada:  
No cinema has escaped [Hollywood’s] force field . . . thus, whether national 
cinemas or not, these other cinemas have variously imitated Hollywood, 
attempted to transform and vary the Hollywood model or else resisted and 
rejected its example in favour of alternative aesthetics, funding arrangements, 
systems of production and distribution, and ways of constituting and relating to an 
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Higson’s, Moran’s, and other discussions of national cinema still reinforce the stability of 
the nation and its central position as a site for film policy, financing, and cultural identity, 
yet choose to problematize this model either within the realm of cultural difference and 
diversity against its relationship to Hollywood. 
However, a number of scholars began to identify the pitfalls of a national 
perspective when analyzing industrial histories. Kristin Thompson suggests scholars 
should be careful when formulating film histories in terms of a 'national cinema.’ While 
she contends the national cinema remains useful in terms of specific industry culture and 
government regulation, “historians should also be aware that few national cinema 
industries operate in isolation; through foreign investment, competition and other types of 
influence, outside factors will almost invariably affect any given national cinema.”19 
While the nation-state still has real consequences in terms of protectionist policies, 
regulations, and identity formation, a close industrial analysis should also consider the 
international influences and cross-cultural exchanges that have shaped industrial models 
and practices.  
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Beyond national cinema defined through the boundaries of cultural identity and 
audiences, international media production and flows have been shaped around policy and 
labor discussions. Since the 1990s and early 2000s, a cycle of scholarship has continued 
to examine issues of transnational media companies, market conditions, and changing 
structures of the global media industries. While addressing similar themes as Guback and 
Schiller, recent research addresses industry spatial transformations through a critical 
political economic perspective. In Political Economy of Communication, Vincent Mosco 
explores how economic systems shape social relations, power structures, and availability 
to resources.20 Jennifer Holt and Alisa Perren describe Mosco’s central interest “in the 
way in which resources are allocated, how they favor some at the expense of others, and 
how greater equity can be obtained throughout society.”21 Mosco’s research explores 
theories of commodification, spatialization, and structuration from the commodification 
of labor and social relations of communication practices to the expansion of media 
companies through patterns of ownership such as vertical integration and regulation. In 
his last chapter, he posits cultural studies and policy studies as alternatives to a political 
economic approach that relies on a “macrosocial organization of power.” Both 
approaches resist the logic of capital for more pluralist perspective of policies and human 
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agents.22 One of the strengths of Mosco’s work is the theoretical depth and his ability to 
identify the strengths and limitations of his methods. Yet, while his discussion of 
spatialization is characteristic of scholarly debates of the 1990s and pertinent to my own 
concerns about Sony’s expansion into local and regional markets, his notions of space are 
tied directly to assumptions about capital and lack the human factor in media as a cultural 
industry. 
In Global Film and Television: An Introduction to the Economics of the Business, 
Colin Hoskins, Stuart McFadyen, and Adam Finn offer a microeconomic perspective on 
trade, public policy, and film business strategies such as co-productions and national 
subsidies during the particular post-World War II era. On a broad level, Global Film and 
Television utilizes classical economics, a positive and normative theory of economics that 
assumes individual behavior and the market’s behavior follow consumer preferences.23 In 
their view, the primary reasons for the global presence of Hollywood studios are 1) an 
economies-of-scale barrier due to vertical integration and the high cost business model 
and 2) the cultural discount argument.24 On the one hand, the U.S. film firms’ 
monopolistic involvement in domestic and international distribution emerges as the 
central explanation for their control of theatrical market share worldwide. With the 
expansion of digital technology and diversification of distribution windows since the 
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1980s, distribution is a key concern and practice for many media companies as will be 
emphasized in the following chapters. On the other hand, when removed from American 
culture and context, the authors claim Hollywood films carry a “cultural discount.” This 
attempts to explain the ease of mobility and thematic universality that appeals cross 
culturally to a wide variety of audiences.25 This argument not only ignores the 
specificities of audiences and unpredictability of consumption patterns outside of the 
United States, but it also relies on the problematic logic of Hollywood films as universal 
and homogenizing—an argument reminiscent of Guback. It is also not clear what the 
authors signify by “Hollywood films.” Hollywood is conflated with both its American 
origin and global position without complicating these designations. Furthermore, a 
discussion of the international market outside of the United States is limited to an 
Anglocentric focus on Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom with different 
linguistic barriers than other regions. While this Anglophile framing is most likely due to 
cultural and linguistic accessibility and resources of the researchers, focusing on English-
language markets has its own set of theoretical erasures and problematic exclusions in 
trying to speak for a “global film and television industry.” 
One recent work most applicable to my study in theme, scope, and research 
questions is Toby Miller, Nitin Govil, John McMurria, Richard Maxwell, and Ting 
Wang’s Global Hollywood 2. While Hoskins, McFadyen, and Finn ground their study in 
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the logical processes of classical economics, Global Hollywood relies on a critique of 
neoliberal trends in political economy and media markets since the 1970s and 1980s. As 
discussed in my Introduction, neoliberal policies have relied on the cornerstones of 
privatization, liberalization, and deregulation and led to the consolidation and 
concentration of ownership in media industries.26 Specifically, David Harvey suggests the 
neoliberal doctrine proposes “human well-being can be best advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” whereas the 
role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework that supports this 
doctrine.27 By shifting from public to privately-owned media systems and removing all 
“artificial” barriers to free trade, the objective is for the market economy to flourish and 
create opportunities for economic development as opposed to dependency on the state. 
 Global Hollywood is grounded in a Marxist tradition, criticizes of corporate and 
state domination, most notably the United States government, and classifies films as 
commodities that derive value from their cultural labor. The authors attempt to 
interrogate the position and practices of Hollywood companies on a global level through 
location and industry-specific case studies. Related to Schiller’s theorizations of media 
imperialism and the spread of an American economic system, the authors suggest 
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“‘Hollywood’ appears in all descriptions of globalisation’s effects – left, right, and third 
ways – as a floating signifier, a kind of cultural smoke rising from a U.S.-led struggle to 
convert the world to capitalism.”28 Miller et al. contextualize a shift in Hollywood’s 
powerful economic and ideological position within the rise of neoliberal “Washington 
Consensus” policies in between 1978-1980. This moment serves as a turning point in the 
world’s social and economic history with the emergence of neoliberal doctrine as the 
central guiding principle of economic thought and management.29 Current media industry 
conditions can be attributed to: 
shifts towards a neoliberal multinational investment climate over the past decade 
[which] have reinforced global Hollywood’s strategic power over the NICL [the 
New International Division of Cultural Labor] through the privatization of media 
ownership, a unified Western Europe market, openings in former Soviet Block 
and spread of television, web and VCR combined with deregulation of national 
broadcasting in Europe and Latin America.30 
 
As a study and a concept Global Hollywood is situated within the particular post-
1989 periodization and shaped by all of the complex geo-movements that follow. 
Specifically, the authors examine contemporary media practices through the role of labor 
and cultural policies. They argue the New International Division of Cultural Labor 
reflects the exploitation and stratification of labor outside traditional studio model fixed 
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in Los Angeles.31 Instead, runaway productions are a common practice for transnational 
film companies like Fox, Universal, Paramount, and Sony in order to save on labor and 
production costs by filming outside of the United States. Although attracted by tax 
incentives, facilities, and crews available from other industries, runaway productions are 
still mostly financed by these studios and categorized as “Hollywood” products.32 Similar 
to Guback and Hoskins et al., the authors created this category on structuralist and 
Marxist ideas of capital. They define Hollywood products as English-language motion 
pictures financed fully by an American studio despite the talent, labor, or resources 
contributed from the shooting location and local industry. They conveniently draw 
borders and boundaries around what is and is not a Hollywood film. In increasingly fluid 
media industries, this is one of my biggest criticisms of the Global Hollywood 
perspective—unlike its locally bounded co-producing partners or competitors, only 
Hollywood operates globally and ubiquitously. 
Another large part of the Global Hollywood study considers how franchise media 
models, technological developments, and labor practices of Hollywood effect the 
European media climate. A push by EU nations to foster a competitive pan-European 
film industry and culture has led to collaborative subsidizing efforts by national industries 
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and regional institutions to make big-budget films that will travel internationally.33 This 
includes international treaty and equity co-productions agreements, big budget pan-
European franchises such as Astérix, growing European media conglomerates like Canal 
Plus, and television broadcasters financing film productions.34 State tax incentives, 
generous subsidies, and co-production treaties have attracted more than just European 
media companies looking to develop and strengthen national cinema.35 Due to their 
criticism of the changing commercial practices in Europe, this seems to be an area of 
contention for the authors. 
On the one hand, the authors suggest commercial, star-driven action films like 
Astérix “are no less culturally specific and diverse than art-house auteurist personal 
visions.”36 This is an important indication. As I will argue throughout this project, large 
budget franchise film series set in Europe or Brazil are no less culturally-specific than the 
characteristically recognizable Brazilian or Spanish festival fare of the small, character-
driven art house drama. So what happens when a transnational media company is 
involved in one of these projects? I doubt Global Hollywood would take this same 
argument. This distinction between what is Hollywood and European assumes shaky 
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logic. Can a film be a Spanish, European, and Hollywood product? Can a culturally-
specific project involve Hollywood?  
On the other hand, Miller et al. view films like Astérix as representative of “the 
twin logics of a commercial industry: textual standardization (genres, sequels, series, 
serials, remakes, reruns and synergy) and differentiation (spectacle, stars, post-production 
and high-concept marketability) – not the desired prescription for diversifying European 
cinema.”37 By employing commercial, capitalist devices, does a franchise series like 
Astérix still signify Hollywood? The authors’ disavowal of commercial models and films 
as “European” never goes beyond the macroeconomic level, association with Hollywood 
production practices. For Miller et al., Hollywood may be everywhere, but it still 
embodies the might of American capitalism. Global Hollywood 2 categorizes the 
contemporary media environment by a one-way flow geographically-bound from the 
United States to the rest of the world. 
The authors identify the contradictory intersection “where border-erasing free-
trade economics meets border-defining cultural initiatives under the unstable sign of the 
nation.”38 The unstable border-erasing practices of transnational media companies like 
Sony’s local language production and border-defining regional and national policies for 
developing national cinema emerge as an area of contention in my project. This Europe-
specific contradiction arises as a major issue within my chapter on Columbia Español. 
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Yet, I find that this analysis of the European regionally-focused co-production 
environment is more of a case study bound within a particular time period between the 
1990s and early 2000s. Not only have national and regional policies evolved and changed 
over the past decade, the European policies and co-production discussions cannot stand in 
for the particularities of Latin American and Asian media industries. 
In general, something is lacking in this broad political economy approach. In 
focusing on a labor at a global and regional level, in this analysis there is an almost 
complete absence of labor’s voice, whether internationally, nationally, or locally,. Miller 
et al. focus on the larger pictures of European film industries through macro-level forces 
(neoliberal economic theories, New International Division of Cultural Labor), regional 
institutions and conglomerates (EU’s MEDIA and Eurimages, Canal Plus), and general 
European cultural critics. Yet, the Marxist critic of Global Hollywood leaves little room 
for a more focused examination of how cultural labor operates through human decision-
making and individual agency within particular co-production situations and creative 
industries.  
 The majority of these institutional and industry studies mentioned so far in this 
chapter explore the global presence of Hollywood studios through the lens of political 
economy. In the case of Schiller, Guback, and Miller et al., this body of research raises 
questions concerning economic power and the dominant position of film studios within 
these transnational media companies that are important for my project. However, what 
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about industry studies research that explores conglomeration and concentration of 
ownership and convergence of media within the neoliberal context while simultaneously 
complicating the all-powerful monolithic perception of these transnational companies? 
While a political economic perspective plays a central role in my research project, I 
prefer research questions and methods that complement but also complicate a strictly top-
down economic heavy scope. Whether neoclassical economics or strictly Marxist, the 
logic of capital is the driving force. This approach is reductive and diminishes the work 
of the human agents involved in the cultural production of media. Curtin asks, “how can 
we shift our perspective so that we take into account both the general and the particular, 
the forest and the trees?”39 As illustrated by the studies above, the “forest” is mapped and 
well-covered territory. One of the most challenging aspects of this project was to 
approach the particularities, the localities, or the “trees.” What is the best approach for 
understanding the logic of creative professionals and industry dynamics within a study of 
transnational media flows and partnerships? What about local partnerships? The 
following section offers alternative approaches to explore the specificities or localities of 
media industries beyond the bird’s eye global approach. 
 
                                                
39 Michael Curtin, “Thinking Globally: From Media Imperialism to Media Capital,” in Media Industries: 
History, Theory, and Method eds. Jennifer Holt and Alisa Perren (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009): 
109. 
 67 
ARTICULATIONS OF SPACE/PLACE, TERRITORIES, AND -SCAPES 
 The “global pluralism” paradigm, introduced as the beginning of this chapter, 
offers an alternative model for media theories and research grounded in cultural studies. 
As a break from earlier studies outlined above, Curtin contends “globalization of media 
therefore should not be understood reductively as cultural homogenization or western 
hegemony. Instead it is part of a larger set of processes that operate translocally, 
interactively, and dynamically at a variety of levels: economic, institutional, 
technological, and ideological.”40 A more dynamic and translocal focus has shaped my 
project and thinking about global media flows. Moving away from a focus on 
imperialism and Hollywood as a central hegemonic core, I consider the interactive 
processes that reshape the current media climate through recent academic debates about 
space, place, and localities. Specifically, I am interested in the disjunctive flows, fluidity, 
and deterritorialization associated with the uneven or unequal processes of media 
globalization and how they operate differently across different locations. Through the 
work of Arjun Appadurai, Andreas Hepp and Nick Couldry, and Nataša Ďurovičová, I 
briefly explore how media and cultural studies scholars are reconsidering notions of 
space and place outside the nation-state. From there, I will discuss the cultural studies-
based industry research of Curtin, Paul du Gay, Serra Tinic, Andreas Hepp as a model for 
my Sony LLP project. 
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By the late 1980s and early 1990s, Appadurai and his contemporaries David 
Morley and Kevin Robins contributed to questioning the constructions and politics of 
space and place.41 Particularly, Robins pushed media scholars to “look at the developing 
relationship between globalization and localization specifically in terms of the logics at 
work in the audiovisual industries. I want to reorient the politics of communication 
towards a politics of space and place.”42 In other words, media scholars have been 
rethinking how we approach media industry studies. How do we understand the 
interaction and overlap between global and local forces by remapping spatial logistics of 
creative work and industry activities? 
 One of the most prominent themes associated within discussions of globalization 
is deterritorialization. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue the multiple processes of 
globalization exist with “no territorial center of power [which] does not rely on fixed 
boundaries or barriers [such as the nation-state] . . . it is a decentered and 
deterritorializing apparatus.”43 There is not one country or place in the center nor Western 
political economic system playing all-powerful puppeteer and hiding behind the curtain 
that controls the Rest. Or as Appadurai argues: “the United States is no longer the 
puppeteer of a world system of images, but is only one node of a complex transnational 
                                                
41 Arjun Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy” Public Culture Vol. 2, 
No. 2 (Spring 1990); David Morley, Family Television: Cultural Power and Domestic Leisure (London: 
Comedia, 1986); Kevin Robins, “Reimagined Communities? European Image Spaces, Beyond Fordism,” 
Cultural Studies 3:2 (1989): 145-165. 
42 Robins, 150. 
43 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2000): xii. 
 69 
construction of imaginary landscapes.”44 The United States does not exist at the core of 
the media industry but is merely one node among other Asian, European, Latin American 
and African media industries. Instead, different powerful institutions and apparatuses in 
the form of media companies appear in Chinese, Brazilian, or Spanish industries and 
operate across national borders.  
By complicating modern notions of geography and territories, questions of 
spatiality and localities alter the conversation about media as cultural industries. Arjun 
Appadurai’s framework explores the disjunctive relationship:  
between five dimensions of global cultural flow which can be termed: (a) 
ethnoscapes; (b) mediascapes; (c) technoscapes (d) finanscapes; and (e) 
ideoscapes. The suffix -scape allows us to point to the fluid, irregular shapes of 
these landscapes, shapes which characterize international capital as deeply as they 
do international clothing styles. These terms with the common suffix -scape also 
indicate that these are not objectively given relations which look the same from 
every angle of vision, but rather that they are deeply perspectival constructs, 
inflected by the historical, linguistic and political situatedness of different sorts of 
actors: nation-states, multinationals, diasporic communities, as well as sub-
national groupings and movements (whether religious, political or economic), and 
even intimate face-to-face groups, such as villages, neighbourhoods and 
families.45 
 
Appadurai’s foundational model shifts scholarly conversations away from center-
periphery to cultural production and consumption as a multi-faceted process across 
various “scapes.” The production, distribution, or consumption of media is merely one 
landscape that overlaps with others. Global cultural flows, and the forces that shape them, 
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do not move in any one direction. While large global forces shape local processes, local 
forces also shape global processes. These –scapes as forces shaping global culture vary 
depending on one’s perspective from nation to nation or from regional to transnational 
movement. Appadurai questions the usefulness of the constructed nature of the 
geographical categories like the nation-state, particularly understanding political, 
economic, technological, and socio-cultural forces solely within a national context. 
Hepp and Couldry question this categorization: “why is the nation accepted as 
unquestioned reference point for media production, representation, reception and 
appropriation?”46 Found in traditional humanities studies, the modernist notion of the 
state functions as a container that confines and supersedes all other forms of society. 
They fault “container thinking” of media and communication studies that binds and 
defines the nation by territory and ignores “all disembedding, transgressing, and 
dysfunctional processes of contemporary life” beyond this geographical category.47 They 
criticize allowing the nation-state to limit the bounds of research through essentializing 
“the state, media system, media market and media culture into a binary model.”48 As I 
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will emphasize throughout this project, it is important not to dismiss the critical aspects 
of the nation within media systems, particularly policies, financial factors, and cultural 
discourses (re)creating national media systems. Nitin Govil warns against dismissing the 
nation completely. He contends:  “for better or (often) worse, the national has facilitated 
the mobilization of the symbolic and material itineraries that characterize modernity as 
well as its alternatives. Media industries play an important role in assembling the 
technologies of interconnection associated with the imagination and narration of the 
nation.”49 Instead of an essentialized notion of the nation, I am interested in Govil’s 
interpretation of Homi Bhabha conceptualizing media and the nation as shifting 
discursive construct.  
In order not to limit ourselves to a fixed, stable industrial model, it is vital to 
understand media localities as unstable and multi-faceted due to pressures from cultural 
flows, forces, and systems from above and below the national space. As my project 
illustrates, multiple forces of globalization pressure and interact with national media 
industries from a local city (Rio de Janeiro or Madrid) and state (Catalonia) to regional 
(European Union or IBERMEDIA) processes. Trying to understand Sony (and its film 
operations) as an institution defined within a national boundaries essentializes the 
company as either Japanese by origin, American by its SPE group headquarters, or 
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Brazilian or Spanish by its subsidiary location and LLP content. In turn, fixing Sony’s 
corporate nationality is not my objective. I am interested in Sony’s fluid and mobile 
positionality of its international production division that operates simultaneously as 
Chinese, Brazilian, Spanish, Mexican, and so on between the late-1990s to 2000s. 
Furthermore, the intention of my project is not to define or locate an essentialized 
“national” Brazilian or Spanish cinema within which Sony’s LLP division operates. 
Instead, I am more interested in how Sony and its local partners imagine and mobilize the 
national as part of their local production and distribution strategy.  
My goal is to understand the deterritorialization, expansion, and blurring of 
borders while still engaging in discourses and realities of the nation-state. In order to 
explore notions of space and place as flexible constructions and discourse while still 
grounded in industry practices, I am shaping my research questions through definitions of 
the “transnational.” In turn, I use the term “transnational” to signify the interactive and 
dynamic processes and current conditions of globalization that shape Sony’s corporate 
structure, its global activities, and its position within local film industries. Ďurovičová 
suggests “transnational” as an alternative to the term “global” that is bound up within a 
category of totality: 
the intermediate and open term ‘transnational’ acknowledges the persistent 
agency of the state, in varying but fundamentally legitimizing relationship to the 
scale of ‘the nation.’ At the same time, the prefix ‘trans-’ implies relations of 
unevenness and mobility. It is this relative openness to modalities of geopolitical 
forms, social relations and especially to the variant scale on which relations in 
film history have occurred given this key term its dynamic force, and its utility as 
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a frame for hypotheses about emergent forms.50 
 
Understanding contemporary media industries as transnational allows a consideration of 
the national as it interacts with other regional and global factors. Steve Vertovec 
classifies the notion of transnationalism through categories as: social morphology, type of 
consciousness, mode of cultural reproduction, avenue of capital, site of political 
engagement, and reconstruction of ‘place’ or locality.51 In my project, I will primarily be 
defining and working with the transnational as a mode of cultural reproduction, avenue of 
capital, and reconstruction of place/locality. Vertovec argues:  
While there is certainly much to be learned about the construction and 
management of meaning offered by cultural studies, there is immediate need for 
more, in-depth and comparative empirical studies of transnational human 
mobility, communication, social ties, channels and flows of money, commodities, 
information and images – as well as how these phenomena are made use of.52 
 
Therefore, I will explore Sony’s local language production strategies through a 
transnational perspective of space/place, institutions, cultural production and industries, 
identities, and capital. This conceptualization and intersection of shifting scapes within a 
transnational context shapes how I approach my understanding of Sony Pictures 
Entertainment’s international production activities. Appadurai’s model assumes media 
companies like Sony Pictures Entertainment rely on deterritorialization and flow of 
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people, machinery, money, images, and ideas to open new markets.53 Imagined as a 
unified corporate strategy, in reality local language productions aimed at a singular 
linguistic, domestic audience are inflected with the “historical, linguistic, and political 
situatedness.”54 A Brazilian or Spanish LLP is shaped as much by Sony as a transnational 
corporation and its national subsidiary as by national and regional policies, local 
partnerships, industrial practices, and linguistic audiences. In order to accomplish a 
project grounded in both theories of “transnational” space/place and cultural specificities 
of a national industry, I am looking to contemporary media industry methodologies.  
 
RETHINKING MEDIA INDUSTRY STUDIES 
In particular, institutional analyses have influenced my own thinking about the 
transnational processes influencing Sony’s LLP strategy. Contemporary media industries 
scholarship has evolved into a transdisciplinary, transnational, and transmethodological 
field. In their edited collection, Media Industries: History, Theory, and Method, Holt and 
Perren suggest that “to explore media industries in the twenty-first century is to engage 
with an extraordinary range of texts, markets, economies, artistic traditions, business 
models, cultural policies, technologies, regulations, and creative expressions.”55 Since the 
late-1990s, the media industries field has expanded to include myriad perspectives and 
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methods rethinking and repositioning media as creative industries operating within local, 
national, regional, and transnational contexts. Unlike the top-down political economic 
approach discussed above, recent scholarship incorporates Sreberny’s pluralistic vision of 
a “complex syncopation of voices” from creative labor to audiences outside of a U.S. 
context. Not only does this contemporary work undertake institutional and industrial 
analyses spanning from Chinese to Canadian to Hollywood cinema but it does so through 
a variety of texts, perspectives, and positions within global media processes. For the 
remainder of this chapter, I will explore current research by du Gay et al., Thomas 
Schatz, Charles Acland, Henry Jenkins, Curtin, Tinic, and Hepp that examines the multi-
faceted nature of transnational institutions like Sony Pictures Entertainment. 
In the foundational 1997 study Doing Cultural Studies: The Story of the Sony 
Walkman, Paul du Gay, Stuart Hall, Linda Janes, Hugh Mackay, and Keith Negus explore 
the Sony Walkman as an institutional and product case study.56 Not only is this the first 
close industrial-cultural study of its kind about the Sony Corporation, it is 
groundbreaking in its integrated scope that incorporates a number of fields and methods. 
As discussed in my Introduction, the authors ground their study in theories of articulation 
and a cultural analysis model they call “circuit of culture” based on five major cultural 
processes: representation, identity, production, consumption, and regulation. Their 
analysis spans print advertising, Sony’s institutional history from a Japanese to “global” 
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entity, consumer identification and practices, breaking down of public and private 
spheres, and the Walkman as a material cultural artifact. du Gay et al.’s study is 
important for its examination of the same corporate logic and discourses around Sony’s 
“global-ness” that still shape the company’s various media divisions and industry 
practices. In general, Sony constructs and mobilizes discourses of the company and its 
products as global to brand and advertise the Walkman worldwide as a flexible cultural 
product.  
The past decade has brought industry research by Schatz, Acland, and Jenkins that 
examines the transformations within media institutions via patterns of production, 
distribution, and consumption of film and media. Each approaches these transformations 
from a different position whether Schatz’s examination of narrative and franchise 
practices within Conglomerate Hollywood or Acland’s and Jenkins’s cultural studies 
approach through discourses of distribution or modes of fandom, respectively. What 
these and other contemporary industry studies have in common is a multi-layered 
approach that considers diverse global operations of conglomerates and how this 
structure shapes their film products and practices beyond the traditional theater.57 As 
discussed in my Introduction, the scholars represent contemporary debates in media 
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industries scholarship that questions the cross-media and cross-border practices in 
Hollywood. Similar to the research objectives of Global Hollywood 2, they raise 
questions such as: what/where is contemporary Hollywood? Should Hollywood be 
conflated with the geography of the United States and American culture? How has 
technology altered production, distribution, and consumption patterns? How have larger 
shifts in political economy aided the concentration and expansion of transnational media 
companies? Where do we locate “Hollywood” in these shifts?  
Furthermore, the work of Curtin and Tinic serve as a dynamic template for 
examining media institutions within a transnational industrial context and localized 
methods. Curtin refocused the traditional location of study from the national to the local 
city space through his work on “media capitals” or the regional with Playing to the 
World’s Biggest Audience as discussed in the previous chapter. 
 Defined as “central nodes in the transnational flow of culture, talent, and 
resources,” media capitals such as Miami, Mumbai, and Rio de Janeiro allow media 
scholars to relocate their research objective and explore how “particular cities are 
participating in the restructuring of spatial and cultural relations worldwide.”58 By 
focusing my research within two media capitals, Rio de Janeiro and Madrid, I am able to 
reposition a study of national cinema within the context of a global production strategy 
and transnational institutional study.  
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 Tinic explores the media capital Vancouver as the center for Canadian television 
and film production and its position as Hollywood North. Her book, On Location: 
Canada’s Television Industry In A Global Market, considers the role of cultural 
production in relation to Vancouver as a place and space in mediating Canadian cultural 
identities. Tinic’s central argument is that “the ‘nation’ is an unstable category and that 
culturally specific programs are negotiated within an arena of competing interests, 
including the perceived need to gain access to global markets, the political and economic 
limitations of federal cultural policies and funding practices, and national network 
programming structures.”59 The cultural dimensions of globalization, regionalization, and 
the flexible nature of the nation intersect through industry practices and labor that operate 
within this particular place functioning as a transnational location for Hollywood and 
Canadian productions.60 Tinic explains her focus on labor, specifically television 
producers, since they are “rarely discussed in the literature of media globalization, which 
tends to emphasize the rapid flow of media content in abstract terms but rarely examines 
the specific negotiations behind the images that end up on television and movie screens 
around the world”61  
One of the most important contributions by Tinic, Curtin, and other scholars 
doing this type of work is how examining cultures of productions/production of culture 
                                                
59 Serra Tinic, On Location: Canada’s Television Industry in a Global Market (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2005): x. 
60 ibid, 5. 
61 ibid, 13. 
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challenges previous academic theories on industries, cultural work, and space/place. A 
focus on the human creative decisions and negotiations involved in the daily activities of 
media production helps to criticize decades of vague and abstract macro-level 
understandings of media industries within the academy. In a post-structuralist tradition, 
this focus on labor allows for a more specific viewpoint of the creative industries and 
individual workers than allowed by the political economic approach discussed above. 
How do producers imagine their media work and the industry of which they are a part? It 
is this attention to cultural labor within transnational media industries and practices that 
offers a more nuanced understanding of media industries outside the United States. 
The theoretical framework that best illustrates the local language production 
strategy is an articulation between local and global process, practices, and conditions—
the concept of the translocal. Andreas Hepp describes how the translocal as a “concept of 
cultures [is] outward-looking, exogenous focused on hybridity, translation, 
identification.”62 Influenced by the work of Curtin, Hepp, and Murphy and Kraidy, I 
argue local language productions between Sony and its Brazilian and Spanish partners 
must be examined as an interactive and dynamic process merging transnational, national, 
and local media cultures. As suggested by Murphy and Kraidy, I position my project as 
simultaneously “locally based and globally engaged” in order “to study the hybrid 
                                                
62 Andreas Hepp, “Transculturality as a Perspective: Researching Media Cultures Comparatively,” Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research 10:1 (January 2009): 3. 
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cultural processes at heart of globalization” through my field research.63 This allows me 
to explore Sony Pictures Entertainment’s position as transnational division of a media 
conglomerate that is shaped by the process of globalization as well as how local 
conditions and practices shape Sony’s operations within the local media industries. 
Furthermore, Hepp claims the term translocal addresses issues of locality and 
connectivity. He suggests  
if research is centered on translocality this emphasizes, on the one hand, that those 
questions pertaining to all that is local still matter, but that on the other hand 
today’s locales are connected physically and communicatively to a very high 
degree. And that is the reason why the local does not cease to exist, but rather, 
changes.64  
 
As I will illustrate in this following chapters, the Sony LLP strategy produces films that 
simultaneously articulate a corporate nature and Brazilian or Spanish media cultures. In 
this case, the Sony film or the Brazilian film does not cease to exist, but rather, changes 
or hybridizes and becomes something else entirely. 
In general, the objective of this chapter was to summarize key academic debate 
and theories for global media industries over the past few decades. Some of the earliest 
contributions such as Guback and Schiller came from the political economic model and 
offered an overview of economic and regulatory systems in relation to questions of power 
and inequality between national industries. From Hoskins et al. to Miller et al., later 
                                                
63 Patrick D. Murphy and Marwan M. Kraidy, Global Media Studies: Ethnographic Perspectives (New 
York: Routledge, 203): 304. 
64 Hepp, 3. 
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political economy research on film examined the post-1980s neoliberal era ranging from 
neoclassical to Marxist interpretations. Yet, still grounded in questions of the ubiquitous 
nature of capital and position of Hollywood aided by co-productions, tax incentives, and 
film subsidies. While these concerns play into my project, I will not limit myself only to 
following the financial path as the powerful determinant for local language co-
productions.  
Another parallel debate emerged in the late-1980s and early 1990s that 
reconsidered notion of the nation-state in order to examine constructions of space and 
place. Through the work of Appadurai and other key figures of the period, 
deterritorialization, “scapes,” and the transnational category emerge as a way to rethink 
media institutions, industries, cultural labor, practices, policies, and audiences from a 
more nuanced, multi-spatial, and multi-faceted perspective. What is most salient for my 
following chapters is how to approach national cinema outside of container thinking or 
Hollywood/national cinema binaries but instead understanding the national within 
transnational networks and influences. The work of du Gay et al.’s “circuits of culture,” 
Curtin’s “media capitals,” and Tinic’s focus on cultural labor interrogate cultural studies 
issues of negotiation and agency via individuals, institutions, communities, and entire 
industries.  
In order to contribute to this body of literature, I am interested in a field research 
methodology grounded in industry interviews with cultural producers, distributors, 
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policymakers, and trade organizations. For my project, this is the best way to explore a 
conglomerate media division working in a local film industry and the internal and 
external negotiations and tensions that arise. Chapters Four and Five present the efforts of 
my field research case studies in the context of contemporary Brazilian and Spanish 
production and distribution practices and industry conditions. I examine Sony’s local 
language production through the intersection of two culturally and industry-specific 
locations, São Paulo and Madrid. My findings complicate previous understanding of 
national and transnational cinema as I explore particular institutional and industrial 
notions of local or regional media products, practices, and culture. 
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Chapter Three  
The Trans/formation of Sony Pictures Entertainment and  
its Global Production Strategies 
 
In 1989, Sony Electronics purchased Columbia Pictures Entertainment, a decision 
that would be questioned, criticized, and eventually lauded in U.S. industrial and 
academic discourse over the next decade. On a larger industrial level, the purchase has 
come to mark a turning point towards globalization, conglomeration, and convergence in 
the structures and processes of media industries worldwide as the 1990s witnessed a 
succession of unprecedented merger-and-acquisition waves.1  Numerous accounts credit 
Sony’s founding CEO, Akio Morita, with pushing the Japanese hardware company to 
move into the Hollywood film and music industries, particularly as a way to boost sales 
of its home electronics through producing and supplying its own content.2 More than just 
an innovative Japanese consumer electronics company acquiring a historic American film 
studio and CBS Records the previous year, these purchases represent Sony’s refashioning 
into a transnational multi-media corporation. In one effect, executives began utilizing 
globalization discourses in corporate language. For example, at the time Morita 
explained, “I use the term [globalization] because I don’t like the word multinational . . . 
                                                
1 Mark L. Sirower, The Synergy Trap: How Companies Lose The Acquisition Game (New York: Free 
Press, 1997): 38. 
2 “Will Sony Make it in Hollywood?” Fortune (9 September 1991) accessed online (20 January 2010); 
Richard Turner and Yumiko Ono, “Japanese Find Hollywood Less Alluring” The Wall Street Journal Asia 
(7 April 1993) accessed online (30 January 2010). 
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if it means a company with many nationalities than [sic] that is not Sony. Sony is 
global.”3   
As I begin this chapter, I want to ask the question: what does it mean for Sony to 
be global? What were some of the early strategies Sony implemented to expand into 
international media markets, specifically for television and motion pictures? As I outline 
in my Introduction, the parent company is often referred to as a Japanese company, but 
its filmed entertainment division, Sony Pictures Entertainment, is described as a 
Hollywood studio. However, as this chapter will interrogate, what internal restructuring 
and external corporate strategies did Sony adopt after its acquisition, restructuring, and 
expansion of Columbia Pictures throughout the 1990s to today in order to transform the 
media company into a global entertainment media producer and distributor? From a 
general perspective, how does Sony refocus and reconceptualize their idea of the “global” 
into a translocal production and distribution strategy for film and television?  
According to Paul du Gay:  
Throughout the 1980s two important developments indicate how Sony began 
actively extending [international operations] and presenting the company as a 
‘global’ corporation. First, the company aimed to operate in ‘all’ markets across 
the world, to reach as many potential consumers as possible. Second, the 
company aimed to reorganize processes of production in such a way so that they 
would not be limited by constraints of the nation-state.4  
 
                                                
3 N. Cope. “Walkman’s Global Stride,” Business (March 1990): 53 as qtd in Paul Du Gay, Stuart Hall, 
Linda James, Hugh Mckay, and Keith Negus, Doing Cultural Studies: The Story of the Sony Walkman 
(London: Sage, 1997): 78. 
4 Paul Du Gay, Stuart Hall, Linda James, Hugh Mckay, and Keith Negus, Doing Cultural Studies: The 
Story of the Sony Walkman (London: Sage, 1997): 79. 
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Although characteristic of numerous transnational corporations, the extension into “‘all’ 
markets across the world” aided by “reorganizing processes of production” becomes key 
to Sony’s corporate identity and strategies. While former CEO Norio Ohga states “a 
commitment to doing things ‘our own way’ has shaped Sony’s image, growth, and 
development since the company’s beginning,” 5 what does Sony’s “way” signify upon 
entering the creative production or software side of the media industry? What I am 
describing through this chapter is how Sony adapted this early expansion strategy from 
acquiring Columbia Pictures Entertainment and restructuring into Sony Pictures 
Entertainment into a pioneering centralized strategy for locally producing and distributing 
film and television throughout the 1990s and 2000s.   
This chapter presents a focused institutional analysis of Sony Pictures 
Entertainment’s pursuit of “all” media markets geographically, particularly through its 
expanding television and motion picture operations in the United States and Latin 
America. In order to set up the context for my project, I will provide a historical and 
institutional background beginning with Sony’s acquisition of Columbia Pictures 
Entertainment in 1989 and restructuring of Sony Pictures Entertainment, through the 
expansion into television in the 1990s, followed by the emergence of the local language 
production strategy (LLP) and its eventual consolidation and centralization within the 
International Motion Picture Production Group (IMPPG) in 2007. The first section 
                                                
5 Norio Ohga, Doing It Our Way: A Sony Memoir, Translated by Brian Miller (Tokyo: International House 
of Japan, 2008): 111. 
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outlines the industrial history surrounding the 1989 acquisition of Columbia Pictures 
Entertainment as a narrative of institutional and cultural clash. An exploration of various 
academic and industrial discursive strands existing around Sony’s entry into the film 
industry reveals corporate transnational (dis)integration connected to conflicting national 
identities and traditional geographical boundaries between its American and Japanese 
operations. More importantly, what also emerges from this story of cultural and economic 
expansion is an internal strategy and struggle to develop a level of synergy between its 
newly joined divisions in order to produce “all media” or cross-media “total 
entertainment” from consumer electronics to media entertainment production and 
distribution. 
 However, SPE’s pursuit of “all” media is not limited to the integration of its 
hardware and software divisions but, as du Gay argues, it also signifies a move into “all” 
media markets with its strategic corporate expansion into local, national, and regional 
international media operations.6 The second section explores Sony’s entry into pay TV 
partnership and ownership through various international satellite operations, production 
companies, and studio infrastructure beginning in Latin America. SPE’s strategy was 
increasingly to expand regional operations along an “adaptation curve” moving from 
joint ventures and importing English-language television programs to creating Sony 
                                                
6 While the following two chapters will address Sony’s strategy for contemporary international film 
production through the Brazilian and Spanish/European locations in detail, this chapter offers the historical 
context for key structural and geographic moves that foreground the remainder of my study. 
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Entertainment Television and co-producing local television shows. However, local 
television production in the region was seen as a failure and led Sony’s operation in Latin 
America to refocus on film production in Brazil as will be discussed in Chapter Four. As 
SPE expands to international television, this regional-based experiment reveals some of 
the tensions that arise when trying to localize production models. 
Where Sony established broadcasting roots in the mid-1990s, the company would 
later expand into local film production units through a similar localization strategy. Sony 
emerged as the pioneering transnational media company, becoming one of the first to 
implement a wide scale local language production (LLP) strategy for film. The final 
section focuses on LLP strategy and maps out the history of Sony’s general regional and 
national territorial expansion between the mid-1990s to today focusing on parts of Asia, 
Latin America, and Europe. The LLP comes to represent another way Sony has 
reorganized and localized its production processes. How is the LLP strategy and Sony’s 
position as a co-producer imagined? In turn, I explore how the executives conceptualize 
Sony’s global identity and centralized LLP strategy against the company’s cultural and 
geographical position within regional and national film industries and co-production 
partnerships.  
What I hope to accomplish in this chapter is to situate the acquisition saga and 
subsequent growth of international operations into a larger narrative picture of Sony 
Pictures Entertainment’s transformation into an integrated and transnational or “global” 
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media production and distribution company.7 By analyzing trade journals, interviews, 
corporate reports, and other industry texts, I will trace the historical trajectory of Sony’s 
international operations using examples primarily from the United States, Latin America, 
and Europe. Overall, I am interested in how Sony built, diversified, and conceptualized 
its overseas media markets from 1989 to today through interconnected film and television 
ventures. This chapter reveals that Sony fashions a tightly industrial controlled global 
media brand and discourse around a shifting, localized production and distribution 
strategy. 
 
THE SONY EXPERIMENT OR SONYWOOD BABYLON? ACQUIRING COLUMBIA PICTURES 
ENTERTAINMENT 
Widely perceived as an inflated buying price, Sony paid $3.2 billion (and later an 
additional $1.6 billion of the company’s debt) for Columbia Pictures Entertainment. 
Partially owned by Coca-Cola, Columbia included Columbia Pictures, Columbia Pictures 
Television, TriStar Films, and Loew Theatres.8 Within two years of the acquisition, Sony 
restructured and folded the film and television divisions under the subsidiary umbrella of 
Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE). The SPE division would eventually encompass all 
                                                
7 By global, I am referring to the term’s implications of vast, expansive, and ubiquitous nature. Nataša 
Ďurovičová, “Preface,” World Cinema, Transnational Perspectives eds. Ďurovičová and Kathleen Newman 
(London: Routledge, 2010): x. 
8 John Nathan, Sony: The Private Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999): 180. 
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film, television, gaming, and new media production, distribution, and exhibition.9 As a 
vertical integration acquisition, the divisions required restructuring that included hiring a 
new team of executives.10 For example, Jon Peters and Peter Gruber, successful 
Hollywood producers who had never run a studio, were bought out of their Warner Bros. 
contract and placed as co-chairmen of the film studio.11 
In an attempt to form an integrated media company developing centralized media 
products, Sony’s acquisition reflects larger political and economic shifts occurring 
industry wide in the 1980s and 1990s such as conglomeration, deregulation, and 
convergence. Douglas Gomery characterizes this as a period of “merger mania” due to 
increased vertical and horizontal integration. In the U.S. context, relaxation on industry 
regulation during the 1980s Reagan administration fostered a climate for increased 
international ownership and concentration.12 Conglomeration peaked by the mid-1990s, 
resulting in the formation of the big six media conglomerates that in addition to Sony 
included: Time Warner, Disney, News Corp, Viacom, and GE.13 New technologies such 
as cable, satellite, and digital technologies such as DVDs have allowed the studios to 
create news platforms and expand markets for entertainment commodities.14 Henry 
                                                
9 For a contemporary breakdown of Sony Pictures Entertainment’s division, see Appendix. 
10 Sirower, 20. 
11 see Negus and Sirower for a detailed discussion of Peters and Gruber. 
12 This relaxation of industry regulation included the Financial Interest and Syndication Rules (Fin Syn 
Rules) which established in 1970 to prevent broadcasting monopolies across broadcasting. 
13 Thomas Schatz, “New Hollywood, New Millennium,” Film Theory and Contemporary Hollywood 
Movies. ed. Warren Buckland (New York: Routledge, 2009): 2 
14 Janet Wasko, Hollywood in the Information Age: Beyond the Silver Screen (Austin: UT Press, 1994): 3. 
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Jenkins suggests “extension, synergy, and franchising are pushing media industries to 
embrace convergence.”15 By either squashing or embracing media technologies,16 new 
technologies have aided convergence, which he describes as “the flow of content across 
multiple media platforms, the cooperation between multiple media industries, and the 
migratory behavior of media audiences.”17 Furthermore, the result of deregulation in 
media ownership in the United States and privatization of many state-owned media 
institutions across Latin America and Europe has aided media conglomerates like Sony in 
controlling the product development, distribution outlets, and flow of content across 
multiple platforms. According to Thomas Schatz, “the key to the conglomerates’ 
hegemony and their financial welfare in the early 2000s has been the strategic integration 
of their film and TV operations in the U.S. . . . as well as their collective dominance of 
the global movie marketplace.”18 Sony’s cross-media, and later cross-cultural, expansion 
from their electronics business model into multi-platform media content by purchasing 
Columbia Pictures reflects many of these industrial shifts. 
Sony’s official reasoning behind the purchase was a way to complement and 
control consumption patterns in their hardware business.19 The acquisition marks a turn 
in Sony’s company identity and strategies away from a consumer electronics company 
                                                
15 Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide. (New York: NYU, 2006): 2. 
16 Most notably, these technologies included Sony’s lost battle with Betamax versus VHS format as well as 
the development of consumer electronics such as the personal music players Walkman and Discman. 
17 Jenkins, 19. 
18 Schatz, 3. 
19 Sirower, 39. 
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solely known for the Walkman, high quality television sets, and the failed Betamax 
experiment. As Keith Negus suggests, “no longer would Sony simply be known as a 
manufacturer of technology, it would now be a ‘total entertainment’ company that 
provided both the hardware (compact disc players, video-recorders, televisions) and the 
software (film, television, videogames, and music) that featured them.”20 Motivations 
included cost-saving benefits of “selling” content or intellectual property to another part 
of the same company and market control of ‘theatrical windows.’21 By expanding and 
synchronizing related areas of the entertainment company, Sony’s executives hoped to 
achieve a level of integration as “synergy” between their various product lines and 
increase the overall value of the company. In relation to the specificity of media 
economics, Borja Mora-Figueroa claims the synergy theory describes four possible 
processes: “exploiting content by re-using it within the different areas of a company; the 
use of several areas to jointly foster a service offered by the company; multi-tasking by 
the staff in different operations or activities and saving in management costs.”22 In 
general, synergy assumes the merger of two companies or institutions will result in an 
                                                
20 Keith Negus, “The Production of Culture,” in Production of Culture/Cultures of Production ed. Paul du 
Gay (London: Sage, 1997): 68. 
21 Douglas Gomery, “The Hollywood Film Industry: Theatrical Exhibition, Pay TV, and Home Video,” 
Who Owns the Media? Competition and Concentration in the Mass Media Industry eds. Benjamin M. 
Compaine and Douglas Gomery (Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000): 365 & 379-
80. 
22 Borja Mora-Figueroa, “The Development of Transversal Media Corporations,” Journal of Media 
Business Studies. 5:3 (2008): 35-52. 
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increase in profit performance than if the two companies remained distinct.23 The actual 
term synergy is more common in industry trades and academic discussion than Sony 
corporate language. In the early 1990s, Chairman of Sony Corporation USA Michael P. 
Schulhof wanted another word besides synergy to describe Sony’s integration or 
convergence strategies: “it connotes something artificial; things have to work because 
they feel right.”24 Whether using the terminology “synergy” or “total entertainment,” 
from a management level, Hollywood producers and Japanese designers could work 
together to create products across a multi-media platform all within the boundaries of 
Sony. In other words, the parts are better (and more profitable) as a whole. 
Ideally, integrating the divisions of the newly combined companies could achieve 
“total entertainment” through a variety of methods. According to Negus, four potential 
synergies specifically for Sony included: 1) textual connections or synergies in software, 
2) connections between hardware and software, 3) convergence of previously distinct 
hardware components, and 4) connections between technologies of distribution.25 For 
example, Sony produces a franchise film that translates into a videogame for the 
Playstation, a music soundtrack for its Discman, and later distribute for Sony satellite 
channels and to watch on Sony televisions. One Sony executive in 1991 described the 
company’s synergistic plans through the concurrent and integrated development of 
                                                
23 Sirower, 20. 
24 Johnnie L. Roberts, “Missing Links: Entertainment Giants, Like Sony, See Little of Synergy’s Benefits,” 
The Wall Street Journal (30 March 1993) accessed online (14 February 2010). 
25 Negus, 85. 
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videogames and soundtracks with a film such as Hook (dir. Steven Spielberg, 1991): “By 
owning a studio, we can get involved right from the beginning, during the writing of the 
movie. We can get footage as it’s being filmed. We can say ‘Can you film the backstage 
in a certain way because we need it for a videogame?’”26 Furthermore, Columbia Pictures 
Chairman, Mark Canton, in the early 1990s described how this integrated strategy 
operated with the big budget of the Arnold Schwarzenegger star vehicle The Last Action 
Hero (1994): “you have a franchise that goes well beyond the movie [since] this isn’t the 
type of movie you do in isolation . . . [Columbia Pictures executives asked] people to go 
back to their divisions and calculate what they could bring to the party, and the 
prospective profit margins that made sense for all of this.”27 By focusing its film, gaming, 
and music divisions on the same franchise, Sony executives hoped to maximize its media 
holdings across a common goal.  
Yet, as any moviegoer knows, plots do not always unfold as planned and 
protagonists do not always reach their goal. As various academic and industrial accounts 
have outlined, restructuring of executives and production processes did not initially result 
in “total entertainment.”28 Japanese executives referred to the acquisition as “The Sony 
                                                
26 Nancy J. Perry, “Will Sony Make It In Hollywood?” Fortune (9 September 1991) accessed online (1 
March 2010).  
27 Roberts, accessed online. 
28 See Jenkins, Convergence Culture; Toshio Mitsufuji, “Strategic Alliance in the Video Industry: The 
Acquisition of Columbia by Sony and MCA by Matsushita,” Strategic Change 2:4 (July/August 1993): 
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Experiment” due to difficulties merging staff, divisions, and the diverse products from 
both the Japanese hardware and American software sides into a cohesive transnational 
company.29 What followed over the course of the early to mid-1990s was described as 
“in-fighting, overspending, and sudden departures among the US movie moguls hired by 
Sony to run its affairs in Tinseltown – often at vast expense.”30 For example, between 
1991 and 1996, four turnovers for the Columbia/Sony Pictures’ chairperson position 
included Peters (1989-1991), Guber (1989-1994), Mark Canton (1994-1996), and John 
Calley (1996 - 2003). Additionally, Sony Pictures Entertainment had to take a $3.2 
billion write-off of losses in 1994 and fired its top executives amid sell-off rumors that 
lasted into the late 1990s.31 
Sony’s aims for synergy came with management and financial problems and 
widespread industry criticism. SPE’s position in the film industry became synonymous 
with a narrative of failure. In turn, Sony openly stopped using the concept of synergy, 
claiming the business term as a “dirty word” tainted in the press.32 The buzzword of the 
1980s became a sign of failure in the 1990s. According to Negus, “the attempt at 
                                                                                                                                            
Organizational Underpinnings of Contemporary Media Conglomerates,” Communication Research. 19:6 
(December 1992): 682-704. 
29 Nathan, 180. 
30 “Welcome to Tinseltown, Mr. Morita,” The Independent (10 April 1994) accessed online (24 February 
2010). 
31 John Lippman and Laura Landro, “The Intrigue Thickens at Sony Pictures – Can Idei End the 
Hollywood Studio’s Battles and Stem its Fortune?” The Asian Wall Street Journal (13 September 1996) 
accessed online (24 February 2010); “Japan’s Sony Denies U.S. Movie Unit Sale Report,” Dow Jones 
International News (13 November 1996) accessed online (31 March 2010). 
32 “Sony in Hollywood – The Nightmare Continues,” The Economist (21 September 1996) accessed online 
(24 February 2010). 
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‘synergy’ had merely forced a series of short-term ‘culture clashes’ rather than created 
any new ways of working with hardware or software.”33 The culture clash metaphor 
comes to stand in for Sony’s inability to integrate its various media companies. Popular 
accounts discuss awkward meetings that united hardware engineers with creative 
producers and marketing teams.34 From a top-down corporate perspective, industry trade 
papers published scathing accounts of Sony’s Japanese executives’ inability to control or 
manage their new American counterparts, describing in detail the company’s numerous 
“flops,” large losses, and excessive spending such as a multi-million dollar purchase and 
renovation of the Culver City studios. Headlines ranging from “When corporate cultures 
collide” to “Sonywood Babylon” tell the story of Sony’s difficulties.35 Tarnished hopes 
for cross-company synergy were most famously connected to the critical and commercial 
failure Last Action Hero (1994) and the English-language Godzilla remake (1996), both 
aiming to integrate Sony’s music, gaming, film, and consumer products divisions.36 In the 
midst of a highly publicized period of restructuring, Sony Pictures became known as a 
“virtual bomb factory” or “blockbuster-free zone” in making English-language 
                                                
33 Negus, 92. 
34 Johnnie L. Roberts, The Wall Street Journal (30 March 1993) quoted in Keith Negus, “The Production of 
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blockbusters by 1996.37    
Particularly, in a Business Week article from December 1994 titled “Sony’s 
Heartaches in Hollywood: A Case Of How Not To Break Into Movies,” authors Ronald 
Grover, David Greising, and Mark Landler identify three lessons learned from the 
Sony/Columbia partnership: “1) Don’t put dreamers in charge of the bank account, 2) 
Don’t spend a fortune on bricks and mortar, and 3) Don’t assume you have to buy a 
studio to be a player.”38 This advice, from a largely American point-of-view, represents 
the widespread belief in the Japanese inability to localize or understand the cultural 
nuances of Hollywood business.  
 Across media and business industry trades at the time, the failure of Sony’s 
management decisions and cross-media strategies was shaped as occurring around an 
inability to integrate different national and corporate cultures. Partnering complex 
organizational activities and management practices involves more than merging media 
technologies and techniques of production; it requires connecting different working 
practices and their ‘cultures of production.’39 One American executive’s description of 
Sony best sums up the accounts during this period: “Sony is the most Westernized 
company in Japan, but they go home at night and put on a kimono. People forget that.”40 
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Electronic Media (25 September 1995) accessed online (24 May 2010). 
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The battlegrounds were drawn between hardware/software, East/West, and Japan/United 
States. Examples of these clashes include accusations of American short-termism versus 
Japanese ultra-long-termism and a disconnect between the efficient, albeit essentialized, 
Japanese management style in dealing with creative executives in Hollywood.41 Sony’s 
failure to produce lucrative films was blamed on Japanese internal logic or “insularity” 
and an overemphasis on and the irrelevance of the Japanese pursuit of market share 
within Hollywood.42 One industry analyst’s comments in a 1994 Independent article echo 
these cultural disconnect criticisms: “does Sony really know what’s it doing, or has it got 
its fingers badly burnt by a secretive and byzantine foreign industry, run by insiders? 
Have the Americans turned the tables and taken the Japanese for a ride?”43  
 The discursive perimeters around these initial problems reflected Sony’s 
geographical and cultural identity as a Japanese company and how its entrance into the 
American film industry also came with protectionist backlash. Metaphors abounded from 
Japan “picking off American jewels one by one” to stealing “a slice of America’s 
precious cultural legacy”.44 While Hollywood is positioned in this scenario as a cultural 
legacy in need of protection, what these criticisms reveal are larger concerns and 
                                                
41 Turner and Ono, accessed online. 
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anxieties around globalization during the 1980s and 1990s.45 Anxieties about a Japanese 
invasion or overtaking of American business resulted, particularly after Sony’s and, later 
Matsushita’s, entrance.46 A September 1989 issue of Newsweek illustrates these anxieties, 
with the Statue of Liberty depicted as wearing a kimono and titled “Japan Invades 
Hollywood.” As former CEO Ohga later stated in his Sony memoir, “the message was 
unmistakable: Sony was usurping the soul of America.”47  
The story of Sony’s acquisition is a telling example of anxieties around 
globalization and the growing pains involved in expanding the media company’s 
international operations. As Sony attempted to transform itself into a global media 
company through its acquisitions and corporate language, much of the debates in the 
business and media industries about cultures of productions were nationally bounded. For 
instance, the Japanese were unable to understand the American film industry or American 
executives could not adhere to Japanese business models. Many industrial accounts of the 
acquisition are overly simplified and furthered the narrative that synergy failure was due 
largely to cultural clashing. They assume a direct top-down hierarchy from Japan to the 
United States. Yet, as I argue throughout my project, Sony Pictures Entertainment does 
not micromanage every aspect of their international entertainment operations but allowed 
their entertainment subsidiary early on to run as a quasi-autonomous subsidiary. 
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However, the challenges Sony faced reveal the messy and disjunctive nature of corporate 
culture and everyday business. Sony may have constructed a global company identity and 
goal to move into film and television industries outside of the corporation’s Japanese 
headquarters. However, as the following chapters reveal, implementing a centralized 
strategy of “total entertainment” and overseeing these international operations is not a 
neat process. The fact that SPE overextended and may have overestimated the immediate 
growth potential for their filmed divisions has a direct correlation with their decision to 
move into the lucrative television satellite business and systematized international media 
production before many of its peers. 
 In 1992, SPE created a specialized film acquisition and distribution division, Sony 
Pictures Classics (SPC). Led by the three co-founders of the independent Orion Pictures 
unit, Michael Barker, Tom Bernard, and Marcie Bloom, the division signaled an early 
move for SPE into distributing international specialized, art house films beginning with 
the successful release of Howard’s End (1992, dir. James Ivory).48 Since the 1990s, SPC 
has been a central distributor of independent and foreign language films within the U.S., 
making reoccurring deals with filmmakers such Woody Allen, Pedro Almodóvar, Ang 
Lee, and Andrucha Waddington. SPC employees describe their division as completely 
autonomous from SPE from acquisition to advertising decisions.49 As will be discussed in 
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accessed online (15 April 2010). 
49 Sony Pictures Classics employee, phone interview by author, January 2010. 
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the following chapter, SPC may partner a LLP operation to provide gap financing or pick 
up the film for release in the North American market. SPC served as an important step in 
SPE creating a multi-layered approach to their motion picture programming that moved 
away from complete dependence on mid- to large-budget English language productions 
and expanded into Asian, European, and Latin American industries.  
In other SPE film divisions of Sony Pictures and Columbia TriStar, motion 
picture performance and profitability finally rebounded with the success of global hits 
such as Men In Black (1997) and My Best Friend’s Wedding (1997) and made headlines 
by setting an all-time record for domestic and international gross of $2.34 billion in 
1997.50 The so-called failed English-language filmmaking operations adjusted and began 
to average a steady profit throughout the following decade. However, the story of Sony 
and Columbia TriStar’s marriage should not be understood as an American romantic 
comedy about an East meets West relationship that did not work until it did. Historical 
accounts of SPE can easily be told through the failure and ultimate rise of Sony Pictures 
vis-à-vis English language blockbusters. Yet, this is the same Hollywood-centric 
narrative largely told throughout the trades and media industry studies literature. Why 
limit the analysis within neat national boundaries, particularly considering the realities of 
an increasingly globalized industry, institution, and operations? This multi-faceted media 
company operates outside of the American media industry, particular as SPE restructured 
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its international television and film operations beyond English-language production and 
distribution in the 1990s. 
Yet, to end the story of Sony’s global/transnational expansion from an American 
perspective, Columbia TriStar would leave out a central yet connected turning point—
how this global refashioning also includes the concurrent movement into international 
television and film production and distribution. In 1993, Sony’s American chairman, 
Michael P. Schulhof, acknowledged the significant effect Sony would have on companies 
like Columbia:  
the real internationalization of the film business is going to come because 
companies like Sony and Matsushita are involved now and will promote a more 
active role in foreign territories than just the business as usual of exporting U.S.-
made product . . . [and] will force companies to establish fully integrated 
operations in all the countries around the world.51  
 
It was around this same period that SPE and Columbia TriStar announced a plan to 
produce local language content for major markets worldwide.52 
While SPE witnessed growing pains through the 1990s with its restructuring, the 
company continued to expand their sights and ambitions to local and regional models of 
ownership and partnership in Europe, Latin America, and Asia through distribution and 
production. For the remainder of this chapter, I am hoping to compliment accounts of 
Sony in the 1990s and 2000s as more than an English-language film studio. SPE striving 
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to become a more global media player is a multi-faceted and complex trajectory 
occurring largely outside of its American headquarters. 
 
OLÉ!: REGIONAL TELEVISION NETWORKS AND MARKETS 
  To understand fully Sony’s (post)acquisition history within the larger corporate 
strategy to achieve “all media” in all markets, it is necessary to consider Sony Pictures 
Entertainment operation beyond a Hollywood film focus. While the Columbia TriStar 
group struggled to turn a profit, particularly from its English-language film units, other 
divisions under the SPE umbrella were expanding successfully beyond the United States. 
In the early 1990s, SPE began systematically investing in satellite television channels in 
Latin America. This section explores how Sony’s international operations developed 
from partnerships in established channels like HBO and exporting English-language 
content to creating their own channel, Sony Entertainment Television, and co-producing 
local programs. SPE developed and adapted international operations within a specific 
geographic context and, later, applied this strategy in other regional markets. This 
strategy reflects what Luiz Guilherme Duarte describes as the “adaptation curve,” a four-
stage process for firms trying to increase local market involvement as part of a larger 
internationalization effort: 1) no regular export activities, 2) exportation of individual 
shows on syndication, 3) development of overseas DBS/cable channels, and 4) creation 
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of overseas production units.53 By focusing on a regional operation and expanding from a 
distribution to production model in this area, Sony strategy reveals a flexibility to adapt 
to local political, economic, technological, and cultural conditions.  
 After decades of national identity and developmental focused policies, the Latin 
American region saw sweeping political economic changes during the 1980s and 1990s. 
A wave of economic liberalization and democratization swept the region (largely from 
the pressure of international institutions such as IMF and World Bank) throughout 
countries such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Mexico. Latin American governments 
turned away from previous import substitution industrialization (ISI) measures that 
focused on replacing imported products with domestically produced cars, computers, 
agricultural goods. Instead, the largest economies in the regions moved toward neoliberal 
reform such as privatizing state enterprises and encourage international investment as a 
method to fix hyperinflation, increase competitiveness of local industries, and open their 
economies to global markets. In order to stabilize their economy after the end of a long 
military dictatorship, Brazil implemented a number of austerity measures cutting social 
programs and introduced the Plano Real that included a new currency in the 1990s.  
The Brazilian, Argentine, and Mexican governments restructured and privatized 
state-owned communications into broadcasting, telecommunications, and film enterprises 
in order to encourage foreign direct investment. As media markets opened and currencies 
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fluxuated, international corporations began aggressively to invest in the region through 
direct broadcast satellite channels. CNN, TNT, and HBO International were the first 
commercial channels to enter the Spanish-speaking market by 1991. In the following 
years, SPE partnered in two HBO channels in Latin America: HBO Olé and HBO Brasil. 
Time Warner and Venezuela’s Omnivision had created HBO Olé in 1991 as a 
subscription channel available throughout Spanish-speaking Latin America. Initially the 
majority of Olé’s television programming emerged from deals with Warner Bros., 
Twentieth Century Fox, and Columbia TriStar whereas only 10 percent of its 
programming was produced locally.54 The same year, SPE also partnered with Warner 
Bros., HBO, Olé Communications, and Televisão Abril (TVA) to create HBO Brasil, a 
pay-TV network modeled after the success of Ole.55 HBO Brasil featured movies, sports, 
and specials 24 hours a day with all programming dubbed or subtitled in Portuguese. 
According to Michael Grindon in 1994, Executive Vice President of Columbia TriStar 
International television division: “The launch of HBO Brasil reflects the growing 
momentum of our HBO Olé alliance and continued strengthening of our presence in the 
important, fast-growing Latin American marketplace. This represents a superb outlet for 
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SPE’s extensive filmed entertainment library, as well as our current and future 
product.”56 This comment from Grindon outlines SPE’s intentions and expectations for 
the Latin American media market as finding further distribution windows beyond 
theatrical release for their television and film content. This also reflects larger patterns of 
growth throughout the satellite television industry around this period by transnational and 
national companies, such as Brazil’s TV Globo launching Cine Canal alongside partners 
Viacom, Twentieth Century Fox, and United International Pictures. While the majority of 
programming would come from outside of Brazil, it is an important shift towards local 
language productions since previously Brazilian movie channels Tele Cine and Showtime 
did not offer 100 percent of its schedule in Portuguese.57 
As waves of democratization, privatization, and deregulation of 
telecommunications changed the media climate in Latin America during the 1990s, the 
region witnessed an increased presence of media partnerships and ventures between 
transnational media conglomerates with national media.58 With the rise of satellite 
technology, conglomerates such as Sony utilized regional pay channels as an opportunity 
to expand their international operations through the 1995 formation of an international 
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distribution division, Columbia TriStar International Television (now known as Sony 
Pictures Television International). At the time, Sony already had U.S. domestic television 
operations and was a major producer of American television shows. However, unlike the 
filmed entertainment divisions of other conglomerates such as Disney, Time Warner, 
Viacom, and News Corp, Sony Picture Entertainment did not have a U.S. television 
distribution operation.  
Instead of focusing domestically, SPE continued to expand internationally. The 
next step for Sony in the Latin American broadcasting market was the creation of its first 
solely owned TV channel, Sony Entertainment Television. Significantly, Sony introduced 
the first TV channel to bear the company name not in the United States or Japan but in 
Latin America. The basic cable network is a mix of subtitled American television series, 
older theatrical releases from Sony’s film library, and, more recently, Brazilian films 
targeted at a younger, upper-class audience.59 As Sony Pictures struggled with bloated 
and underperforming English-language productions during the early to middle 1990s, 
other SPE divisions such as its international television group continued to expand 
successfully and utilize Sony’s library offerings through new television ventures. Diane 
Mermigas contends SPE began to regain profitability in the mid-1990s “on the wings of 
strong domestic program returns, deep cost cuts, and ambitious international 
                                                
59 Robert Marich, “WB, Sony Plan Latin Cablers Announces Plan To Launch Cable Networks In Latin 
America,” Hollywood Reporter (25 January 1995) accessed online (25 April 2010). 
 107 
expansion.”60 By the late-1990s, SET added an exclusive Brazilian feed that included 
local Portuguese language productions such as As Últimas and Estilo Sony.61  
In 1995, Sony was in initial stages of its international expansion. Mermigas 
recounts “having invested hundreds of millions of dollars at a loss to produce programs 
and to launch new cable services abroad, [SPE’s] financial and competitive future [was] 
firmly rooted overseas.”62 From the Latin American experience, SPE went on to launch 
pay TV channels in Germany, India, and East Asia as a part of a larger overseas 
“rebuilding strategy,” fashioning themselves as a “global content supplier.”63 For 
example, Sony continued to invest in international television networks and operations 
such as a Hindi-language channel in 1995, a joint venture in HBO Asia (1995), Kuwaiti 
TV (1996), and a pan-Asian action channel, AXN (1997), which was later expanded 
across Latin America, Europe, and Asia.64 SPE President and CEO at the time, Alan 
Levine, described these strategies as “an opportunity to leverage assets we already own—
namely, our extensive library and the continuing TV and motion picture contributions to 
that library. We are expanding the marketplace for our own product.”65  
In 1997, Columbia TriStar International Television (CTIT) ventured beyond 
outlets and into creation of content by co-producing programs with local producers and 
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broadcasters in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela. Co-productions ranged from 
importing program formats to developing original programming such as sitcoms, game 
shows, miniseries, and telefilms. Senior VP and CTIT head of production recalled that 
“the company’s drive into the market with local productions is in line with a worldwide 
move to team with local broadcasters and producers to make local language programming 
. . . as a rule, local language programs achieve better ratings than dubbed or subtitled 
programming.”66 In only a few years, Sony shifted from its earlier strategy of distributing 
the Sony television library to actively co-producing local television shows and arguing 
for the importance of cultural proximity by noting, as had academic research, that local 
audiences prefer local programming.67 This realization becomes one of the driving forces 
behind the push for the local language productions in the 1990s and 2000s examined 
throughout this project. 
Yet, this shift from recycling the English-language media library to co-producing 
original local programming was not an easy transition within the growing Latin American 
industry. The Latin American television model Sony created worked better from a sales 
perspective than local production. According to Iona de Macedo, former VP of 
Television in Latin America:  
you can’t go in and produce with television stations that have been doing it the 
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same way for 75 years and try to impose another way. We tried and it wasn’t the 
right model. The right model was what we do with the game shows that we come, 
we say how it works, we consult, and they do it the way they know how to do.68  
 
Although for a short period of time Sony Television offered a production service and 
program format sales to local television networks in Latin America, they quickly 
discovered the political, economic, and cultural problems of trying to sell a different 
production model to industries with strong, local institutional and production practices. 
de Macedo describes the tensions and “clash of production cultures” between Sony and 
its Latin American partners. According to one of the producers with whom I spoke, these 
local partners criticized Sony’s production model as inefficient and not specific enough to 
deal with local market conditions and audiences. In turn, Sony Television changed the 
model back to selling formats and exports but based their offices out of the Spanish-
language media capital, Miami. 
Sony’s move into overseas television services is significant for two reasons. First, 
Sony chose the large cultural linguistic market of Latin America (including the 
Caribbean, Mexico, Central, and South America) in creating its first television network 
and its move into television production. Karen Anderson suggests the reason for Latin 
America as a desirable location was because “as the mature North American and 
European satellite markets maintain incremental growth, and the Asian market plods 
through an economic recession, Latin America has become a hot spot for the global 
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satellite industry [and media investment in large].”69 The region served as a testing 
ground or early experiment for many of the company’s local production strategies 
throughout the 1990s. When the television production model failed in Brazil, Sony 
International executives shifted the people and resources from television to film and 
refocused on expanding local film production (as explained to me by Sony employees in 
Latin America).  
Second, Sony’s strategy for entering new markets seemed to be to partner with 
knowledgeable transnational and/or local entities with experience in the region and media 
industry. Sony followed a similar pattern when moving into other key markets throughout 
East Asia, the Middle East, and Europe during the late 1990s, in a way experimenting and 
laying roots for further ventures in each area. Beginning with television export and 
distribution systems in the first part of the decade, Sony quickly moved into television 
co-productions. It appeared Sony gradually and systematically adapted production and 
distribution models to a cultural linguistic region based on ideas of cultural proximity as 
argued by John Sinclair and Joseph Straubhaar.70 As the remainder of this chapter and 
dissertation illustrates, Sony’s move from distribution to production in Latin America 
reveals a similar localization pattern or strategy for expanding region by region into 
international film markets.  
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LOCALIZING SONY: THE LOCAL LANGUAGE PRODUCTION STRATEGY 
 In relation to the expansion of international television operations, the local 
language production (LLP) strategy emerges in the 1990s as part of SPE’s expanding 
international operations. In this section, I will outline the history and practices of the LLP 
as an alternative film strategy. Instead of treating markets such as Latin America, Europe, 
and Asia as merely an extension of the domestic, North American market by distributing 
the same English-language content as has been the strategy historically, Sony began 
actively to produce and distribute motion pictures and television programs specifically 
for regional and local audiences. In 1997, SPE co-president Jeff Sagansky stated at a Los 
Angeles Entertainment Symposium: “my belief is that the days of ‘if we film it, they will 
come’ are either over or soon will be. The world is changing, and we have to change with 
it (or we) will pay a terrible price.” 71 Sagansky criticized the traditional Hollywood-
centric, one-size-fits-all approach to overseas territories and instead distinguished Sony’s 
future strategies: “Today, I see two new boats pulling out, one for Asia and one for Latin 
America . . . [a] company that aspires to market leadership on a global basis – and I work 
for one, Sony – better be on those boats.”72 For the remainder of this chapter, I will 
examine a general industrial and institutional history of the LLP “boat.” What results is 
an aggressive localization strategy that has emerged over the last decade, become 
associated primarily with Sony, and reflects changing contemporary transnational media 
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 Beginning around 1998, SPE’s international film division made a strategic shift 
towards local co-productions in smaller markets outside of the United States.73 Described 
as a “bottom-up approach” to filmmaking (to distinguish it from Sony’s globally 
distributed English-language top-down approach), the LLP strategy is a film produced 
within a local industry such as Brazil, Germany, or India using local talent and creative 
professionals but financially backed, guided, and, in some cases, solely developed by 
Sony’s local or regional offices.74 Within the industrial discourse, Sony is positioned as 
the “vanguard” in pioneering the LLP strategy, becoming: “the first global company to go 
into foreign-language film production” on a large scale and “leading the way in 
producing motion pictures not just overseas, but in languages other than English with 
cultural content geared for particular countries or territories.”75 Furthermore, between 
1998 ad the mid-2000s, Sony’s LLP operations are described as “the most ambitious 
worldwide” due to its position as the only major transnational film company to maintain 
stand-alone local language productions units throughout Europe, Latin America, and 
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Asia.76   
In general, the local language films are aimed at local, regional, or geo-linguistic 
audiences and typically not planned for exportation to other markets. Instead they are 
designed for limited to wide release in their national or regional industry within Sony’s 
global marketplace described as “east of Columbus Avenue and west of Pacific Coast 
Highway.”77 International co-productions are not a new strategy, as illustrated by the 
scholarly work of Thomas Guback, Kristin Thompson, Tino Balio, Tim Bergfelder, and 
Colin Hoskins, Stuart McFadyen, and Adam Finn.78 Particularly, in his book United 
Artists: The Company That Changed the Film Industry, Balio examines the international 
operations and co-productions between United Artists and its U.K., French, and Italian 
partners such as Tom Jones (dir. Tony Richardson, 1963) and Last Tango in Paris (dir. 
Bernardo Bertolucci, 1972). However, media companies like Sony, Fox, and Warner 
Bros. appear to be (re)thinking their local position through more centralized, corporate 
production strategies. The LLP reflects a “policy of ‘global-localization’” as described by 
Sony international executives. From their perspective, a national or regional Sony office 
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teams up with local production companies. Sony planned in 1998 to produce additional 
local content to “supplement” the distribution of their English-language films already in 
British, Hong Kong, or Mexican theaters.79 Examples of these LLPs range from the 
Brazilian Orfeu (dir. Carlos Diegues, 1999) to the Chinese language, Kung Fu Hustle 
(dir. Stephen Chow, 1998) and more recently the German Friendship! (dir. Markus 
Goller, 2010).80  
There are disputes in the industry over the definition of “local language.” A few 
professionals suggest Sony’s U.K. operation and co-productions such as Damned United 
(dir. Tom Hooper, 2009) are not considered local language due to their English-language 
status as well as the imperialist baggage and historical dominance within international 
media markets resulting in ease of travel.81 As discussed in my Introduction, historically 
English-language films increasingly have dominated box offices in European or Latin 
American territories.82 Thus, the LLP strategy exemplifies a shift from Sony’s primary 
strategy of focusing on big-budget tentpole pictures such as 2012 (2009, dir. Roland 
Emmerich) or Eat, Pray, Love (2010, dir. Ryan Murphy), produced by Sony Pictures and 
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intended for wide release in a global market.83 According to the former head of MPA 
Latin America, MPAA members’ main concern was how to increase their 90 percent 
market share in the region. Instead of accomplishing this growth with their English-
language content, Sony and its peers have adapted television and film distribution and 
production policies for this purpose. Sony conceives the LLP strategy as an opportunity 
to diversify their position in these markets through “a growing appetite” for local 
language films.84 As one Fox International executive suggested, “The template for 
popular culture comes from Hollywood, but the interest is becoming more local.  Either 
you say, ‘We are going to protect what we know,’ or you realize that the world is 
changing without you.”85 Many executives at Fox, Paramount, Sony, and so on see this 
move towards local language production as adapting to local audiences and tastes. 
Significantly, SPE’s executives claim not to follow a strict recipe or template for 
each LLP production no matter where it is produced. Sony becomes involved with local 
productions through acquisitions for distribution rights, development, and co-production 
deals depending on the local industry conditions, such as available tax incentives or 
policies. According to the former President of International Motion Picture Production 
Group, Deborah Schindler, “Sometimes we team up with local producers. Sometimes we 
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do it on our own.”86 Many times, Sony’s local offices hire individuals from within the 
local industry for their on-the-ground knowledge and professional relationships. This 
insider knowledge helps with identifying material and developing partnerships that work 
within the cultural and economic context for a particular market.87  
A local language operation begins with Sony establishing a subsidiary territory in 
a city such as Hong Kong or Madrid or expanding operations in a distribution office such 
as São Paulo that already has staff and a brick-and-mortar location. While Sony appears 
to choose national or regional markets where it has some familiarity or previous 
operations, it tends to establish LLP operations first in large national markets within each 
geographical region. Most industrial accounts locate Germany as the first location for an 
official Sony LLP operation beginning in 1998.88 Deutsche Columbia TriStar made a deal 
with the Brandenberg state government in Germany to co-produce film, television, and 
other media projects. Sony planned to make two to three local language pictures a year 
ranging in budget from $2.5 to $4.5 million each in an effort to “work with the [German] 
industry to double the turnover of German films to make them not just successful in 
Germany, but also to expand the market to cross European borders in production and 
distribution.”89  
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Within a few months of the German operations announcement, Sony established 
Columbia Pictures Film Production Asia located in Hong Kong.90 According to former 
SPE chairman John Calley, “By creating a production company in Asia, we increase 
Sony Pictures’ global production capacity and take another step in our overall strategy of 
producing (movies) in key markets around the world.”91 The first credited success of 
Sony’s LLP strategy was Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (1999, dir. Ang Lee). A 
transnational Chinese language film co-produced by Sony’s Asian operation and released 
by Sony Pictures Classics, Crouching Tiger grossed over $209 million worldwide and 
became known as the “brass ring” for LLPs due to its successful widespread release out 
of its cultural linguistic region. The film is credited with igniting widespread “ambitions 
in the world of local-language production.”92   
Mapping a chronological timeline for the development and expansion of the LLP 
strategy is a challenging and untidy task. The interviews I conducted and the findings 
presented in the following chapters contradict the trade history of Sony and the LLP. 
Sony began co-producing films from its operation in Brazil by the mid-1990s, a few 
years earlier than the reported “first” local production operations in Germany. Thus, this 
strategy does not automatically originate from at one specific moment or in one particular 
location. Moreover, instead of a linear journey across the globe, Sony’s movement into 
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LLP operations appears to be occurring almost simultaneously across areas Sony defined 
as “key markets.”   
Sony’s LLP strategy is to choose a large film market in a diverse geographical 
region, establish a central Sony LLP operation, and then expand to other markets within 
that region with other linguistic operations. For example, from Hong Kong and successful 
motion pictures like Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Sony has expanded into co-
productions within East Asia, Southeast Asia, and, more recently, the Middle East. Sony 
co-produced and released the 2007 Indian film, Saawariya, and thus is credited as the 
first North American company to release a Bollywood film.93 In the past decade, Sony 
has moved throughout Europe, Asia, and Latin America operations into locations such as 
United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, India, Australia, and Mexico.94   
 
Why Localize?  
One of the main questions of this project is: why would a company like Sony 
undertake a wide-scale LLP strategy, both geographically and across SPE’s divisions? In 
other words, what are the main reasons beyond the typical public relations sound bites 
about discovering new talent or exercising “international goodwill”?95 Consider the 
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context of the 2000s and several factors are at play. From a macro-level, Hy Hollinger 
points to larger “forces of globalization, new technology, industrialization, and free 
trade.”96 More specifically, accounts point to declining domestic box office against 
increasing international profits and the cost effectiveness of LLPs. Increased international 
operations reflect major economic shifts in the global film industry, particularly with big 
transnational corporations such as Sony scrambling to makeup for overall flat corporate 
earnings due to the economic recession and declining consumer electronics sales in the 
late 2000s.97 At the same time, non-U.S. markets have become a central profit center in 
recent decades. In 1999, John Calley cited an increased importance of the international 
market. In the 1970s, “you got 30 percent of your income from international [as 
compared to domestic]. Now it’s almost reverse.”98 Since the 1980s, gross profit from 
international markets has steadily increased. According to a 2010 Motion Picture 
Association of America report on theatrical statistics, international or foreign box office 
returns make 67 percent or $21.2 billion of its members’ earnings, whereas domestic 
(U.S. and Canada) consists only of 33 percent or $10.6 billion.   
Part of this growth, particularly in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, is 
due to the continued expansion of movie screens and increased theatrical audience 
attendance throughout these regions. Director of Paramount Pictures Latin American, 
                                                
96 Hollinger, accessed online. 
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Jorge Peregrino, suggests these regions have growth potential “in terms of infrastructure 
and construction of cinemas.” In the case of Latin America, the total number of movie 
screens has doubled between 2000 and 2010 from 6000 to 12,000 screens. With an 
annual box office of $1.5 billion for the region, Peregrino connects LLPs to this growth 
potential since “we have a lot of space to grow. It is one of the few regions in the world 
that has potential to grow that fast…in Latin America. So the investment and the 
infrastructure is paying really well.”99  
Hollinger suggests “the major changes in the international marketplace, 
augmented by political and cultural pressure and a pool of top-notch local filmmaking 
talent, sees the majors turning to local language films to supplement their offshore box 
office income and help maintain their costly, worldwide distribution operations.”100 Not 
surprisingly, the domestic and international box offices are not conceived of as separate 
but more as integrated, symbiotic units of the SPE media machine at best. Similar to the 
relationship between Latin American television satellite channels and Sony’s media 
content, Sony’s various domestic and international film divisions work to create 
complementary content. Whether they are producing films for a global or local audience, 
the LLP strategy assumes the production for one group supplements the production for 
the other. One of SPE’s former international production executives, Gareth Wigan 
described the new entrance of the LLP strategy into the Indian film industry through a 
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food metaphor; the Indian market is a meal of diverse choices with American films as 
dishes to compliment the Bollywood and other local cinema offerings already on the 
table.101 In areas like Latin America, English-language films have the dominant market 
share ranging from 85-90 percent. Yet local productions, or side dishes, such as Sony’s 
Chico Xavier (2010, dir. Daniel Filho) earned over R$25 million and 2.8 spectators or 2 
Filhos de Francisco (2005, dir. Breno Silveira) with R$36.7 and over 5 million 
spectators.  
Another major reason cited for widespread investment in local productions is that 
comparatively they carry little financial risk. For example, Sony’s recent co-production 
of Chico Xavier with Lereby and Globo Filmes cost $12 million reais (US$6.6 million 
today).102 Local productions typically are less expensive than the average mid-range 
English-language film budget that in 2010 ranges from $45 to 60 million for production 
costs or before prints and advertising (P&A). In addition to theatrical release, DVD and 
broadcasting help these films achieve further local profitability and visibility.103 Since 
these films are intended for limited audiences, they require not only less money on the 
front-end but also less for P&A, distribution, and exhibition costs. Furthermore, local tax 
incentives can help cushion costs through tax breaks for investing in local productions 
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where the only “real” investment or loss for Sony is P&A.104 In the past two decades, 
numerous countries from Ireland to Mexico have passed aggressive local tax incentives to 
attract film productions and investments. As will be discussed in Chapter Four, tax 
incentives have been a deciding factor for establishing LLP operations in major Latin 
American markets, particularly in Brazil, allowing the local office an unprecedented 
amount of creative and financial autonomy. 
Yet, this strategy is not fool proof considering that not all LLPs, or any film for 
that matter, operate or perform as hoped, particularly when moving into markets with 
strong national or regional film industries such as India.105 After all, Sony learned that 
lesson in the early days of SPE. Additional challenges include complicated local tax 
codes and distribution rights. The home language markets, audiences, and, consequently, 
profits for these films are small. While one of Sony’s tentpole pictures may be released 
widely in about 3,700 U.S. screens, venues are limited in markets such as Russia, Brazil, 
and Mexico. For example, a “big” opening for a LLP in Brazil is 200 to 400 theaters, or 
150 to 250 in Spain, and the film may only stay in the theater for a few weeks to a 
month.106 Initially, the distribution model focusing on limited, domestic releases was the 
design for the LLP strategy. Sony’s LLPs were intended to complete but compliment 
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their English-language products. As discussed in Chapter Four and Five, market 
conditions changed in local territories, and Sony’s international division and SPE 
executive begin to restructure the strategy and push LLPs to perform wider in the late 
2000s. 
 
Sony’s Way: “Think Globally, Act Locally” 
By analyzing the interviews, reports, and industry trades, the language used by 
Sony American film executives reveals how the company constructs or describes the LLP 
strategy and their position in the global film industry. One figure historically associated 
with the LLP vision was SPE chairman John Calley. Calley’s installation as SPE CEO in 
1996 is associated within internal corporate memory as pushing localization efforts. Iona 
de Macedo credits Calley with making “Think Globally, Act Locally” as Sony’s 
production motto.107 Another executive behind developing the wide-scale implementation 
of Sony LLP policy is Gareth Wigan. Wigan, who oversaw each territory and signed off 
on greenlighting, described his role with local Sony offices and partners as 
collaborative.108 In general, most individuals working within local language productions 
describe Sony’s position in each local territory as one of collaboration or partnership. 
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 124 
Furthermore, many employees with Sony and other transnational media 
companies discuss their LLP operations in terms of cultural immersion or localization. 
Executives describe spending time to become “fluent in each countries’ business 
practices” by working closely with local producers and filmmakers.109 Because of this 
turn towards cultural investment, some executives argue their LLPs should be categorized 
and treated as part of local or national cinema. For example, a Fox international 
operations executive argued: “If we produce in the country of origin – in the language 
and culture of the country – we should be treated just like a local company . . . we should 
get the same benefits as a local producer.”110 Wigan saw Sony contributing and investing 
in local economies: “This is not Hollywood coming to work in Europe . . . [Melissa P 
(Spain/Italy, 2005, dir. Luca Guadagnino) or Friendship! (Germany, dir. Markus Goller, 
2010)] are genuinely European films.”111 In this comment, Wigan reflects the general 
views of most SPE international production executives. 
Yet, there is a critical push against the massive size, scale, and powerful position 
of these media companies. Similar in tone to the American protectionist backlash Sony 
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witnessed upon its Columbia purchase in 1989, the role of Sony executives (based both 
locally and in Culver City) with local producers is not always seen as collaborative 
relationship. Frank Rose regards the LLP strategy as the emergence of a new two-tier 
system in global filmmaking that largely benefits companies like Sony: “English is the 
language of the international blockbuster, but lower-budget pictures can be made in 
almost any language for the home market, and a few . . . will even become international 
hits. Hollywood, with its vast corporate resources, can call the shots in both tiers. All it 
has to learn is how not to reduce the world to cultural mush.”112 International companies 
such as Sony, Warner Bros., Fox, and so on continue to dominate the global film market, 
adapting and producing transnationally and locally focused content. From a largely 
political economy and corporate institutional perspective, a two-tier system furthers 
Hollywood’s historically hegemonic position. From the point of view of media scholars 
such as Toby Miller and Robert McChesney, Sony’s growing resources, expanding 
locations, and changing international production and distribution policies continue to 
resemble earlier definitions of media imperialism.   
Significantly, Hollywood executives echo the turn in academic debates by 
claiming that the local operations are, in effect, hybrid enterprises blending transnational 
operations with local partners.113 Specifically, Sony’s executives directly defend their 
                                                
112 Rose, accessed online. 
113 I am utilizing Jan Nederveen Pieterse’s definition of hybridity functioning “as part of a power 
relationship between center and margin, hegemony and minority, and indicates a blurring, destabilization or 
 126 
policies against claims of imperialism. Wigan argued: “We’re not carpetbaggers. Our 
goal is to put down roots and become part of the native talent pool and culture.”114 The 
former head of Sony’s international production division, Schindler acknowledges these 
concerns by largely defending their position: “Sure we’re coming into these territories 
from Hollywood, but we’re not going to impose Hollywood on them. It’s not the way 
[we] approach it.”115 Yet, in an attempt to marry the best of local “rich culture” with the 
“professionalism and the polish of Hollywood,” many executives arrogantly presume the 
lack of professionalism or “quality” available locally only can be developed by 
production companies working in Hollywood. 116 As will be illustrated in the following 
chapters, Sony executives have to readjust from being the “don” or boss of the film to 
another collaborator. Although many readily acknowledge the resources and 
infrastructure available to this large-scale global organization, these discussions ignore 
the specifics of these producing relationships between a local Sony operation and 
independent partners. Additionally, claims of local hybridity completely gloss over a long 
history of distribution, financial resources, dominant position of English-language media, 
and other advantages held by these transnational film companies.117  
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One of the most direct discussions of Sony’s LLP strategy emerged from CEO 
Michael Lynton’s 2007 op-ed in The Wall Street Journal.  Lynton questions the direct 
correlation between globalization and homogenization in order to defend Hollywood’s 
role in diversifying glocal markets. He claims the globalization of the entertainment 
business evident in the international wide-release and box office success of Sony’s film 
Spiderman 3 (2007, dir. Sam Raimi) is not “turning the world into an American shopping 
mall” but instead “encouraging the proliferation of cultural diversity.” Engaging in 
academic debates regarding media imperialism and globalization, Lynton contends “these 
are not signs of Hollywood’s homogenizing effect on the world. They are signs of the 
world changing the way Hollywood works. It makes sense to marry our production, 
marketing, and distribution experience with the growing global appetite for entertainment 
tailor-made by and for a variety of cultures.” He argues Sony’s move towards adapting 
content to local markets is the proof of heterogeneous, mediated culture, whereas 
“Hollywood is not simply a place in Southern California. It is a symbol of an 
entertainment culture which is becoming as diverse as it is universal.”118  
Why is Sony conflated with Hollywood and its assumed position as the universal, 
every place? Lynton attempts to shape conversations about Sony’s position in the 
ubiquitous “foreign” or “international” market that relate to academic theories of cultural 
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discount to explain the international appeal of English-language films.119 While Lynton’s 
opinion essay appears more as a public relations piece for Hollywood’s foreign policy or 
expanding position abroad, it is loaded with academic language that echoes earlier 
debates discussed in the previous chapter. Essentially, Lynton is arguing against media 
imperialism and the idea of one-way flow of Hollywood products imposed on the rest of 
the world. Instead, he argues for local markets pushing back against Sony’s presence and, 
in turn, altering its practices and content. However, this should be understood as SPE’s 
constructed corporate language and discourse aimed at neutralizing criticism of Global 
Hollywood and its powerful position as a producer and distributor.  
Throughout this chapter, I have noted that in discussing the LLP strategy, Lynton 
and other SPE executives fall back on the global/local dichotomy—Hollywood as global 
and Brazil/Germany/China/India as local—without acknowledging this problematic 
classification or the company’s dominant historical presence. From Sony’s corporate 
perspective, the development and the implementation of the LLP strategy is a 
streamlined, uncomplicated process of a major transnational film company entering and 
operating in various national and regional film industries. However, in examining two 
different Sony LLP operations, the location-specific situations are more complicated than 
the case of media imperialism or Global Hollywood as academic literature would suggest 
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or the harmonious and equal partnerships as Sony executives would describe. As the 
following chapters will illustrate, Sony’s local language production divisions do much to 
navigate and negotiate local conditions and cultural practices that differ greatly from 
region to region. As illustrated by industry discourse and extensive field research, many 
Sony do Brasil employees and local partners argue that both their bosses at SPE and local 
division have given up control and the process in Brazil has become a more blended, or 
what I am calling translocal, process. For the Spain LLP operation, Columbia Español, 
regional, national, and local pressures shape the LLP strategy differently. Yet, while my 
research suggests a process between transnational and local actors where power shifts and 
is negotiated back and forth. The Spain case also suggests a more hands-on, centralized 
relationship and a different negotiation process among Sony international division LA 
headquarters, the Madrid operation, and their local partners.  
 
Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter was to provide the institutional history and industrial 
context necessary to understand the development of Sony’s LLP strategy. The pursuit of 
“all” markets through cross-media and cross-cultural expansion reflects the reimagining 
of Sony Pictures Entertainment in the 1990s and 2000s. Sony’s transformation into a 
diverse hardware-software media company was largely driven by these global film and 
television operations. This chapter in no way can address all of the broad and multi-
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layered strategies for expanding international operations during this period. Yet, three 
key examples of internationalization—the Columbia acquisition and “culture clash,” the 
move into Latin America television industries as a testing ground, and the development 
and implementation of the LLP strategy—offer an interrelated and complex picture of the 
globalization of a media corporation, their content, and imagined audiences. These three 
internationalization strategies are not only symptomatic of larger political, economic, 
technological and cultural shifts occurring across global media markets but also the 
corporate language, practices, and international expansion that come to characterize 
Sony’s international production and distribution operations post-1989. 
In conclusion, I want to focus on three implications of Sony’s international 
operations that are addressed throughout this project. First, Sony’s focus on cross-media 
expansion reflects the convergence of film, television, and home entertainment as 
interconnected, particularly in the case of Latin American television industries. While 
television may be a different group than the film divisions under the SPE umbrella, this 
history of Sony provides a different perspective on the relationship between television 
and film and how they operate through some level of flexibility (or as I discuss below, 
various divisions also contradict each other). Creative staff, production strategies, and 
partnerships are mobile and interrelated in a way for which traditional film studies does 
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not account in the expansive, general histories of Sony’s media divisions.120 Furthermore, 
this cross-media emphasis reflects a larger industry-wide convergence of media 
companies, technology, and medium-specific production and distribution as will be 
illustrated by the role of television and home video in Sony’s LLP operations in Brazil 
and Spain. 
Second, the Sony Corporation through SPE aims to pursue all media in “all” 
markets. But what becomes clear from early in this pursuit is they do not actually mean 
all markets. At first Sony’s international film and television operations focus on North 
America, Latin America, Europe, and parts of East Asia. In turn, this localizing 
production and distribution initiative ignores Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. 
Only by the late-2000s do LLP operations expand on a project-by-project basis to parts of 
the Middle East and India. It is important to acknowledge how Sony imagines “all” 
markets or global operations through mostly Westernized, developing world models. As 
this study of Sony’s LLP strategy between the late-1990s and 2010 reveals a reimagining 
and refocusing of international audiences from a reliance on traditional, Western 
European markets to strategic attempts at capturing the growing economic markets in 
Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Represented as a regional category, BRIC, these four 
nations are positioned as the fastest growing economies and population. By the late 
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2000s, IMPPG restructured and shut down its LLP operations in Madrid and Hong Kong 
and, instead, refocused efforts on Brazil, Russia, and India.  
Third, a problem with this corporate history, a largely U.S.-based corporate top-
down approach, is how it creates a narrative of SPE expanding their localized production 
and distribution operations through collaborations in a variety of political, economic, and 
socio-cultural locations with some range of success. This traditional political economic 
perspective offers a historical trajectory for local language films, but it cannot account for 
the human factor, the messy creative and financial relationships that produce these 
products’ media. I want to move beyond corporate sound bites of LLP strategy and 
understandings of Sony as a Japanese corporation or Hollywood film studio in order to 
understand how local industry conditions, partnerships, and internal politics create local 
language productions. From the “culture clash” of the Columbia acquisition or the 
abandoning of TV production in Latin America, conflicts and backlash in local markets at 
Sony’s position in local media emerge. One of the central issues that addressed in my 
research is the varying definitions of local media inside Sony’s diverse international 
operations and in their target markets. 
In turn, I will implement a more expansive cultural studies approach around 
issues of power, negotiation, and agency of cultural workers in local industries. Moving 
beyond an institutional history, I conduct mid-level field research interviewing various 
media professionals working for and with Sony LLP operations in Latin America and 
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Europe. These two LLP locations serve as illustrative counterpoints of Sony’s strategy. 
Sony do Brasil’s local language productions succeeded as a translocal operation. 
Columbia Español’s inability to negotiate regional and national pressures and conditions 
with the corporate strategy result failed for theoretically intriguing reasons. They must 
negotiate a shift from a one-size-fit-all distribution strategy to creating culturally specific 
content within shifting industrial conditions due to piracy and declining theatrical 
audiences. Furthermore, Columbia Español’s local partners view this relationship and 
Sony’s position in their local or regional industries from a collaborative to controlling 
partner. Local language productions are invoked and constructed in debates conflicting 
views of local cinema and culture between SPE’s international production division 
headquarters in Los Angeles, specific LLP territory operations, and local producing and 
distributing partners. 
A key layer of debates surrounding the LLP is varying definitions of local or 
national cinema. The discourse surrounding what defines or “counts” reflects larger 
issues debated by media scholars and government agencies for decades surrounding 
geographical boundaries of cultural industries. Part of the debates center on definitions of 
national cinema from where the money comes, what tax incentives are utilized, the home 
of cast and crew, production location, the cultural content, intended audience. If Sony is a 
Japanese company with American divisions and European or Latin American locations 
and employees, is Sony a local or international partner? Can Sony be both? As I will 
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explore from an on-the-ground perspective in the following two chapters, these 
distinctions drive many of the debates with Sony’s partners regarding local language 
productions.  
The following chapter will look at Sony’s LLP entrance into the Brazilian cinema 
against the backdrop of an industry evolving from state to privately funded. An integrated 
circuit of political, economic, industrial, and cultural conditions effect Sony do Brasil’s 
participation as co-production partner in Brazil. As I will discuss, particular local industry 
practices shape Sony do Brasil’s LLP strategy. Brazilian producers and distributors view 
their position and partnership in relation to Sony do Brasil in making local language films 
from a variety of perspectives. Overall, what are the implications of this case for 
understanding broader trends at the transnational or comparative level?            
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Chapter 4  
Sony do Brasil as Translocal Player: How Contemporary Brazilian Film 
Partnerships and Policies Shape LLPs 
From favela films to romantic comedies, since the early 1990s a change in 
Brazilian audiovisual financing policies stimulated the national industry and led to an 
increase in transnational production and distribution partnerships. As the world’s fifth 
largest country, Brazil has witnessed a series of transformations significantly over the 
past decade. The country of 200 million is one of the fastest growing economies with 
rising incomes, lower unemployment, an expanding middle class, and increasing foreign 
investment credited largely to the administration of President Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva 
(2003 - 2009).1 In the midst of this growth, the Brazilian film industry has undergone a 
pivotal restructuring from a nationally focused, state-supported enterprise up until 1990 
to a more globalized and commercialized, incentive-driven system over the following 
decades. Within this contemporary national cinema, distinct production and distribution 
models have emerged and are structured around a geographically complex network of 
actors, institutions, practices, and policies. Various competing and partnering institutions 
and agencies participate in film production ranging from the prefeitura (municipal) 
mixed-public/private enterprise Rio Filme and national regulatory and financial agency 
ANCINE to local distribution company Downtown Filmes and transnational corporation 
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Sony Pictures Entertainment. The combination of these various agents complicates 
contemporary notions of local co-productions and the position of the various 
trans/national players involved. 
Sony do Brasil is one of the key institutions actively involved in film investment 
since this 1990s rebirth or retomada. It also operates as one of the earliest and most 
significant market examples of Sony’s local language production strategy, a development 
often absent from the English-language trade paper accounts. Sony do Brasil existed 
previously in the form of Columbia Pictures do Brasil. While Columbia maintained a 
historical position partnering with local companies to produce projects since the 1950s, 
significantly, this national industry also represents one of Sony’s earliest and most 
successful markets for the LLP strategy after the 1989 corporate acquisition of 
Columbia.2 As my historical overview will illustrate, today Sony do Brasil includes the 
distribution division Columbia that allows it to maintain a systematic and strategic 
position in the local industry. Expanded largely to take advantage of the shift in national 
audiovisual policy and flood of productions released since the mid-1990s, Sony do Brasil 
actively invests in two to three local language productions per year. While two to four 
LLPs per year is a typical production slate for their peers such as Warner Bros. or Fox, 
Sony do Brasil’s project consistently place in the top grossing Brazilian films each year. 
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However, this is not merely a one-sided retelling from the perspective of the 
transnational media company looking to expand its business vis-à-vis larger forces of 
globalization such as commercialization, privatization, and conglomeration. As outlined 
in earlier chapters, traditional media industry and political economy literature such as 
media imperialism and Global Hollywood would predict two scenarios: 1) Sony do Brasil 
follows a global corporate strategy for LLPs spanning from East Asia to Latin America 
alluding to the power and direct management of Sony corporate over its local operations, 
and 2) the historically dominant position, bargaining power, and corporate resources of a 
media conglomerate would allow Sony do Brasil to have the controlling or loudest voice 
in any local partnership. Although global forces clearly have helped to shape this local 
film industry, a macro-level perspective leaves little room for “local-to-local 
articulations” of human agency, dissonance, or resistance.3  
My mid-level fieldwork reveals Sony operating as translocal in a more 
complicated and contradictory situation than predicted.4 Borrowed from Timothy 
Havens, Amanda D. Lotz, and Serra Tinic, my mid-level work emphasizes industry 
analyses that examine the “complex interactions” across cultural and economic forces 
and the business culture of media industries. In order understand the complex nature of 
media conglomerates, this type of research encompasses field research and interviews 
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speaking with executives and creative workers about their activities and how they 
internalize and negotiate institutional discourses and strategies.5 By examining the 
executives and cultural works responsible for producing Brazilian LLPs, a different 
perspective of a transnational media company working with local partners emerges. In 
this current co-production system Sony do Brasil participates less as a direct agent of 
policies enforced from Sony Pictures in the United States and more as quasi-autonomous 
local subsidiary and distribution partner within Brazilian cinema. 
The goal of this chapter is to consider the position and partnerships of Sony do 
Brasil within the context of a changing trans/national industry. How do the partnerships 
between Sony and local actors operate? Is Sony importing Hollywood production and 
distribution models or is it adapting to Brazilian industry models? What is Sony’s 
strategy for investing in Brazilian co-productions? How does creative agency function in 
relation to financing? How do the local producers think about these projects?  This is not 
a story of merely media imperialism or even the forceful interfering hand of a media 
conglomerate guiding local operations. Instead what emerges is a distinct production and 
distribution mentality shaped by a complex history and network of trans/national 
partnerships and negotiations. 
 In order to understand the impetus behind the current incentive-based, market-
driven industry attracting transnational partners, in the first section I describe the 
                                                
5 ibid., 247. 
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historical context behind Brazilian cinema and the historical position of Sony/Columbia. I 
briefly will trace the evolution of the Brazilian film industry since the 1920s vis-à-vis 
Sony/Columbia’s participation. This includes the policies, mechanisms, and institutions 
key in the evolution, decline, rebirth, and commercialization of Brazilian cinema and the 
industry and local government’s position on international partnerships over time. On the 
one hand, the industry experiences periods from protectionist policies and developmental 
discourse to open encouragement and incentivizing of international partners. All of these 
cycles have come to shape the current industrial climate. On the other hand, a notable 
transformation has occurred since the early 1990s due to larger political economic forces 
of globalization and significant institutional pressure by inside trans/national actors. 
Brazilian local language productions represent the current globalized state of media 
industries when so-called national media productions consist of various partners across 
city, state, national, and transnational spaces.  
The core of this chapter focuses on the contemporary production and distribution 
patterns and practices of these local language co-productions based on my interviews, 
fieldwork, and archival research in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. By speaking with local 
producers, distributors, and government policymakers as well as directors of local 
operations of transnational media companies such as Sony do Brasil (or “os majors” / the 
major studios as they are known in Brazil) and the former head of the MPA Latin 
America, I investigated the daily, on-the-ground realities and complexities of co-
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production relationships by speaking with the various actors involved in the co-
productions Chico Xavier (2010, dir. Daniel Filho), 5xs Favela: Agora Por Nós Memos 
(2010, dir. Carlos Diegues), and Lope (2010, dir. Andrucha Waddington). These filmic 
examples demonstrate the processes and thinking related to raising funds, marketing 
practices, and attracting national audiences. The most salient discourses I found emerge 
around Brazilian blockbuster vs. international art cinema, authorial vs. “popular” 
commercial projects, local vs. international funding sources, creative agency and 
decision-making, and growing national popular audiences. 
I did not find Brazilian production and distribution operating in a cohesive 
cultural linguistic region or Ibero-America media market. Although there are funding 
mechanisms and organizations such as IBERMEDIA and nation-to-nation co-production 
treaties, Sony do Brasil does not utilize these resources. Instead it conceptualizes 
Brazilian cinema within traditional national boundaries. A production mentality emerges 
around the idea of “Brazil as different” or “Brazil as complicated” in relation to other 
trans/national industries and partnerships as well as the distinct nature of negotiations and 
creative agency. Yet, the internationalization of distribution and exhibition systems 
reveals the continued controversial position of key financial policies and privileging of 
Sony do Brasil and other MPA members. In turn, what my research concludes is that 
Sony do Brasil operates in a national audiovisual market driven by competing and 
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contradictory practices, policies, and systems that suggests shifting notions of power, 
decision-making objectives, and trans/national cultural industries. 
Sony developed the LLP as part of a global strategy and the Brazilian operation 
functions translocally balancing between a local partner and transnational entity. I am 
adapting the term from Patrick Murphy and Marwan Kraidy’s definition that calls for a 
comprehension of the “articulation of the global with the local.”6 This not only 
demonstrates the disjunctive and contradictory nature of the media conglomerate but also 
the interwoven, complex nature of the contemporary trans/national filmmaking processes 
and the arguably historically both globalized and national nature of the Brazilian film 
industry. 
 
BRAZILIAN FILM INDUSTRY: A TRANS/NATIONAL HISTORY 
During the early 1990s, state-supported film mechanisms were removed and film 
production decreased to zero. After a restructuring the financial system and a supported, 
booming production culture known as the retomada or rebirth, which I discuss later in 
this section, the Brazilian film industry produced from thirty to fifty films annually by the 
mid-1990s. Today, with a healthy economy and growing local film audiences and 
theatrical spaces, the Brazilian industry produced 135 films in 2010 in relation to the 374 
films imported and released. Brazilian films captured twenty percent of the theatrical 
                                                
6 Murphy & Kraidy, 304. 
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market share in 2010. Furthermore, 154 of those films belonged to MPAA film studios 
such as Sony, Warner Bros., and Fox, or “os majors” as they are called within the 
industry, with thirty of those films Brazilian co-productions. It is important to note that 
English-language films distributed in Brazil by Sony such as The Karate Kid (2010, dir. 
Harald Zwart) or Eat, Pray, Love (2010, dir. Ryan Murphy) dominate their release slate 
in terms of gross profits and showing in 400-250 screens, an average two million 
spectators, and $R17 million gross. While the majors distribute less than half of the 
motion pictures released in Brazil, Sony and its peers capture an annual market share of 
80 to 90 percent. However, the market for Sony’s and other os majors local language 
production is expanding. LLPs such as Sony’s Chico Xavier (2010, dir. Daniel Filho) or 
Fox’s Nosso Lar (2010, dir. Wagner de Assis) are released in more screens (400-450 
screens as opposed to previous 200-250 screen standard of the 2000s), capturing larger 
audiences (three to four million per picture), and higher ticket returns (R$30-36 million). 
Although 2010 proved to be a strong year for Brazilian theatrical releases, in some cases, 
Sony do Brasil’s LLPs out perform its English language content as illustrated above. 
A major difference for Sony’s LLPs in the Brazilian market is the emphasis on 
theatrical returns over home entertainment. In fact, due to the high cost of DVDs, cable, 
and satellite for consumers as well as high levels of physical and online piracy, there is 
not a major ancillary market in Brazil. Even with most DVDs rented not purchased, the 
rental sector has dwindled with DVD rentals decreasing by 60 percent between 2006 and 
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2009. Furthermore, because piracy is a major issue with more than 59 percent of DVDs 
are pirated copies.7 Due to the lack of DVD markets, one independent distributor 
suggests the necessity of relying on popular genres and big stars to guarantee a successful 
opening weekend: “Now we have to do better theatrically, which has made us bet more 
and more on the genres that really work at cinemas.”8 
Not surprisingly, the success of a Brazilian LLP is determined theatrically and 
movie-going audiences are growing due to improved economic conditions as well as 
more theaters are built in mid-sized cities and rural areas and the number of theaters, and 
screens, is increasing. The average audience member historically has been relegated to 
the upper-middle and upper classes due to the high price of admissions (R$8-10) and 
concentration of theaters in urban centers such as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Brasília. 
In the late-2000s, movie-going demographics have shifted to include a wider socio-
economic and geographical diversity. While Brazil is still one of the most under-screened 
film markets in the world, by 2011, the number of screens totaled 2,200 with an estimated 
250 additional screens to open by the end of 2012.9 In turn, as the Brazilian film audience 
has grown in the past two decades so has the demand for more feature length motion 
picture releases within the theatrical market. According to the Senior Vice President of 
Sony Pictures International Releasing, Steve O’Dell:  
                                                
7 Guerini, “The Land of the Promise,” accessed online. 
8 ibid. 
9 Elaine Guerini, “Brazilian Cinema Boom to Follow Shopping Mall Growth,” Screen International (28 
June 2011) accessed online (7 July 2011). 
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Brazil is one of the markets in the world with the most promise for growth for our 
industry. If this growth successfully reaches more economic classes, which right 
now can’t afford to go to the cinema — and we’re talking about tens of millions 
of people — we could see incredible growth and bring entire new audiences back 
to the movies.10 
 
One strategy to meet this growing demand for local content has been Sony do Brasil’s 
local language production strategy. 
 Located in the media capital São Paulo, Sony do Brasil consists of a general 
manager and three director-run divisions: theatrical, home entertainment, and television. 
Sony has been one of the most prominent co-producers and distributors since the 1990s 
production boom or retomada. Until 1999, Sony do Brasil was the only MPAA studio co-
producing local language films. By the early 2000s, Sony invested in more than half of 
the popular and commercially successful films including Deus é brasileiro (2003, dir. 
Diegues), Carandiru (2003, dir. Hector Babenco), Cazuza (2004, dir. Sandra Werneck), 
and Dois Filhos de Francisco (2005, dir. Breno Silveira).11 In 2004, Sony do Brasil made 
over 45 percent of its revenue from local productions, which today includes an average of 
three productions per year. In order to invest in a new project, all three divisions have to 
approve the script while the executives in the New York City and Culver City 
international production division offices approve the prints and advertising budget.12 
                                                
10 Guerini, accessed online. 
11 MPA Brasil, accessed online (1 December 2009) http://www.mpaal.org.br/br/filmes.htm 
12 Sony do Brasil and Buena Vista International are a joint venture. While they share the same director, 
Rodrigo Braga Saturnino, employees, and the same office, the two business are completely separate; Jorge 
Peregrino, Paramount, interview by author; Rodrigo Saturnino, Sony do Brasil, interview by author, 15 
September 2010, São Paulo, Brazil. 
 145 
Although it is following the parent company’s local co-production strategy, Sony do 
Brasil calls itself a Brazilian, not an American, company.13 It focuses on co-producing 
solely for the Brazilian market, working with established or new talent, and searching for 
the next local blockbuster.14 
The history of state policies and the industrial climate in the past century 
facilitated Sony/Columbia’s entrance and encouraged participation in local productions. 
One of the goals of this chapter is to illustrate how the relationship between international 
partners such as Sony/Columbia and local producers, distributors, and policymakers is 
more complex than often depicted and reveals shifting or contradictory motivations 
within the Brazilian film industry. It is vital to outline earlier debates and criticism in 
order to locate their reappearance during the 1990s retomada and drive to “restructure” 
the film industry. 
According Randal Johnson, historically “Brazilian cinema, even without direct 
government protection or intervention, [has been] in many ways dependent on or shaped 
by the state and its policies.”15 Since the creation of the first federal law to protect 
national cinema in 1932, the government has facilitated film production through 
developmental and protectionist policies in an effort to develop a sustainable film 
                                                
13 Rodrigo Saturnino, Sony do Brasil, interview by author. 
14 The current structure of Sony do Brasil consists of one General Manager (Rodrigo Saturnino Braga) and 
three division heads: theatrical (Eloisa Winther), home entertainment (Wilson Cabral) and television 
(Dorien Sutherland). During the interview process, I was able to speak with Saturnino and Winther. 
15 Randal Johnson, The Film Industry in Brazil: Culture and the State (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1987): 10. 
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industry and culture. As early as the beginning of the Getulio Vargas administration 
(1930-1954), the state has worked to stimulate music, film, and the arts as a way of 
shaping a cohesive national culture and identity.16 Many of these policies have been 
presented as a reaction against the dominant presence of American film companies and 
culture.17 By 1929, Columbia Pictures already had a strong distribution presence and 
market share because of the international distribution of its English-language films.18 
According to the film scholars and local Sony employees I interviewed, Sony/Columbia’s 
long-term presence in Brazilian cinema production and distribution is something often 
overlooked when talking about contemporary LLPs and was a surprising discovery in the 
research process.19 
In the late 1940s, a São Paulo-based group formed the Vera Cruz studio. By 
adopting a studio model similar to MGM, they hoped to create a system to produce 
quality films to rival Hollywood.20 In partnership with Vera Cruz, Columbia Pictures and 
Universal Pictures distributed projects such as the internationally acclaimed O 
Cangaceiro (The Bandit of Brazil, 1953, dir. Lima Barreto).21 Not surprisingly, many 
                                                
16 Examples include samba and popular chanchada musical films in this cultural policy. See Hermano 
Viana, The Mystery of Samba, Translated by John Charles Chasteen (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1999). 
17 Melina Izar Marson, Cinema e Políticas de Estado (São Paulo: Escrituras, 2009): 13. 
18 Randal Johnson and Robert Stam, eds. Brazilian Cinema, 2nd edition. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1995): 36. 
19 Professor Anita Sims, UNESP, interview by author, 13 September 2010, São Paulo, Brazil. Rodrigo 
Saturnino, Sony do Brasil, interview by author, 15 September 2010, São Paulo, Brazil. 
20 ibid, 27-29. 
21 Johnson, 62. 
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Brazilian filmmakers and critics including Nelson Pereira dos Santos criticized the 
American companies’ relationship with the Brazilian studio. Pereira dos Santos claimed 
that a company like Columbia “has in its hands a Brazilian Hollywood that produces 
films in its [Hollywood’s] interests, at low cost, and in the country’s language, which 
makes them all the more efficient.”22 According to the current Sony do Brasil general 
manager, one of the reasons Columbia entered into these partnerships was due to the 
“cota de tela” or screen quotas at the time, requiring that one local feature receive 
theatrical release for every eight foreign films each year.23 Screen quotas have long been 
a protectionist policy in Brazil to balance the screen time given to Brazilian and foreign 
films in theatrical distribution. These quotas have ranged from a 1:1 ratio in 1932 to a 
minimum of 140 days per year of Brazilian films’ exhibition in 1980.24 
The Vera Cruz project ultimately was unsustainable due to an overreaching 
strategy to conquer simultaneously both the domestic and international markets. This 
commercial filmmaking model was difficult for one studio to sustain without a strong 
economic infrastructure and distribution system.25 Between the 1950s and 1960s, the 
government created a variety of evolving and revolving national organizations such as 
Grupo Executivo da Indústria Cinematográfica (GEICINE, 1961-1966) and the Instituto 
                                                
22 ibid, 68; Alessandra Meleiro, ed. Cinema e Mercado “O pensamento industrial cinematográfico 
brasileiro, by Arthur Autran (Escrituras: São Paulo, 2009): 18. 
23 Rodrigo Saturnino, Sony do Brasil, interview by author, 15 September 2010, São Paulo, Brazil. 
24 Johnson, 185. 
25 Johnson and Stam, 28-9. 
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Nacional do Cinema (INC, 1966-1975) to stimulate national film production. Similar to 
the import substitution model created to support the national automobile and agricultural 
industries, the programs were based on the developmental ideologies popular with Latin 
American governments at the time. During the period, economist and future president 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso championed development as a strategy to strengthen the 
economy of the modern nation. He believed potential development strategies such as 
import substitution would drive “the progress of production forces, mainly through the 
import of technology, capital accumulation, penetration of local economies by foreign 
enterprise, increase in numbers of wage-earning groups and intensification of social 
division of labor.”26 By stimulating and developing national industries internally, 
Cardoso believed in breaking Brazil’s cycle of dependence on the United States and 
Europe.  
During this period, the GEICINE and later INC set up film production financing 
that allowed foreign distributors to invest “income tax on profit derived from the 
exhibition of foreign films . . . to be used in the co-production of national films.”27 
Although there was widespread opposition to this financing scheme by the Brazilian 
filmmaking community, foreign distributors set up co-production partnerships that later 
became a key resource for Cinema Novo directors. For example, Columbia Pictures do 
                                                
26 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Dependency and Development in Latin America Translated by Marjory 
Mattingly Urquidi Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979): xxiv. 
27 Johnson, 112. 
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Brasil and Screen Gems do Brasil co-produced Arnaldo Jabor’s first feature-length film, 
Pindorama (1970).28 Significantly, Cinema Novo began as an oppositional political 
movement against Brazilian commercial cinema and Hollywood’s dominant influence 
over aesthetics, narrative structure, and distribution models.29 The film movement 
championed New Wave aesthetics and realism and focused on urban and rural stories of 
poverty, struggle, and hardship.  
The country experienced a coup and entered a military dictatorship lasting from 
1964 to 1985. Any type of dissent or criticism led to intense censorship, arrest, and exile 
of filmmakers, musicians, or activists. Yet, the military regime invested heavily in 
cultural programs such as national cinema programs. In 1969, the government created the 
“mixed-owned enterprise” Empresa Brasileira de Filmes (Embrafilme) that eventually 
replaced earlier co-production and incentive-based systems by 1975.30 For the first time, 
“the government became an active agent and productive force in the industry.”31 Initially 
focused on distribution, Embrafilme began directly to invest in productions and, in a few 
                                                
28 Rodrigo Saturnino, Sony do Brasil, interview by author. 
29 According to Robert Stam and Randal Johnson, Cinema Novo evolved through specific phases: “each 
corresponding to a specific period of Brazilian political life. After a preparatory period running roughly 
from 1954 to 1960, we see three main phases: a first phase going from 1960 to 1964, the date of the 
first coup d'etat; from 1964 to 1968, the date of the second coup, within-the-coup; and from 1963 to 1972. 
After 1972, it becomes increasingly difficult to speak of Cinema Novo; one must speak, rather, of Brazilian 
Cinema. This latter period is marked by esthetic pluralism under the auspices of the state organ 
Embrafilme. While such a posteriori divisions are artificial and problematic, they are also broadly useful, 
because they illustrate the inseparable connection between political struggle and cultural production.” 
Robert Stam and Randal Johnson, “Brazil Renaissance, Introduction  
Beyond Cinema Novo,” Jump Cut no. 21 (Nov. 1979): 13-18 accessed online (22 May 2011). 
30 Johnson & Stam, 368.   
31 Johnson, 137-8. 
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cases, provided 100 percent of the production budget. At its height, the enterprise 
produced 80 to 100 films per year and garnered a market share of 35 percent.32 However, 
filmmakers, industrial accounts, and general public opinion criticized Embrafilme as a 
clientele system with a financing focus more on artistic rather than commercial projects 
for a wider audience.33 It was difficult for anyone but established and/or Cinema Novo or 
Embrafilme era filmmakers such as Carlos Diegues and Bruno Barreto to receive 
funding. Much of the financing schemes, production mentality, negotiation styles, and 
professional relationships developed during the Embrafilme era would have a direct 
impact on the industry in the 1990s and 2000s.34 The filmmaker’s creative autonomy 
under this system remains an industry standard as will be discussed in the following 
section. The relationships among Brazilian policymakers, producers, and distributors in 
this system created during this period are maintained in the current film industry. This is 
because many professionals working for and running Embrafilme would later go on to 
become the heads of the current national film agency, Sony do Brasil, and so on.  
Beginning in the 1980s, Western international pressure towards neoliberal 
economic policies and free trade coincided with high unemployment and inflation in 
                                                
32 Alessandra Meleiro, ed. Cinema e Mercado “Políticas públicas federais de apoio à indústria 
cinematográfica brasileira,” ed. João Paulo Rodrigues Matta (Escrituras: São Paulo, 2009): 43-4. 
33 Marson, 13. 
34 Rodrigo Saturnino, Sony do Brasil, interview by author; Jorge Peregrino, Paramount Pictures, interview 
by author, 25 August 2010, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Bruno Wainer, Downtown Filmes, interview by author, 
9 September 2010, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
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Brazil.35 Declining resources and profits plagued Embrafilme amidst larger inter/national 
political economic trends of deregulation and privatization sweeping Latin America. 
Carolin Overhoff Ferreira describes how President Collor in 1990 “immediately 
implemented a plan to modernize the Brazilian economy according to the neo-liberal 
recipe of global capitalism . . . [which] resulted in mass unemployment, the temporary 
freezing of salaries and savings, and the extinction of foundations and public 
companies.”36 In turn, the Collor government dismantled the state film enterprise in 1990 
as part of widespread cuts to state-supported cultural policies. His administration treated 
cultural programs such as Embrafilme as a ‘problem for the market’ to solve and not the 
government.37 
In retrospect, what happened next has been named o collapso (the collapse). 
According to the former Audiovisual Secretary, José Álvaro Moisés:  
the entire Brazilian film production and distribution support fell apart  . . . as a 
result, Brazilian films, which had one third of the market share in the 1970s, only 
managed 0.5 per cent of the market in the early 1990s, leaving behind a vacuum 
which was quickly filled by a more competitive alternative product, namely 
American cinema.38  
 
Without a centralized funding or distribution scheme to replace it, national film 
production fell to three films in 1992 and nine films in 1993. Of the 1,186 films released 
                                                
35 Randal Johnson, “Film Policy in Latin America,” Film Policy: International, National and Regional 
Perspectives ed. Albert Moran (London: Routledge, 1996): 140. 
36 Carolin Overhoff Ferreira, “The Limits of Luso-Brazilian Brotherhood: Fortress Europe in the Film 
Foreign Land,” Third Text 20:6 (November 2006): 734. 
37 Marson, 17. 
38 José Álvaro Moisés, “A New Policy for Brazilian Cinema,” The New Brazilian Cinema ed. Lúcia Nagig 
(London: I.B. Taurus, 2003): 7. 
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in Brazil between 1990 and 1993, only 29 produced locally.39 This mobilized the film 
community including Marco Altberg, the former head of Embrafilme, to pressure the 
state for alternatives to foster local film production and distribution.40  
Between 1991 and 1993, the Congress passed two key pieces of legislation to 
alleviate the audiovisual funding problems: Lei Rouanet (Lei Federal no. 8.313/91) and 
Lei do Audiovisual [Audiovisual Law] (Lei Federal no. 8.685/93).41 While the Rouanet 
Law functions primarily as a mechanism for corporate sponsorship, the Audiovisual Law 
Articles 3 and 3A operate as mechanisms of investment or co-production as outlined 
below. 
Mechanism Article Function Company Example 
Lei Rouanet  patrocínio: corporate or individual 
sponsorship 









1 investment or co-productions: 
active participation and logo 
promotion 
Petrobras, state governments, 
Bradesco 
1A patrocínio or sponsorship: exchange 
income tax for image promotion 
Petrobras, Banco do Brasil, 
TAM 
3 investment or co-productions: 
allows for withholding tax to be 
invested in films 
Sony do Brasil, Buena Vista, 
Warner Bros., Universal, 
Fox, Paramount 
 
Fig. 4.1 Brazilian Film Financing Mechanisms, Early 1990s 
                                                
39 Rêgo, 86. 
40 Marson, 11; Isabel Vincent, “Brazil’s Cameras Are Rolling Again,” The Globe and Mail C15 (4 May 
1996). 
41 ANCINE, interview by author, 11 September 2010, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
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A number of producers, distributors, academics, and government professionals 
credit these tax-based incentive mechanisms for stimulating a mid-1990s cycle of film 
productions known as the retomada.42 The retomada does not refer to an organized 
movement by filmmakers or a new visual style as in the case of Cinema Novo.43  Instead, 
it describes the rebirth of the market between 1994 and 1998. The result is a steady 
increase of local productions from seven films in 1994 to eleven, twenty-one, twenty-
two, and thirty-three films released the following four years, respectively. Reflecting a 
significant increase in audience numbers for national cinema and increased attention in 
international film festivals, films produced during the early part of the retomada include 
Carlota Joaquina: princesa do Brasil (1994, dir. Carla Camurati), O Quatrilho (1995, 
dir. Fábio Barreto), Tieta do Agreste (1996, dir. Carlos Diegues), O que é isso, 
companheiro? (1997, dir. Bruno Barreto), and Central do Brasil (1998, dir. Walter 
Salles).44 Sony do Brasil participated in many of the films recognized with reviving local 
production, such as Tieta do Agreste; O que é isso, companheiro?; and A Guerra de 
Canudos (1997, dir. Sergio Rezende). 
In addition to a production boom, these early financing mechanisms mark a 
strategic shift away from Embrafilme’s direct involvement to facilitating investment by 
                                                
42 Rodrigo Saturnino, Sony do Brasil, interview by author; Bruno Wainer, Downtown Filmes, interview by 
author; Steve Solot, Rio Film Commission and former VP MPA Latin America, interview by author, 22 
August 2010, Rio de Janeiro; Mario Diamante, ANCINE, interview by author. 
43 Marson, 11. 
44 For a discussion of retomada films, see The New Brazilian Cinema ed. Lúcia Nagib (London: I.B. 
Taurus, 2003). 
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national and international corporate partners. Specifically, Article 3 of the Audiovisual 
Law permits foreign distributors with local subsidiaries such as Sony or Warner Bros. to 
invest up to 70 percent of their income tax on local profits from their English-language 
products into Brazilian film projects.45 This portion of the Audiovisual Law greatly 
shaped commercial filmmaking in Brazil for the next two decades and, as my interviews 
suggest, dominate debates within the film community about the state and globalization of 
the national industry. 
It should not be surprising that restructuring the audiovisual industry would 
position Brazilian cinema within a transnational co-production context. Although film 
scholars and producers proclaim contemporary Brazilian cinema as newly globalized 
since the retomada, Brazilian cinema has operated from the early days as a transnational 
industry through its relationship with international distributors, co-production partners, 
and financial policies.46 The imagined national policies to protect and stimulate Brazilian 
audiovisual industries are typically developed and implemented with both national and 
transnational actors, institutions, and factors/context in mind. Brazilian cinema is 
inseparable from its relationship from other national industries and international 
institutions, such as Sony/Columbia.    
                                                
45 Cacilda Rêgo, “Brazilian Cinema: Its Fall, Rise, and Renewal (1990-2003)” New Cinemas: Journal of 
Contemporary Film 3 (2005): 88. 
46 Marson, 181.  
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In the early 2000s, the Brazilian government expanded the financing model for 
the audiovisual industry. This included the creation of a government audiovisual board, 
the National Film Agency ANCINE in 2001. ANCINE functions as an independent 
autarquia47 and strategic unit working with the Ministry of Culture to: 1) stimulate 
audiovisual productions, 2) support and encourage international co-productions, and 3) 
develop and implement public policies and funds for the audiovisual market.48 
Today ANCINE works as an intermediary between the audiovisual community 
and financial institutions and investors. For example, a producer has to apply directly to 
ANCINE’s board for allocation of incentives and awards. Additionally, ANCINE works 
to set up regional and international co-production relationships and funding mechanisms 
such as IBERMEDIA, the Iberian and Latin American collaboration. In recent years, the 
financing scheme has expanded beyond a focus on tax incentives to include direct funds 
and direct government support. Funds include the Audiovisual Sector Fund (refundable 
and non-refundable investments paid for by the federal CONCINE tax on the audiovisual 
industry) and FUNCINES (private closed funds managed by Brazilian financial 
institutions for media companies such as Downtown Filmes). More recently, direct 
government support is available for independent productions through the Premio 
                                                
47 According to Randal Johnson, the “autarquia is designed to undertake indirect or ‘decentralized’ 
administrative duties . . . [or] to engage in activities typical of public administration which require greater 
financial and administrative autonomy than direct administration by a government ministry would allow.” 
Randal Johnson, The Film Industry in Brazil: Culture and the State (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1987): 113. 
48 Meleiro, 2. 
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Adicional de Renda (Box Office Prize awards funds to films that generated between 
R$1.5 and 7.6 million in theatrical box office receipts) and the Programa de Incentivo a 
Qualidade (the Quality Incentive Program awards to production companies that have 
films screened at national or international festivals). In the past few years, there also has 
been an increased focus on the number of theaters in Brazil. Funding is now available to 
build additional theaters in smaller cities and rural parts of the country in order to develop 
the national exhibition infrastructure in underserved areas.49 According to one of 
ANCINE’s directors, these later laws were a way of “equalizing” the resources available 
between the Audiovisual Law favoring os majors and independent producers and 
distributors.50 Yet, many in the industry and ANCINE will agree that the industry is still 
dependent on the earliest incentive laws—Audiovisual and Rouanet.51 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the goal of restructuring the state institutions and 
funding schemes was to shift the majority of audiovisual investments from the direct 
government support of Embrafilme to private financing and to develop a market-driven 
industry. Yet, the systematic financial and regulatory “rebirth” bears a resemblance to 
schemes from the 1950s and 1960s. Why return to another incentive-based financing 
                                                
49 Film Financing and Co-producing in Brazil, presentation by Alberto Flaksman, Madrid, October 2010, 
available ancine.gov.br; Fabio de Sa Cesnik and Guilherme Anders, Fiscal Incentives for Audiovisual 
Production and Co-Production in Iberoamerica, Canada, and the U.S. Brazil, ed. Steve Solot (Rio de 
Janeiro, Latin American Training, 2009). 
50 Mario Diamante, ANCINE, interview by author. 
51 Meleiro, 5. 
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system that encourages corporate sponsorship and co-productions with international 
partners? Who benefits from this structure? 
According to the former head of the Motion Picture Association (MPA) Latin 
America52 office, Steve Solot, the President and Brazilian Minister of Culture developed 
the Audiovisual Law specifically to attract investment from MPAA members and 
generate a quick influx of capital. Other than Sony do Brasil in the early 1990s, the 
majority of MPA members were not interested in investing. At the time, the focus of 
Warners Bros., Fox, and others in the Brazilian market was to expand their 90 percent 
market share. They saw little correlation between distributing their English-language 
films and cultivating local production relationships. Because co-productions do not 
generate the same scale of profits as the English-language projects nor necessarily make 
any profit at all, MPA members considered producing films locally as a kind of tax.53  
 
SONY DO BRASIL AS CO-PRODUCER 
By contrast, Sony do Brasil began actively co-producing in the early 1990s. 
Between 1994 and 1997, the unit produced ten local language productions including 
                                                
52 Motion Picture Association of America, which serves as the lobbying organization for major film 
companies such as Sony, Paramount, Universal, Disney, Fox, etc. has regional offices worldwide. Motion 
Picture Association of Latin America is the regional division based in São Paulo. The director and its staff 
oversee distribution, legal, and technology issues such as copyright and piracy for all MPAA members 
operating in the Latin American territory.  
53 By the early 2000s, this mentality towards co-productions changed drastically. After updates in specific 
legislature regarding tax-incentives and participation, Warner Bros., Fox, Paramount, and Universal begin 
systematically to participate in LLP partnerships; Steve Solot, Rio Film Commission and former VP MPA 
Latin America, interview by author, 22 August 2010, Rio de Janeiro. 
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Tieta do Agreste (1996, dir. Carlos Diegues), O que é isso, companheiro? (1997, dir. 
Bruno Barreto), and A Guerra de Canudos (1997, dir. Sergio Rezende). However, the 
production division was not managed well with most films losing money and two 
projects never released. After restructuring the division in 1997, all production decisions 
were made by the various division heads at Sony do Brasil: Rodrigo Saturnino Braga 
(General Manager), Iona de Macedo (Production), Wilson Cabral (Home Video), and 
Dorien Sutherland (Television). Three filmmaking models emerged at this point: 1) first-
time directors with experience in commercials or television (Cao Hamburger’s Castelo 
Rá-Tim-Bum, O Filme, 1999 originally developed as a television series); 2) alliance with 
Rede Globo and their television franchises (such as comedian Renato Aragão); and 3) 
project with established “old guard” filmmakers like Bruno Barreto and Carlos Diegues. 
Since Sony do Brasil was the only filmed entertainment division of a transnational media 
conglomerate producing LLPs, it had complete pick of projects and flexibility to move 
into development. It dominated the market during the 1990s and de Macedo describes the 
situation as win/win.54 
Within the course of my interviews, a variety of reasons were cited to explain 
Sony’s early and dominant position as a co-producer. According to Solot, Sony Pictures 
Entertainment entered into Brazilian film productions to offset huge losses from English-
language film productions (as discussed in the previous chapter) since the acquisition of 
                                                
54 Iona de Macedo, former VP Production for Latin American and President of Columbia Films 
Producciones Españolas, interview by author, 17 January 2011, Madrid, España. 
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Columbia in 1989 and the spending sprees on development and studio renovations that 
followed. Therefore, from this point of view, Sony’s decision to invest “was all a tax 
issue: the way the tax laws were written they could either claim a tax credit in the United 
States or invest that money in Brazil.”55 Since a local subsidiary of an international 
company could not file a claim in both countries and Sony was losing money on bloated 
English-language blockbusters, the Brazilian tax incentives prompted their entry.   
Rodrigo Saturnino, General Manager of Sony do Brasil, offers an opposing 
account. He argues that Sony began co-producing in 1988, a period before the 
dismantling of Embrafilme and creation of the Audiovisual Law. At the time the Law 
passed, Sony Pictures Entertainment already had a corporate aspirations for international 
operations. The director recounted attending a January 1992 meeting at Sony’s Los 
Angeles headquarters with all the domestic and international executives. At this meeting 
then-CEO Peter Guber discussed the possibility of implementing a local co-production 
policy in various regional markets. Incidentally the same week the Brazilian Congress 
approved the Audiovisual Law, a financing measure Sony do Brasil anticipated. Since 
their operation already had an informal policy in place, “[Sony in] Brazil was ahead of 
the entire world.”56 For the rest of the 1990s, Sony do Brasil claimed to be the only 
international media company strategically investing in co-production through Article 3. 
Both accounts suggest an interplay between the global and local in Sony do Brasil’s 
                                                
55 ibid. 
56 Rodrigo Saturnino, Sony do Brasil, interview by author. 
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decision to undertake LLPs. However, there is a distinct difference in the perceived 
relationship between Sony corporate in the U.S. and Sony in São Paulo as well as which 
operation developed this policy locally. 
Former VP of Television and Film Production in Latin America, Iona de Macedo 
offers a third perspective. According to her, Sony do Brasil entered local productions due 
to two lawyers at the Brazilian firm Monash and Morris selling the idea of the incentive 
law to its clients. For the first few years at Sony do Brasil, film production was delegated 
to a pair of Rio lawyers to pick projects in which to invest. The restructuring in 1997 
shifted the management of the unit from a legal team to in-house creative producers. de 
Macedo claims this move led to the late-1990s success of Sony LLPs.57 In line with 
Saturnino’s account, this narrative suggests local individuals convinced Sony to become 
involved and drove this impetus to produce locally. 
The varying stories of Sony’s entry in co-productions illustrate two things. First, 
Sony do Brasil’s institutional memory supports the narrative of a transnational corporate 
policy and industry discourse constructing Sony as a LLP “pioneer” and neatly positioned 
in the Brazilian market within this account. Yet, an “origins” debate reflects not only 
conflicting industrial memories but also the varying degrees of trans/local interests and 
perspectives. How do the various positions and motivations of each individual with 
whom I spoke shape his/her media industry history? While both Sony do Brasil accounts 
                                                
57 Iona de Macedo, former VP Production for Latin American and President of Columbia Films 
Producciones Españolas, interview by author, 17 January 2011, Madrid, España. 
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maintain a nationally focused and “home grown” narrative, the MPA offers a more 
transnational, multi-company interest. Instead of thinking about the institutional interests 
and policies of the Brazilian film industry and Sony as a media conglomerate as 
geographically separate and competing, these industry and institutional accounts reveal 
shifting perspectives on different motivations for the same situation. 
Second, the relationship between MPA members and national policies is the story 
most often told. While this relationship particularly between Brazil and Hollywood has 
been characterized as one of hegemonic distribution practices, an examination of these 
production practices presents a more nuanced analysis than this U.S./Rest binary. The 
reality of creative processes and decision-making locate local language productions or 
co-produções locais as messy sites of struggle and negotiation. The various individuals 
and institutions disagree, perspectives differ, and power is not weighed equally. 
The remainder of this chapter explores various institutions involved in these co-
productions by exploring the translocal nature of the Brazilian LLP strategy through mid-
level interviews.58 Over a two-month period in 2010, I conducted fieldwork in Rio de 
Janeiro and São Paulo. In addition to Sony do Brasil and other majors located in Brazil, I 
interviewed a variety of professionals working in various spaces of the film industry:59    
                                                
58 see Kraidy and Murphy; Havens, Lotz, and Tinic. 
59 The process of setting up interviews derived from the nature of the small and insular Brazilian industry. 
My first attempt at “cold emailing” the media relations or production representative at small to large 
Brazilian production companies proved unsuccessful. After personalized email introductions by the former 
head of the MPA Latin America, I was able to directly set up appointments and meeting with almost two 
dozen high-level professionals. 
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City-state or Prefeitura: Rio de Janeiro partners 
+ Rio Filme 
+ Rio Film Commission 
 
City-state or Prefeitura: São Paulo partners 
+ Pandora Films 
 
National independent producers/distributors based in Rio de Janeiro 
+ Diler & Associados 
+ Urca Filmes 
+ Conspiração 
+ Luz Produções 
+ Downtown Filmes 
 
National Independent producers/distributors based in São Paulo 
+ O2 Filmes 
 
Trans/national institutions and agencies 
+ Globo Filmes 
+ ANCINE 
+ MPA Latin America 
+ Sony do Brasil 
+ Paramount Pictures Brasil 
 
Despite that the majority of os majors and a group of production companies are 
located in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro emerges as the center or media capital of the 
Brazilian film industry.60 Institutions and agents from the local city spaces to national and 
international merge in this location to produce culturally specific LLPs for a national 
audience. The following two sections examine the complicated relationships and 
negotiations of Sony do Brasil through discussions of production and distribution 
practices. 
                                                
60 Michael Curtin, “Media Capital: Towards the Study of Spatial Flows,” International Journal of Cultural 
Studies  6:2 (June 2003): 202-228. 
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“BRAZIL IS DIFFERENT”: PRODUCTION MENTALITY AND DEGREES OF AGENCY 
While discussing the general state of the local industry, participants expressed a 
couple of discursive patterns surrounding contemporary production and distribution 
practices. Although I heard varying iterations of this mentality, they repeated that 
culturally specific production practices exist and revolve around the idea that “Brazil is 
different” or “Brazil is complicated.” Primarily, the characteristics of a “blockbuster” vs. 
art cinema and production, distribution negotiations, and creative decision-making all 
effect the nature of local co-productions and Sony do Brasil’s position and LLP strategy. 
First, the concept of a Brazilian “blockbuster” arose in multiple interviews as a 
term industry professionals used to describe popular and mainstream, commercial films 
produced locally and in Portuguese. Since the early 2000s, productions such as Cidade de 
Deus (2003, dir. Fernando Meirelles and Kátia Lund), Se Eu Fosse Você (2006, dir. 
Daniel Filho), Tropa de Elite (2007, dir. José Padilha), Meu Nome Não é Johnny (2008, 
dir. Mauro Lima) and Chico Xavier (2010, dir. Daniel Filho), have attracted record 
audience numbers and increased market share for national cinema. While recently big 
budgets for blockbusters such as Nosso Lar (R$20 million) and Tropa de Elite 2 (R$16 
million) have surpassed the R$7-10 million industry average, Brazilian commercial films 
are not necessarily driven by the same bloated budgets, special effects, and genre film 
tradition as Sony Pictures Entertainment’s English-language global blockbusters such as 
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2012 and the Spiderman franchise.61 Instead, general criteria have emerged for successful 
Brazilian commercial productions categorized locally as blockbusters: 
• Attracts more than 1-2 million Brazilian audience members  
• Premise based on a Brazilian history, biography, or actuality; a “polemical” theme 
that “stays in the heads of the people” such the recent cycle of favela and 
spiritualism films OR popular comedy influenced by well-known Brazilian actors 
from television or theater, primarily Globo Filmes characters and properties 
• “valor do produção” or a “well-made film”  
• “padrão de qualidade” or quality of visual language similar to American films or 
Brazilian television62  
 
 One of the most recent Brazilian blockbusters is Chico Xavier. Based on the 
biography As Vidas de Chico Xavier, the film follows the life controversial medium 
Chico Xavier and his connection to the espiritualismo (spiritualism) movement in Brazil. 
The film attracted over 3 million spectators, beating twenty-year-old audience records.63 
Xavier’s celebrated position as a public figure and spiritual writer has been revived in 
recent years and includes another commercially successful blockbuster, Nosso Lar, based 
on one of his books about the afterlife. As director of Globo Filmes, the company’s film 
division, Filho has been branded and promoted as a Brazilian commercial filmmaker and 
                                                
61 “Nosso lar atingiu um milhão de espectadores, diz distribuidora,” G1 (8 September 2010) accessed 
online (1 October 2010) http://g1.globo.com/pop-arte/noticia/2010/09/nosso-lar-atingiu-um-milhao-de-
espectadores-diz-distribuidora.html; “Divulgadas as primeiras cenas de Tropa de elite 2,” G1 (29 June 
2010) accessed online (1 October 2010) http://g1.globo.com/pop-arte/noticia/2010/06/divulgadas-
primeiras-cenas-de-tropa-de-elite-2.html 
62 Rio Film, interview by author, 31 August 2010, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Diler Trindade, Diler & 
Associados, interview by author, 31 August 2010, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Paramount, interview by author; 
Sony do Brasil, interview by author. 
63 “Filme sobre Chico Xavier chega a 3 milhões de espectadores” Estadao.com.br (May 6, 2010) accessed 
online (1 September 2010) http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/arteelazer,filme-sobre-chico-xavier-chega-
a-3-milhoes-de-espectadores,547995,0.htm 
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associated with the “padrão de qualidade” of the nation’s most powerful media 
conglomerate and telenovela producer.64 Called “O dono da bilheteria” or box-office 
boss, he has produced a number of films since the retomada that have broken box office 
audience records.65 As director of Globo Filmes and his own production company, 
Lereby Produções, Daniel Filho holds a significant amount of cultural capital with both 
industry professionals and Brazilian audiences. Along with Fernando Meirelles, Walter 
Salles, Jose Padilha, and Guel Arraes, he is one of the filmmakers redefining local film 
authorship in more commercial, cross-media ways. 
 
Fig. 4.2 Chico Xavier (2010) Theatrical poster 
                                                
64 The term “padrão de qualidade” is widely used industrially and popularly to describe Rede Globo’s big 
budget, glossy production style representing the company’s dominant position in the Brazilian media 
market. see pages 29-30 for a further discussion of Globo. 
65“O dono da bilheteria” accessed online (1 November 2010) 
http://www.chicoxavierofilme.com.br/site/?p=2579 
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 Yet, the categorization of the commercial Brazilian film as a blockbuster cinema 
is controversial in an industry with a strong “artistic authorial” legacy. Producer 
Leonardo Edde criticized the distinction of the term “commercial,” claiming all films are 
commercial products made for audiences to watch and to make a return on the 
investment; still it is important to understand the distinction made today between local 
commercial films and “art cinema.”66 The term “art cinema” was raised during interviews 
to describe smaller, authorial films that receive limited theatrical release and typically 
perform better internationally and at film festivals. The discussion surrounding Brazilian 
cinema as director-driven versus commercial was a major driving force behind the 
Cinema Novo movement as an auteur-driven movement characterized by its class politics 
and New Wave aesthetics. This earlier distinction shaped financing policies and projects 
during the Embrafilme era when commercial viability was not a factor in receiving funds 
nor how many Brazilian film professionals imagined their national industry.67  
 Contemporary debates continue to position the authorial and artistic mindset 
against one focused on a financial return, competiveness, and a large, mainstream 
public.68 The fiscal incentive system through the Audiovisual Law provides money to 
filmmakers whether or not they make financially successful projects, which according to 
Sérgio Sá Leitão of Rio Filme allocates funds “from the perspective of cultural policies 
                                                
66 Leonardo Edde, Urca Filmes, interview by author, 6 September 2010, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil. 
67 Bruno Wainer, Downtown Filmes, interview by author. 
68 Sérgio Sá Leitão, Rio Filme, interview by author. 
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and not industrial policies for developing a market.”69 A number of professionals make 
the distinction between cultural and industrial policies promoting either small-scale 
authorial projects or large, commercial ones, respectively. Even using the word 
“industry” to describe Brazilian cinema produces scoffs and criticism from some media 
scholars and producers. Namely, Urca Filmes producer Edde blames the financing 
scheme for the lack of a commercial cinema: “Brazilian cinema is 100 percent dependent 
on incentives. We don’t have an industry because [of this financial system].”70 Although 
my focus is primarily on the popular, commercial part of the industry, the discourse about 
“art cinema” reflects concerns around financing, audiences, and the domestic market. 
This argument for the best methods in investing public money (or whether there should 
be public money available at all) is a highly contested issue.  
In terms of audiences and commercial viability, “blockbuster” films are expected 
to perform well in both urban and rural markets. Some Brazilian blockbusters such as 
Cidade de Deus receive wide international distribution, but only a few of these films 
actually receive distribution regionally or internationally. While the majority of theaters 
are located in urban centers, producers are beginning to rethink the domestic, Brazilian 
industry beyond city centers and look for the growth possibilities in smaller towns and 
rural areas. This has altered how companies like Sony do Brasil select, invest in, and 
                                                
69 ibid. 
70 Leonardo Edde, Urca Filmes, interview by author. 
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distribute film projects.71 Films aimed only at urban audiences are having a harder time 
finding financing and partnerships. For example, a founding member of Cinema Novo 
and one of the most well-known and active filmmakers in Brazil, Cacá Diegues, 
produced 5x Favela: Agora Por Nós Memos (2010) based on his 1962 film, 5x Favela. 
Guided by Diegues’s production company and written, produced, and starring youth from 
various Rio favelas, the film took years to raise the seed money and capital necessary to 
start production for budget of US$2 million.72 After most of the os majors such as 
Warner Bros. passed, Sony do Brasil entered the production as a distributor along with 
Rio Filme, a mixed private and government company under the Rio Prefeitura, or local 
government. As a community project developed by a famous Brazilian “auteur,” it fell 
under the category of independent, art cinema.  
Favela films such as Cidade de Deus and Tropa de Elite have been commercial 
and critical successful genre domestically and internationally. Rooted in the political 
films that explored issues of urban poverty and racial discrimination during the Cinema 
Novo movement of the 1950s and 1960s, films based around the lives of individuals and 
families living in favelas in Rio and Salvador have witnessed a resurgence since the 
retomada. While contemporary favela films explore drug trafficking, gang violence, 
                                                
71 Considering the lack of theaters available in rural and interior areas, Sony do Brasil has adapted their 
methods beyond traditional theatrical distribution to capitalize on a large portion of the domestic market 
that does not have access to theaters. In order to expand DVD distribution of Sony do Brasil’s film Maria-
Mãe do Filho de Deus (2003, dir. Moacyr Góes), the Home Video division sold DVDs at grocery stores, 
butchers, and pharmacies around the country. Breaking DVD sales records, they sold over 300,000 DVDs. 
Diler & Associados, interview by author. 
72 Veronica de Machado, Luz Produções, interview by author. 10 September 2010, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
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police corruption and brutality, 5x Favela aimed to show a different view of day-to-day 
life within these Rio communities. 
The film did not garner the same box office or audience numbers of Tropa de 
Elite 2, which broke audience records with over eleven million admissions during the 
same year. Premiering at Cannes Film Festival, 5x Favela played well in Rio de Janeiro 
and Salvador da Bahia, both areas with concentrated favela neighborhoods. Yet, the film 
did not perform well in other urban areas such as Brasilia and São Paulo that do not have 
the same historical concentration of favela communities, nor was it even released widely 
outside of these cities in more rural areas. Thus, many of the companies partnering with 
os majors are moving away from what they consider to be smaller, independent authorial 
projects and towards a more nationally and internationally focused commercial model.  
 
Fig. 4.3: 5x Favela: Agora Por Nós Memos (2010) Theatrical Poster 
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 Another “difference” highlighted during my research was the nature of the 
production deal, partnerships, and creative decision-making. Since the Embrafilme 
period, the film industry adopted a business model of participation and ownership that 
many consider to be geographically and culturally specific, adding to the “Brazil is 
complicated” discourse. Unlike earlier commercial industry models where film studios 
closely manage development and contract production companies, Brazilian production 
companies and filmmakers maintain a distinct level of control over the negotiation 
process and film property.73 For example, the production history of the blockbuster Chico 
Xavier involved a mix of trans/local companies: 
• Downtown Filmes (Rio-based independent distribution company) 
• Lereby Produções (Rio-based independent production company) 
• Sony do Brasil (local division of transnational media company) 
• Globo Filmes (national media conglomerate) 
• Estação da Luz  (non-profit civil enterprise based in the state of Ceará) 
 Head of Downtown Filmes, Bruno Wainer, originally bought the rights to the 
biographical source material. Since Downtown is the only independent distributor in 
Brazil dealing solely in cinema nacional (national cinema), it releases 70 percent of local 
commercial productions. After initial development, Wainer offered a parceria 
(partnership) to Sony do Brasil including investment through Article 3 and co-
distribution rights. Significantly, part of the deal included an exchange of participation in 
one film project for another. Downtown leveraged a deal based on Sony giving up their 
                                                
73 Rodrigo Saturnino, Sony do Brasil, interview by author. 
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participation in the lucrative project Meu Nome Não é Johnny for a partnership in Chico 
Xavier.74 Wainer and Downtown Filmes negotiated Sony do Brasil’s participation, and 
together they took the project to Filho’s production company, Lereby.75 Estação da Luz, 
the non-profit organization based in the Northeastern state of Ceará, also participated as a 
co-producer.76 Additional actors included ANCINE’s board approval of incentive money 
from Article 1, 1A, 3, and Premio Adicional de Renda as well as co-producer Globo 
Filmes, contributing cross-media marketing and input during development.  
 Projects such as Chico Xavier raise questions about creative agency and decision-
making. Whereas many industry professionals see “the rest of the world” adopting a more 
U.S. model where the major studio can control creative and financial decisions from pre-
production to distribution, Brazilian film professionals differentiate themselves as 
maintaining their own cultural industry practices.77 One of the key differences is the 
Brazilian producers’ ability to retain decisions about the theatrical version, or final cut, 
which is a standard in the local industry.78 Sony do Brasil executives do not participate in 
daily production activities, visit the set, or see “dailies.”79 Instead they see a first rough 
                                                
74 Also based on a bestselling biography, Johnny became one of the top grossing films of 2008. 
75 Entrevista com Daniel Filho. Globo Filmes (29 January 2010) accessed online (1 September 2010). 
http://www.paginadocinema.com.br/entrevista/index/53 
76 Estação da Luz organization supports development projects in education, sports, and culture that promote 
“peace and human rights,” accessed online (1 November 2010) 
http://www.estacaoluz.org.br/quem_somos.php 
77 Rodrigo Saturnino, Sony do Brasil, interview by author. 
78 ibid; Bruno Wainer, Downtown Filmes, interview by author. Eliana Soarez, Conspiração, interview by 
author, 25 August 2010, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
79 Jorge Peregrino, Paramount, interview by author. 
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cut of each project in order to give input on the marketing campaign and to produce the 
trailer. The Sony director cited a few disagreements with various production partners 
over the final theatrical cut.80 Although Sony, Globo Filmes, Lereby, and Downtown 
participated in developing the script and cast, ultimately director Filho and his production 
company had control over the theatrical cut.  
While Chico Xavier and 5xs Favela are clear examples of this local co-production 
strategy, the commercial, domestic LLP strategy becomes even more apparent with the 
films that Sony passed on. When offered a partnership in Andrucha Waddington’s recent 
Spanish-language co-production, Lope (2010), Sony do Brasil declined despite 
participating in the Brazilian director’s previous features Eu, Tu, Eles (2000), Viva São 
João (2002) and Casa de Areia (2005). Sony Pictures in Los Angeles developed Lope, a 
Brazilian-Spanish co-production shot in Spain with an international cast. Aimed at 
international film festivals and Spanish-language markets, Rodrigo Saturnino of Sony do 
Brasil suggested Lope did not fit Sony do Brasil’s local Portuguese-language strategy. He 
cited the difficulty of translating a historic Spanish epic to Brazilian audiences for both 
linguistic and socio-historical reasons. Instead, Warner Bros. Brasil picked up co-
production and Brazilian distribution rights; Warner Bros. Brasil presumably has a 
different domestic and international strategy than Sony. 
                                                
80 Not surprisingly, Sony declined to offer film examples. 
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 Sony do Brasil’s working relationship with its local partners reflects a more 
complicated scenario than anticipated. Bruno Wainer, prominent producer and head of 
Downtown Filmes, described the relationship as “friction with cooperation.”81 Described 
by him as a “mutually beneficial relationship,” Sony has resources to invest, produce 
marketing materials, and research test audiences whereas its partners bring the scripts, 
talent, and experience. Sony supports a large portion of mainstream commercial 
filmmakers who mostly like the incentive policies. Wainer humorously characterized the 
relationship in this way: “I think many of the [Brazilian] players have a sexual fantasy to 
see their film with the majors’ name at the beginning of the credits. It is the realism of a 
sexual fantasy.”82 Yet, the friction comes with institutional and industrial differences. 
Wainer asserted:  
In reality when a major invests they consider themselves the ‘don’ of the film. 
Here [in Brazil] they are not the ‘don’ but a co-producer. The ‘don’ of the film is 
the producer. Many times they are shocked. . . they have [provided] 30 percent of 
the film’s cost, the other 70 percent is mine. I have to give them a realization . . . 
That is not how it works here. This also reflects a [different] relationship of 
power. We are partners, we are not [Sony’s] employees. I brought most of the 
resources so I am a partner with you.83 
 
Another of Sony’s co-producing partners is Globo Filmes.84 Part of the Globo 
media conglomerate, this Brazilian company also owns the fourth-largest commercial 
                                                
81 Bruno Wainer, Downtown Filmes, interview by author. 
82 ibid. 
83 ibid. 
84 After going through various formal and informal processes, I was unable to secure an interview with 
anyone at Globo Filmes. Most of my research relies on information provided by their partners, trade 
publications, and Globo’s media relations and online marketing. 
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television network in the world, Rede Globo. In addition to its in-house television 
production known for “padrão de qualidade” (standard of quality), TV Globo typically 
captured a 60 to 80 per cent share of the market in the major Brazilian cities.85 In 1998, 
the company founded Globo Filmes in order to participate as a co-producer in the revival 
of Brazilian cinema. Due to the company’s cross-media holdings in online, television, 
newspaper, and radio, Globo Filmes is in a key position in the industry. As an “equity 
investor,” Globo provides marketing on its network by giving the films an 85 percent 
discount on TV spots and giving free exposure on talk shows and telenovelas.86 Many 
individuals in the industry talk about “Globo power” for attracting their telenovela 
audiences to the films. In the past decade, Globo has co-produced 34 out of the 37 
Brazilian films that achieved over a million spectators and many of these productions are 
with Sony. In the early 2000s, Sony and Globo were heavily criticized for dominating the 
industry. According to filmmaker Aluízio Abranches, 
one of the obstacles facing Brazilian cinema is the Globo-Columbia [Sony] duo. 
If you are not connected with this duo, then you have few chances for success. So, 
the biggest problem is the exhibition and distribution. The public is only going 
where Globo Filmes is involved. [The 2002 film] As Três Marias was seen more 
in Italy than here.87  
 
Similar to Sony and os majors, Globo has adopted the Brazilian commercial, blockbuster 
strategy working with bigger budgets, established filmmakers and actors, and typically 
                                                
85 Joseph Straubhaar, World Television: From Global to Local Communication and Human Value 
(Thousand Oaks, Ca: Sage, 2007); Amelia S. Simpson, Xuxa: The Mega-marketing of gender, race and 
modernity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003). 
86 Rodrigo Saturnino, Sony do Brasil, interview by author. 
87 Aluízio Abranches, “3 anos de Revista de Cinema” Revista de Cinema (julho de 2003): 33. 
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well-known source material such as the film adaption of popular Brazilian literature 
Lisbela e o prisoneiro (2003, dir. Guel Arraes) and Chico Xavier as well as the recent 
Tropa de Elite 2 franchise. 
 Based in Rio de Janeiro and described as “the most powerful company in Brazil,” 
Globo is able to leverage deals and partnerships to its favor within the Brazilian media 
industries. Globo Filmes and Sony both want to have the “postura dominadora” 
(dominant position) in the contract process according to Downtown Filmes’ Wainer. His 
strategy has been to let the two corporate entities fight out the details.88 While most of the 
majors and local producers such Sony, Paramount, Conspiração, Downtown Filmes, and 
Diler Trindad interviewed cite the benefit of Globo’s experience and resources, this 
friction or negotiation revolves around Globo’s participation as a co-partner. In an off-
the-record conversation, an executive from a major media company other than Sony do 
Brasil criticized Globo’s business model of selling commercials on its networks. Since 
the media regulations will not allow Globo to be a producer, the way for it to participate 
is through selling commercials at discounted rate along with a portion of the distributor’s 
fee. According to this executive, at certain times of the fiscal year Globo’s advertising 
clients buy fewer commercial breaks. In turn, Globo sells this “unsellable” airtime to Fox, 
                                                
88 Bruno Wainer, Downtown Filmes, interview by author. 
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Warner Bros., Paramount, or Sony at an 85 percent discount in exchange for a percentage 
of the film distribution fee.89  
 Sony do Brasil’s LLP strategy does not reflect the kind of cohesive and localized 
corporate strategy guided by American executives as suggested in the English-language 
industry and trade coverage. As my fieldwork suggests, neither Sony do Brasil’s 
relationships with its Brazilian partners, nor its position within Sony Picture International 
Motion Picture Production Group (IMPPG), follows a traditional corporate hierarchical 
structure. Sony’s IMPPG oversees the local language production strategy yet is not 
involved in the everyday Brazilian operations. While SPE’s central international 
production division may take a more hands-on approach with its LLPs in China, Mexico, 
and Western Europe, Sony do Brasil maintains a unique level of creative autonomy for a 
number of reasons. Saturnino, the Director of Sony do Brasil, claims “Sony LA [IMPPG] 
leaves us alone . . . we never work with the international group” after a picture is 
officially greenlit.90 After the three divisions within Sony do Brasil vote to develop a 
project, the head of production sends an email to the head of IMPPG to approve the 
development budgets and overhead budgets and to a marketing and distribution executive 
                                                
89 Off-the-record conversation, interview by author, August 2010, Brasil. 
90 Rodrigo Saturnino, Sony do Brasil, interview by author. 
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to approve the prints and advertising budget. Unlike the more formal greenlighting 
process in Spain, approval for Brazil happens through email.91 
In the case of approving projects, IMPPG typically follows the recommendation 
of the local office.92 First, the Brazilian financial incentives such as Article 3 fund almost 
all of the Sony investments in LLPs. Saturnino suggests because of the audiovisual funds 
“[SPE international production executives in Los Angeles] don’t enter the budgets here 
and we don’t rely on them. Everything is completely separate.”93 In order to invest in 
Chico Xavier, Sony do Brasil was able to access tax incentive resources from the 
Audiovisual Law that covered all of its expenses. Additionally, due to the business model 
specific to Brazilian cinema, trying to gather information, contracts, or reports to send to 
IMPPG is difficult to translate for Sony employees outside of Brazil. One Sony do Brasil 
employee in the theatrical division cited the difficulty getting their Brazilian partners to 
comply and participate in reports that are sent to Sony in the United States. No precedent 
exists for this kind of micromanaging in the local industry so these production reports 
become mostly a gesture for the Brazilians.  
Overall, the idea of Brazil as culturally, economically, and politically 
“complicated” and taking care of itself comes to stand in for a disconnect and separation 
in Sony’s corporate structure and its quasi-autonomous position as a translocal operation. 
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Sony argues it operates this way because of the conditions of the industry. However, in 
the following sections I will argue that Sony do Brasil’s resources and position as co-
producer and distributor are the sign of an unequal and broken system that also overlooks 
local, independent players. 
 
PUBLIC OR REAL MONEY? SONY’S POSITION AS INVESTOR AND DISTRIBUTOR 
Most producers and distributors praise the negotiation, development, and 
production process as an important and culturally specific aspect of their industry, 
whereas the current distribution system is incredibly controversial. Primarily, many argue 
Article 3 of the Audiovisual Law was designed to attract os majors in the early 1990s and 
does reflect the current competency and strength of local filmmakers. Expressed by 
Downtown Filmes’ Wainer: “I have a close relationship with Sony but I am completely 
against the Audiovisual Law’s Article 3. It is absurd. It is crooked and should not exist. . . 
I am not struggling against the majors but am struggling against the system.”94  
As explained above, Article 3 allows international distribution companies to use a 
percentage of their taxed income within Brazil as investment money into local co-
productions as explained in the beginning of the chapter. Due to the historic dominance 
of Fox, Sony/Columbia, Warner Bros., and Universal and their English-language films in 
the local market ranging from 80 to 95 percent of the market share over the past two 
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decades, this taxed income creates an investment pool equaling $30-35 million Reais a 
year. With these resources Sony and others are able to choose the “filet mignon of 
Brazilian films.”95 While recent revisions in the fiscal incentives provide additional 
resources for independent companies such as Downtown Filmes and Rio Filme and taxed 
income has decreased since 2006, between 1995 to 2009 MPA Latin America members 
released three quarters of the top grossing films, Sony released one third of that portion. 
Andre Sturm of Pandora Filmes, a state-sponsored distributor based in São Paulo, calls 
the current situation an “oligopoly” since four companies dominate worldwide 
distribution. He contends in Brazil 
[the majors] have 85 percent of the market with American films, they have 10 
percent of the market with Brazilian commercial films with public money because 
of fiscal incentives. They enter as partners and earn from distribution for nothing. 
Because there are less than ten independent producers in Brazil, [the incentive 
system] is bad for the market, bad for the people, and bad for the country.96 
 
Many of the film professionals who partner with Sony consider Article 3 “absurd,” 
“crooked,”97 and “ruim”98 [bad] since “we are more fragile, smaller, harder to raise 
capital. And the government gives them money? For us to make money for them, it is too 
much.”99  
                                                
95 Sérgio Sá Leitão, Rio Filme, interview by author. 
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Two general discursive categories surround this incentive money—public money 
and real money. First, the view is that Brazilian government uses public tax money to 
incentivize international companies and not local ones: “It does not make sense for a 
government that subsidizes multinational companies and does not subsidize national 
companies . . . especially when they show they are just as competitive as the 
multinationals.”100 The argument over public money stems from a larger political 
economic debate in Brazil about whether the position of the state is to foment or direct 
cultural industries. Similar to the criticism of direct state investment by Embrafilme in the 
1970s and 1980s, more specifically, this reflects questions about the best method to 
stimulate and sustain a national cinema industry. By directly managing these cultural 
policies, the state agencies and financing function, according to Rio Filme’s Sérgio Sá 
Leitão, acts “more as a generator of dependency than development.”101 
Some in the film community suggest the presence of os majors has influenced 
local theatrical distribution practices and created a riskier investment for Brazilian 
“public money.” Traditionally, Sony and other major international studios relied on rigid 
models for distribution. According to Iona de Macedo:  
These companies have models for every type of films. If you have a Spiderman, 
you release 700 prints. But if you don’t have a Spiderman, then don’t. Why? 
Because you have to] spend so much money on the [prints], then you have to 
make the money back [from production costs and prints]. But with a film that 
costs $8 million why would you [release] 700 prints? Since the people who 
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approve the [prints and advertising] budgets are in Hollywood, they use a 
Hollywood mentality.102 
 
In the late-1990s, numerous Sony Brasil staff recall asking for prints and 
advertising approval beyond the standard 150 to 200 copies was almost impossible. 
Although Brazilian LLPs offered little risk, the LLP distribution model is more 
conservative than the English-language model in order to minimize risk.  
Yet, today os majors are expanding their models beyond the model of big 
English-language blockbuster release and limited LLP release. In order to maximize on 
the recent Brazilian commercial blockbuster trend, distributors are producing more 
copies, developing wider simultaneous releases, and emphasizing opening weekend 
gross. In 2010, the average wide release for a local production is 300 to 400 screens. 
However, local companies wanting to capture a wider market share and compete with the 
85 to 90 percent market share of English-language films are altering the wide release 
model. In 2010, an independent distributor released Tropa de Elite 2 in over 700 screens 
across Brazil, more than twice the average. Brazilian trade and popular press covered the 
new aggressive commercial strategy through discussions of the number of theaters, the 
breaking of audience records, and the weekend gross: “Recorde de Público: Cinema 
nacional chega a 22.3 milhões de espectadores em 2010, superando números de 2003” 
(Public Record: National Cinema arrives at 22.3 million spectators in 2010, passing 2003 
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numbers”), “Tropa de elite 2 é a terceira maior bilheteria do cinema brasileiro” (Tropa de 
elite 2 is the third best box office in Brazilian cinema), and “Tropa de elite 2 é visto por 
1,29 milhão de pessoas e arrecada R$ 13,9 milhões no fim de semana” (Tropa de elite 2 
seen by 1.29 million people and earns R$ 13.9 million weekend).103 However what do 
these records and box office numbers mean in relation to the health of local industry 
partners and policies?  
Brazilian LLPs have led to the development of a local wide-release model and are 
now expected to perform strongly at the box office opening weekend. São Paulo-based 
distributor, Andre Sturm, questions this number-obsessed logic and the adapting of an 
imported Hollywood model for the Brazilian market funded by public money:   
First weekend box office is an obsession. . . but wait a minute! How can you 
compare the film with 200 copies with a film with only 30 copies?. . . What does 
the information signify? It doesn’t signify anything. By the second weekend it 
dropped 50 percent and the film with 30 copies doesn’t drop at all. How much did 
200 copies cost and how much did 30 copies cost? What investment was made? 
What about these questions in the manner of quantitative research? No, it is only 
the number of spectators for the weekend, number of spectators overall for the 
film, the rest is not considered. What if I make a film that costs less, a more 
modest release . . . When you are considering public money, my money, my 
mother’s money . . . when a film costs seven million of the public’s money, 100 
percent public money with five million for prints and advertising. What is best for 
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the public? . . . In the U.S., a film that makes $50 million in the box office and 
cost $300 million to make. This is not a success. Here in Brazil . . . it is a 
failure.104  
 
This echoes Charles Acland’s discussion of weekend box office discourse (‘How was 
your weekend?’) that “relies on a popular recognition of box office revenue as a gauge of 
success and currency.”105 According to Sturm, this recognition and gauge of success now 
factors into how local language co-productions perform in the Brazilian film market. 
However, the notion of “failure” varies depending on the partner, their position in the 
local industry, and their stake in the project. Sony Pictures Entertainment can cushion 
English-language blockbuster flops across its various media divisions through transmedia 
strategies, multiple distribution windows, and international markets. Sony do Brasil’s 
partners do not have the size or resources to survive these kinds of losses in theatrical 
release. What angers most independent Brazilian producers and distributors is how Sony 
do Brasil and subsidiaries of international media companies use “public” tax dollars to 
gamble for huge Hollywood-style opening weekends. 
Second, since Article 3 resources originate from Sony’s taxed income, it does not 
invest using “real” money.106 Investing the money in a local production carries little risk 
since Sony would pay the Brazilian government this taxed income either way.107 The risk 
involved is primarily with costs for prints and advertising. This is a key reason for Sony 
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do Brasil’s autonomy from the corporate international division. The corporate parent does 
not see Brazilian productions using its “real” money so it does not interfere in creative 
decisions or financing.108 Even though Sony do Brasil has the experience and resources to 
invest, release, and promote a co-production locally, it does not have the resources or 
experiences to operate within the international market outside of Brazil. Thus, Sony’s 
international operations executives see Brazilian theatrical distribution and home video 
sales as fairly nationally contained although television sales may extend across Latin 
America through SPE’s Sony Entertainment Television or other satellite movie channels 
based in the region.109 
On the one hand, a few Brazilian independent producers make the distinction that 
os majors are better partners for the local market due to their experience and resources 
locally. On the other hand, they also consider Sony’s investment not “real” money. The 
logic is because Sony do Brasil and the IMPPG have so many English-language films and 
LLPs from other regions, they will not spend the time and resources selling a Brazilian 
LLP outside of the national market when they do not need the international market to 
recoup costs. If Sony Pictures Releasing International decides to distribute a LLP outside 
its domestic market, they will pass the film off to another division in their conglomerate: 
Sony Pictures Classics for U.S. theatrical and International Distribution for outside of 
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North American theatrical.110 An example of this would be the Brazilian LLP Casa de 
Areia that Sony Pictures Classic picked up in the U.S. and IMPPG gave a limited 
international release. In contrast, minor and independent partners such as Independent 
Film and Television Alliance members are “better” for the international market since they 
are focused on recuperating their initial “real” investment (not subsidized by the incentive 
systems). Yet, the expectation for international distribution outside of Brazil is rare for 
most LLPs, which is also the case with the Sony’s Spanish LLPs in the following chapter.  
Moreover, I observed a pattern of criticism that Sony and the other majors “do not 
release [LLP] films with the same enthusiasm as their matriz (their own, home) films . . . 
Brazilian films are always secondary for the majors.”111 The assumption is that 
independent distributors will release a film “better” than Sony because, according to Rio 
Filme’s Sérgio Sá Leitão, “[Brazilian] films are more important to me . . . I can do things 
that they cannot. I will do more guerilla marketing than they would do. I could do much 
more viral marketing.”112 While this statement implies an independent distributor has a 
more flexible distribution and marketing model, this mentality absolves Sony do Brasil of 
any involvement, albeit limited, in the creative co-production process. It also implies a 
distinction between real vs. public money, independent companies vs. local corporate 
subsidiaries, national vs. inter/transnational, and Brazilian vs. non-Brazilian. 
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As my interviews reveal, the flow of transnational finance, talent, resources, and 
media operate across slippery notions of local, national, and transnational in 
contemporary film industries. These debates over (trans)national positions and 
participation call into question the difficulty of locating contemporary media production 
practices in a concrete national space. Asking the Sony do Brasil director about critical 
debates in the industry surrounding the dominant position of os majors as appendages of 
American companies was one of the most provocative moments in my field interviews. 
Quickly switching from Portuguese to English, he calls this criticism “bullshit.” Sony do 
Brasil calls itself a Brazilian company run by Brazilians making Brazilian films and is not 
a traditional major. A definite “us-versus-them” discourse surrounds available resources. 
While working to emphasize the separation between themselves and Sony corporate 
headquarters in the United States, Saturnino also acknowledges that: 
we are distributors and we need films to release. Of course we receive the 
majority of our productions from the studio because we work for them. I know 
that if a Chinese movie arrives and it has a very good chance to make money, we 
release it with the same amount of work and energy. With Sony, it is 100 percent 
the same. We have a few years when our number one movie is Brazilian such as 
Chico Xavier. People in LA are more than happy . . . my boss is more than happy 
to make a Brazilian movie. . .We love to make blockbusters and make money. It 
doesn’t matter about the nationality.113 
 
I observed this popular narrative from many Brazilian producers and 
distributors—a good movie is a good movie no matter who produces it or where it is 
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produced. However, the strength and health of their national cultural industry, market 
share, and support for local productions dominate industry discussions today. Sony do 
Brasil rides the line between “we are Brazilian just like them” and the nationality of our 
company and projects is insignificant. If nationality does not matter, does Sony’s strategy 
have no clear identity, dominant national ties, or allegiance? Their Brazilian LLPs have 
no space or place in the lobby saturated with posters, trailers, and marketing for the 
English-language films they distribute. Yet financing, development, and marketing 
Brazilian LLPs take a large portion of resources to release three films per year from the 
São Paulo office. The films they produce are in the Portuguese language, and they 
consistently discuss the linguistic and cultural barriers for distributing outside of the 
domestic or Lusophone geo-linguistic market. 
 Overall, I can draw three conclusions from the Sony do Brasil case study. My 
interviews revealed an intimate, on-the-ground understanding of Brazilian local co-
productions and Sony do Brasil. First, many producers, distributors, and audience 
members have a complex love/hate relationship with Sony Pictures and other MPA 
members yet clearly argue that the current system is more complicated than has been 
represented. This type of qualitative interviewing had limitations in the number of 
interviews I could conduct and analyze, particularly in an industry that depends 
immediate appointments and professional connections. I also did not anticipate the candid 
opinions expressed and access I received with these film professionals. The type of data I 
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gathered enriched my understanding of the local practices that would not have been 
available with earlier top-down methodology which focused on institutions instead of 
humans as agents. By navigating the conversations, introductions, and professional 
networking within the Brazilian film industry, I have a clearer idea of the types of people 
in these executive and creative worker positions, their internal network and relationships 
to each other, and the importance of their individual agency within these local, national, 
and transnational institutions. I routinely was asked the question “Who have you talked 
to?” followed by a history of their professional relationship to each other and a list of 
who else to whom I should talk. Part of this is the cultural networking that exists in all 
levels of Brazilian society and the other part is the internal references and “door opening” 
that is necessary to contact anyone in the media industries. Many of the industry 
professionals were eager to share their experiences and opinions on cultural, political, 
economic implications of working with Sony as discussed above.  The experiences 
working with Sony do Brasil and the opinions about their position in the local industry 
were negotiated as a necessary due to their experiences, personnel, and resources. Yet, 
Brazilian producers and distributors almost universally despise their strong presence and 
financial resources from the tax incentive system.  
Furthermore, a number of film professionals wanted to engage in theoretical and 
academic debates regarding national cinema, political economy, globalization, audiences, 
and cultural proximity. When asked about media audiences and ideas about cultural 
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proximity, each producer and distributor described his/her idea of the Brazilian audience 
by sex, class, education, location, and so on. In terms of issues of the effect of 
international media ownership and production on the Brazilian population, responses 
varied. Many producers justified working with the majors as part of a business logic that 
“rewards” good scripts, good projects, and the desire to make money. Yet, I specifically 
asked Sá Leitão, who is incredibly vocal against the advantages of os majors in Brazil, 
about Latin American debates and literature surrounding Hollywood and media 
imperialism. He argued:  
it was easier in past to say the business has a hand in imperialism . . . the fact that 
the companies are familiar. You have figures, tycoons that represent the 
companies. Today there is not one person . . . there are levels and levels . . . 
stockholders. Capitalism is more complex than it was. There does not exist an evil 
plan by one person to control . . . there exists an economic system with logic. The 
same thing that motivates Disney is the same thing that motivates companies in 
other countries, Downtown or mine.114  
 
Beyond arguments of power and place, Sá Leitão offers a critic of media imperialism 
based on rethinking theories of the media industry from the driving vision of the 
individual to the complex nature of a global economic system.  In critiquing the idea of a 
single tycoon representing a company, he is also critiquing media histories that have 
favored a simplified and mogul-driven story of industry workings over complex, multi-
layered, and contradictory notion of media institutions.  
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Many echoed this argument about economic logic and the complex nature of 
state-supported culture industries. It is not the individual institutions such as Sony that 
producers and distributors blame but the tax incentive and regulatory system. While 
Sony’s partners want an equalized industry where they can compete with the majors, the 
consensus of mainstream audiovisual professionals is the government should not foment 
or regulate this process.  
Second, my research does not offer a cohesive picture of Brazilian LLPs or Sony 
do Brasil’s place as a local institution but only further complicates the LLP practices. 
Any study of the Brazilian film industry must be contextualized and viewed in more 
nuanced and complicated ways that incorporate understand of local agents including 
issues of urban location, socio-economic levels, and internal structure and politics of this 
media culture. I interviewed a select and prominent group of Brazilian film producers and 
distributors, a specific dominant group with unprecedented access and resources. These 
are educated, upper-class mostly male professionals who work with each other in a small 
and at times insular industry. It is necessary to acknowledge that their positions and 
decades of experience in the industry offer them more power or leverage in their 
relationships with Sony. I gathered mostly an insider’s view of commercial, mainstream 
co-productions that manage to locate funding and do receive wide distribution unlike the 
smaller, independent films made from people outside this system. Moreover, I observed 
an overall shift away from earlier support of a protectionist, state-sponsored system based 
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on incentive to a strong argument for an open, market-driven industry based on economic 
logic and trans/national partnerships. Understandings and opinions about Sony do Brasil 
varied depending on whom I was talking and their position in the industry—private vs. 
state institutions, history of partnership with Sony, their training or history with national 
or international film companies.  
Third, it is impossible to ignore the historical influence and position MPA 
members still maintain in the Brazilian film industry. This is evident from 
Sony/Columbia’s longtime presence as a co-producer and distributor but also from the 
current financial system that continues to support their English- and Portuguese-language 
films. Additionally, I heard the common usage of industry terms in English such as 
“major player,” “blockbuster,” “opening weekend,” and so on. This influence should be 
identified and questioned but does not represent the Hollywoodization of Brazil. 
Actually, as my chapter illustrates, the local filmmaking practices are far from it. 
But to classify Sony do Brasil as merely another local company with co-
production interests ignores this problematic legacy and the current global size of these 
media conglomerates and their powerful position in international film markets. Their 
local co-production focus may be on a national space but the same operations and 
resources are also dedicated to selling the owners’ English-language films to Brazilian 
audiences. Yet, to deny Sony/Columbia’s history within the development of Brazilian 
LLPs would discount its local agency, imagination, and actors who are separate 
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individuals from the large entity of Sony worldwide. Therefore, Sony do Brasil presents 
an excellent example of a translocal media institutions that operates in an in-between 
space; somewhere between transnational corporation and local Brazilian company that 
must balance and adapt to the goals of both. Sony do Brasil is promoting and adapting a 
global corporate production strategy developed within their transnational media parent 
group, SPE. While the LLP strategy has transnational participation from executives in 
Los Angeles to managers and producers in Brazil, local and national conditions also push 
back to shape the media products. Chico Xavier is not merely an example of a Sony local 
language film. Producers and distributors based in the specific local business culture of 
the media capital Rio de Janeiro participate, negotiate, and, at times, maintain a 
significant amount of creative control over these films. Additionally, cultural policies 
through national subsidies and incentives transform the financial, political, and cultural 
nature of what constitutes a Brazilian film co-production as well as how and where these 




Navigating the National/Regional European Film Market:  
The Short-Lived Case of Columbia Films Producciones Españolas 
Film scholars and industry professionals historically have portrayed the 
relationship between European and Hollywood industries through a “rhetoric of conflict” 
and as an “economic, political, and cultural battlefield.”1 Most notably, the 1992 GATT 
debates centered on rounds of discussion between U.S.-supported free trade policies and 
a French-led European stance of protecting the cultural place of media. While decades of 
protectionist measures, public subsidies, and free market vs. national cultural policy 
debates support this image, the everyday relationships and exchanges between major 
studios and independent producers suggest a more complex contemporary situation. What 
instead exists is a cinema that transverses national borders, cultural boundaries, and 
languages as well as the flow of people, finances, and technology. This chapter examines 
the short-lived Columbia Films Producciones Españolas against the contemporary state of 
the Spanish film industry.  
From theatrical distribution to minority producer investment, Sony Pictures 
Entertainment and other transnational film companies such as Warner Bros., Fox, 
Paramount, Disney, The Weinstein Company are engaging systematically in European 
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media industries through more localized partnership. Based in Madrid between 2001 and 
2007, Columbia Films Producciones Españolas produced two local language productions 
(LLP) in Spain and later expanded to oversee European co-productions for France and 
Italy. The goal of this chapter is to explore this LLP operation within the context of a 
changing Spanish and European industrial context during the 2000s. Over the past 
decade, an economic recession, online piracy, and a shrinking theatrical box office and 
DVD sales hit the Spanish industry hard. Although the industry produced between 98 and 
173 films per year during the 2000s, during the period of Columbia Español’s LLP 
operation the market share for local films dropped from 17.8 to 13 percent.2 While Sony 
arrived full force with its LLP unit and strategy in place, building from a precedent in 
Brazil, the Madrid operation and Los Angeles-based international division headquarters 
faced a domestic marketplace characterized by multi-layered regional and local financing 
measures as well as declining audiences and dwindling distribution windows. 
Within a fraught historical context, how do we understand the Columbia Español 
position as local language producer and partner in the Spanish film industry? Although 
the LLP originally was conceived as financed fully by SPE, the Spanish projects were co-
produced and co-financed with television broadcasters and independent producers. Due 
to these multi-layered partnerships, I explore competing commercial cinema models as 
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well as tensions and conflicts between the various national/regional/transnational 
partners. What results are competing notions of “local” Spanish cinema and conflicts 
between Sony’s corporate studio models with industry practices.  
My research is based on five weeks of mid-level field research spent in Madrid, 
Spain, and Brussels, Belgium, during 2011. Introductions from Brazil led me to my first 
interview contact, the Brazilian former Sony executive, Iona de Macedo, who was 
involved in both the Brazilian and Spanish LLP divisions. After an extensive interview 
with de Macedo, I approached national and regional public institutions (Instituto de la 
Cinematografía y de las Artes Audiovisuales/ICAA, the European Union’s MEDIA 
program, and Eurimages program), trade organizations (Federación de Distribuidores 
Cinematograficos/FEDICINE or Spain’s distribution organization, and the Motion 
Picture Association headquarters in Europe), major producers and distributors (Sony, 
Warner Bros., and Universal), and a number of independent producers and distributors 
(Morena Films and El Toro Pictures). What emerged was a complicated history of 
Columbia Español alongside a struggling Spanish film industry over the 2000s. Although 
it would be impossible to address all the intricacies and elements of filmmaking in Spain 
and Europe in this format, an exhaustive look at all levels of the Spanish and European 
film industries is not my intention. Instead, my goal is to describe the most salient 
commercial models within the Spanish film industry from various historical, political, 
economic, technological, and cultural elements most salient to my case study, Sony’s 
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LLP division. In turn, I utilize industry data, trade journals, popular press, film 
marketing, and field interviews to focus on the three major issues that emerged: 1) co-
production financing, 2) television broadcasters as co-producers of feature length films, 
and 3) online piracy and theatrical distribution. 
On a large level, this chapter deals with two key issues within culturally complex 
European media industries: 1) developing national media industry conditions and 
practices through co-productions, subsidies, television funds, and distribution, and 2) the 
interaction between national and regional media policies to protect local media and attract 
audiences. On a more focused level, this chapter will explore the short-lived Sony 
Spanish LLP division within the particular media environment. First, I will outline a brief 
history of the Spanish film industry from the 1920s to the 1990s around key policies, its 
relationship with Hollywood cinema, and its struggle to find sustainable financial, 
production, and distribution models. From the emergence of a commercial cinema in the 
1990s, genre and language become methods for creating films aimed at trans/national 
markets.  
The core of this chapter focuses on three key issues affecting the Spanish film 
industry and, in turn, Sony’s LLP operation. The first section explores the reliance on co-
production financing through national and regional subsidies for independent European 
producers. As part of the major transnational company, Sony Pictures Entertainment, 
Columbia Español was not eligible for a majority of the European public sector financing 
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nor was SPE interested in dealing with the legal or financial complexity of European co-
productions. In contrast, I analyze Español’s attempt to finance fully its first Spanish 
LLP, Di Que Sí (2004), during the early 2000s and its sole attempt towards international 
co-productions with the Italian-Spanish Melissa P (2005, dir. Luca Guadagnino). The 
next section discusses the position of private and public television broadcasters as film 
co-producers and the role of European and Spanish film policies creating this cross-media 
model. Here I examine Columbia Español’s second LLP, Salir Pitando, as a product of 
both these policies and Sony’s changing LLP role from full-financer to minority 
producer. The last section explores distribution challenges faced during the late 2000s 
due to online piracy, shrinking DVD sales, and declining domestic theatrical which is 
credited widely with why the Madrid division was closed. I outline the challenges 
Columbia Español’s partners faced in trying to distribute the LLP outside of the national 
market as well as the internal conflict the Spanish production staff experienced working 
within the other Sony international divisions. Overall, Columbia’s Spanish, and on a 
larger scale European, production strategies reflect its incompatibility with the state of 
national and regional industrial conditions and the current commercial co-production 
model.  
Ideally, Spain would have served as a cultural linguistic crossroads between 
European and Latin American markets, a productive industry with a rich cinematic 
tradition and international selling power. Instead, what unfolded was a more complex 
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situation of changing market conditions and conflicting cultures of production. By the 
numbers, Sony’s attempt to adapt a generic global production and distribution 
experiences for LLPs in Spain was modestly successful. Yet, the former President of 
Columbia Films Producciones Españolas, de Macedo, asked me: “Why the hell do you 
want to do a dissertation about something that did not have a chance to flourish?”3 From 
the point of view of those in the local industry, the Columbia Español experiment was a 
failure largely because of the strategy’s incompatibility of adapting to Spanish and 
European film practices and conditions. While this case study explores the state of 
Spanish and European industry conditions in the 2000s, it reveals the story of Columbia 
Español trying to navigate and adapt a local production and distribution strategy that 
succeeded so well in Brazil into a new national/regional setting. The case study of 
Columbia Films Producciones Españolas is a contemporary analysis of the Spanish film 
industry and a battle to keep an audience. What emerges is a nationally-bound fixed LLP 
strategy that was unable to transverse a fluid Spanish film industry that operates 
simultaneously as national and European.  
 
A HISTORY OF SPANISH CINEMA 
Although celebrated internationally for the artistic and commercial achievements 
                                                
3 Iona de Macedo, former VP Production for Latin American and President of Columbia Films 
Producciones Españolas, interview by author, 17 January 2011, Madrid, España. In general, many of the 
Spanish film professionals I spoke with had a similar reaction. Part of my part in the interview process 
became justifying my interest in their industry. 
 199 
of filmmakers such as Pedro Almodóvar and Alejandro Amenábar, Spanish popular 
commercial cinema historically has struggled domestically for financing and audiences. 
With a country of forty-six million, around twenty percent of Spain’s population visit a 
movie theater monthly. Yet, the market share of Spanish films remains around ten 
percent as compared to the English-language films that historically have dominated the 
3,874 screens of this local market.4 Although Spain may be one of the most active film 
industries in Europe producing between 100 and 176 local projects during the 2000s, 
their audiences for both theatrical and home entertainment are disappearing. Many 
challenges for Spanish media industries are symptomatic of the larger economic 
stagnation reshaping the national climate with unemployment reaching twenty-one 
percent nation-wide and forty-five percent for Spanish youth in 2011.5  
For Sony Pictures Entertainment, these economic conditions directly effect the 
company’s declining position and participation within the Spanish market. When SPE 
established Columbia Español in 2001, together with Sony Pictures Releasing 
International España, the company released eighteen local films and forty-seven English-
language and non-Spanish-language films within Spain the following year. Although SPE 
focused the majority of their operations in Spain on marketing and distributing their 
English-language content, in the early 2000s the establishment of a LLP operation along 
                                                
4 Chris Evans, “The Pain in Spain,” Screen International (10 February 2011) accessed online (15 February 
2011). 
5 Sarah Rainsford, “Spanish Vote Amid Mass Protests,” BBC News (22 May 2011) accessed online (1 July 
2011). 
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with increased acquisition and distribution of local films showed that the company was 
approaching the market with a more localized and multi-faceted strategy using local 
language content to capture Spanish audiences. However, this change in production and 
distribution strategy proved to be temporary. After 2007, when the Spanish LLP division 
was shuttered, SPE distributed between two and five local films and less than twenty-five 
English-language films through theatrical release.6 Even though SPE’s peers such as 
Warner Bros. and Fox continue to co-produce and release three or four local films in 
Spain each year, general expectations for making a Spanish blockbuster and capturing 
three to four million spectators are low with the film producers and distributors I 
interviewed in Madrid.7  
In turn, in order to understanding Columbia Español within the contemporary 
Spanish film industry, this section outlines a brief history of key policies, institutions, 
movements, and individuals that shaped Spanish cinema during the twentieth century. 
The story of this industry follows battles over national identity, private versus public 
funding mechanisms, cultural protectionism, trans/national audiences, and Hollywood’s 
dominant presence. Before entering a discussion of Columbia Español and Sony’s 
participation in local production, I will outline a brief historical overview and key 
developments in the industry since the 1920s to the contemporary Spanish film industry. 
                                                
6 see ICAA website for data: “Boletín Informativo de Cine: Producción, distribución y exhibición de 
películas.” http://www.mcu.es/cine/MC/BIC/2009/Portada.html 
7 Ivan Losada, Sony Pictures Releasing Spain, interview by author, 18 January 2011, Madrid, España. 
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Not surprisingly, American film studios and later transnational media companies directly 
and indirectly figure into this history. The long contentious battle between Hollywood 
and European film industries is well-known and discussed in academic literature and is 
valuable to understand in the context of the Spanish cinema.8 Yet, how this relationship 
vacillated between imports/exports, protectionist policies and institutions, censorship, and 
cultural exchanges across the twentieth century deeply shapes the Spanish film industry 
today. 
Early Spanish cinema was funded mainly through private production companies 
producing sixty films per year in the late 1920s. Driven by a number of growing 
Barcelona- and Madrid-based studios, the Spanish film industry had a “strong domestic 
following” with early films about bullfighting, nineteenth-century romantic plays, and 
Spanish literary adaptations.9 Yet by the late teens and early 1920s, U.S. studio films 
accounted for more than 50 percent of Spanish market share with Columbia Pictures 
having a strong distribution presence with their English-language films.10 The 
                                                
8 See Thomas Guback, The International Film Industry: Western Europe and America Since 1945 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), Higson and Maltby; Peter Lev, The Euro-American 
Cinema. (Austin: UT Press, 1993); Kristin Thompson, Exporting Entertainment: American In The World 
Film Market 1907-1934 (London: BFI publishing, 1985); Jake Horsley, Dogville vs. Hollywood: The 
Independents and the Hollywood Machine (London: Marion Boyars Publishers, 2005); Thomas Elsaesser, 
European Cinema: Face To Face With Hollywood (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2005). 
9 Phillip Williams, “The New Spanish Cinema,” MovieMaker: The Art and Business of Making Movies (29 
September 2002) accessed online (15 July 2009). 
http://www.moviemaker/com/directing/article/the_new_spanish_cinema_3329/ 
10 As a solution to exporting internationally with the challenge of sound technologies, studios such as 
Columbia and Universal produced Spanish-language versions of many of their English-language films 
using the same sets and stories but different cast and crew. Thompson: 131 &161; ICAA website, “Base de 
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introduction of sound into Spain in 1931 coincided with the abdication of King Alfonso 
XIII, general elections bringing new challenges, and a new studio structure to Spanish 
cinema. Between 1931 and 1936, known as Spain’s Second Republic, two important 
production studios emerged—CIFESA (Compañía Industrial Film Español S.A.) and 
Filmófono—aligning themselves with the Conservative and Liberal political parties, 
respectively.11 In reference to the productivity of both studios, Marvin D’Lugo suggests 
“it is possible to speak of a boom in national cinema in Spain, spurred in part by the 
extraordinary support of Spanish films by the general populace.”12  
Between 1936 and 1939, Spain experienced a Civil War sparked by General 
Francisco Franco’s military uprising against the elected left-wing coalition. In response to 
Franco and his Nationalist party’s victory, the newly appointed dictator embraced an 
autarky, “a policy that attempts to create a self-sufficient national economy entirely 
insulated from international trade.”13 In turn, the cultural repression and censoring 
experienced by the Spanish people included submission to one language, one Church, one 
political party, and one cultural agenda. This “self-sustainability” extended to the film 
industry through major government oversight, restructuring, and “corrections” or cuts to 
                                                                                                                                            
datos de películas calificadas”.” accessed January 13, 2011. 
http://www.mcu.es/bbddpeliculas/cargarFiltro.do?layout=bbddpeliculas&cache=init&language=es 
11 Nuria Triana-Toribio, Spanish National Cinema (London: Routledge, 2002): 21. 
12 Marvin D’Lugo, A Guide to the Cinema of Spain (UK: Greenwood Press, 1997): 6. 
13 Tatjana Pavlović, Inmaculada Alvarez, Rosana Blanco_Cano, Anitra Grisales, Alejandra Osorio, and 
Alejandra Sánchez, 100 Years of Spanish Cinema (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009): 60. 
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finished films.14 Specifically, the government began a strategy of direct involvement 
through the creation of the National Department of Cinematography (DNC) in 1938 and 
Institute for Cinematic Investigation and Experimentation (IIEC) in 1947. Franco sought 
to cut off any exchange between Spain and other film industries in the 1940s by tightly 
controlling the “Spanishness” of the national cinema from production to reception. Due 
to their Republican political views, CIFESA survived the war to become one of the most 
important production companies in the 1940s, producing high-budgeted literary 
adaptations and dramas that adhered to Franco’s forced and tightly controlled national 
imagined community.15  
While the autarky16 tried to create “a self-sufficient Spanish cinema, sealed off 
from foreign influence and input,” Nuria Triana-Toribio argues this plan was impossible. 
She claims this because “much Spanish cinema production had taken place  [in other 
parts of Europe], because internal production inevitably drew on imported genres, and 
because funding of Spanish-made films was directly tied to the lucrative business in 
import licenses for foreign films.”17 This artificial containment and engineering of a 
national cinema was unrealistic. This is particularly true on a financial level since film 
companies made more money off distributing the highly taxed foreign films than 
                                                
14 Rob Stone, Spanish Cinema (Harlow, England: Longman, 2002): 37. 
15 Pavlović, et al., 63; Triana-Toribio, 55. 
16 Michael Richards describes the “autarky” in the form of policies implemented during the Franco era to 
obtain national economic self-sufficiency; Richards, "Constructing the Nationalist State: Self-sufficiency 
and the Regeneration in the Early Franco Years," Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: 
Competing and Conflicting Identities eds. Clare Mar-Molinero and Angel Smith (Oxford: Berg, 1996): 149. 
17 Triana-Toribio, 52. 
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producing Spanish projects. These highly regulated and protectionist policies seemed 
only to strengthen the dominance of Hollywood films. 
The following decades saw the rise of a new production company, Suevia Films, a 
turn towards film comedies, the rise of a new generation of filmmakers, and the 
governmental opening of a space for oppositional and international cinema.18 While the 
1950s brought international recognition by the United Nations and the economic 
liberalization and modernization due to a technocratic restructuring of Franco’s cabinet, 
the 1960s introduced the First Economic Development Plan to develop tourism and 
encourage international investment.19 The Spanish film industry was not only opening up 
politically but also to international financing, production, and styles. Subsidies available 
for individual films amounted to 15 percent of the total budget, with an additional 25 
percent available to higher budget projects.20 Because of the heavily state-subsidized 
cinema, the films of this period were criticized for being elitist and out of touch with the 
mass Spanish audience. In contrast, under new special protections and funding for 
“quality” films, the New Spanish Cinema movement emerged, greatly influenced by 
Neo-realism and other international film movements. Furthermore, Spain was now 
attracting a number of American and British runaway productions. These included 
spaghetti westerns and Hollywood superproductions such as Anthony Mann’s El Cid 
                                                
18 Pavlović, et al., 83-84. 
19 Ibid, 81 & 104. 
20 Catherine Fowler, The European Cinema Reader (London: Routledge, 2002): 225. 
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(1961) and Nicholas Ray’s King of Kings (1961) filmed in Spain due to cheap production 
costs.21  
Although the country experienced increasing political and cultural backlash 
against the government regime into the 1970s, Franco’s death in 1975 marked the official 
transition from dictatorship to democracy and reinstatement of a monarchy. This period 
impacted the film industry by the softening of film censorship and the revoking of screen 
quotas for domestic and international films. Even though a small percentage of Franco-
era production subsidies remained, the opening of distribution and exhibition policies 
resulted in a flood of English-language films that found Spanish films struggling for 
audiences.22 Due to the relaxation of quotas and censorship, the number of films 
Columbia Pictures imported to Spain greatly increased during this period as Hollywood 
saw Spain as a newly open market to exploit. 
In the 1980s, a major restructuring of film policies and institutions took place 
under the socialist government, Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE). Pilar Miró, 
one of the country’s most prominent female filmmakers, was appointed director general 
of cinematography and quickly passed the Ley Miró (Miró Law) in 1982. As a 
protectionist measure, the law introduced state subvention in the form of grants for 
Spanish filmmakers to produce “quality” films to compete in the Hollywood dominated 
domestic box office. Definitions of “quality,” set by Miró and the various government 
                                                
21 Pavlović, et al., 110. 
22 Ibid 127-130; Triana-Toribio, 108. 
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agencies she formed, typically translated to high budget literary adaptations that 
incorporated nation-building themes.23 Esteve Riambau describes the films of “El periodo 
‘socialista’” between 1982 and 1995 as reacting “to the sum of these parameters (auteur 
film + genre + literary adaptation + star system + formal look) in different proportions 
but with an identical desire for polyvalence.”24 Critics labeled these films elitist and 
homogenous whereas the Miró Law echoed 1940s Franco policies of building a national 
cinema linking quality to economic cost.25 Furthermore, these films were expected to 
travel well internationally since by definition a “good” film had to succeed in both a 
national and transnational market. As I will discuss throughout this chapter, this is an 
expectation that still exists for Spanish and European commercial cinema today. Yet, the 
1980s “quality” films of Carlos Saura and Mario Camus performed better at international 
film festivals of Berlin and the U.S. Academy Awards than with their domestic 
audience.26 As well, while the market share of Spanish film remained around 10 percent, 
the share of English-language Hollywood films increased from 56 percent to 72 percent 
by the end of the decade.27 
Furthermore, national and regional regulatory bodies impacted film policies and 
                                                
23 Pavlović, et al., 144; Triana-Toribio, 112-3. 
24 Esteve Riambau as quoted in Pavlović, et al., 154. However, it should be noted this does not constitute 
all Spanish cinema during the Socialist Period. Low budget and experimental movements countered these 
trends. Most notably, the independent and politically transgressive early films of Pedro Almodóvar 
exemplified the “Movida” counter-cultural movement of Madrid during this period. 
25 Triana-Toribio, 115-7. 
26 Triana-Toribio, 113-4. Pavlović, et al., 155. 
27 Esteve Riambau, “Public Money and Private Business (Or How To Survive Hollywood’s Imperialism): 
Film Production In Spain (1984-2002),” Cineaste (Winter 2003): 58 
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institutions from film subsidies to co-production practices. Established in 1984, the 
Instituto de la Cinematografía y de las Artes Audiovisuales (ICAA) became the central 
film institution under the Spanish Minister of Culture and oversaw subsidies, awards, 
legislation, development, co-production treaties, screen quotas, etc. ICAA further 
restructured national film mechanisms towards more automatic subsidies that rewarded 
box office results and encouraged European co-productions. In 1986, Spain was 
integrated into the European Community (EC). As I will discuss in the following section, 
Spanish filmmakers now had financial, creative, and market access that expanded the 
resources and reach of their national cinema. By the late 1980s, a new director general of 
cinematography pushed the film industry toward free market thinking, private funding, 
and self-regulation. Spain’s integration into the European Community was believed to 
solve the problems described above by creating a more commercial cinema oriented 
towards the regional market. Even with a push toward privatization, commercially viable 
projects, and integration into a larger regional market, Tatjana Pavlović, et al. argue, “the 
end of the socialist period is seen as a moment of profound crisis for Spanish cinema: 
lavish state subsidies drained budgets; an industrially weak Spanish film industry was 
incapable of challenging the domination of American cinema; and the arrival of private-
sector television in the 1990s only exacerbated the crisis.”28 The number of films under 
the Miró Law actually decreased per year and more than half of Spanish films earned less 
                                                
28 Pavlović, et. al, 155. 
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than the amount subsidized by the government (startling since the subsidies could not 
exceed more than 50 percent of the budget).29 In response, Spanish government funding 
schemes underwent a number of changes under the 1994 Ley de Cine [Cinema Law] 
including removing the production subsidies system, adopting automatic subsidies based 
on box-office performance, and reserving advanced subsidies for first-time directors.30 A 
self-sustainability model is further pushed upon the 1996 victory of the conservative 
Partido Popular (Popular Party) that supported cultural policies based on ‘deregulation 
and commercial viability.’31  
Since the 1990s, Spanish commercial filmmaking is redefining earlier notions of a 
national cinema. Spanish cinema witnessed an influx of new directors constructed around 
the idea of the commercial auteur with the success of films attracting over one million 
spectators such as Almodóvar’s Todo Sobre Mi Madre (1999), Amenábar’s Abre Los 
Ojos (1997), Fernando Trueba’s Belle Epoque (1992), and Álex de la Iglesia’s La 
Comunidad (2000). Emphasized in industry interviews and academic literature, writers, 
producers, filmmakers, and distributors developed a more commercial Spanish cinema or 
“shift towards the popular” with trans/national appeal.32 For example, Sony Pictures 
Classics distributed both Belle Epoque and Todo Sobre Mi Madre in the United States. 
                                                
29 Riambau, 59. 
30 Triana-Toribio, 144; Pavlović et al., 243. 
31 B. Jordan, “The Spanish Film Industry in the 1980s and 1990s,” Contemporary Spanish Cultural Studies 
eds. B. Jordan and R. Morgan-Tamosunas (London: Arnold, 2000): 188 as quoted in Triana-Toribio, 144. 
32 Albert Mira, “Introduction” The Cinema of Spain and Portugal (London: Wallflower Press, 2005): 10. 
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They performed well for Spanish-language art house films grossing $5.4 and 8 million, 
respectively.33 
Unlike the glossy, high budget literary productions supported by the national and 
regional policies in the 1980s, contemporary industry professionals I interviewed 
emphasize commercial viability through audience accessible genres such as horror, 
thrillers, historical dramas, and comedy as well as multi-lingual filmmaking. Some of the 
most successful box offices releases domestically and internationally have been the 
horror film El Orfanato (The Orphanage, 2007, dir. Juan Antonio Bayona) and the 
Torrente dark comedy series about a racist, misogynistic former cop who patrols the 
streets at night. Many of the local producers and distributors I interviewed expressed a 
similar focus on genre pictures when looking for projects to develop and in which to 
invest. Morena Films independent producer, Pedro Uriol, believes genre 
helps the audience to understand what you are selling. But this is not enough. You 
have to give them genre with an edge with characters. With something different 
that usually Hollywood movies are not able to give the audience . . . we can talk 
about more specific cultural questions and issues than the Americans.34  
 
Instead of merely borrowing international genres or Hollywood modes of production, 
differentiation comes from transnational genre traditions grounded in the cultural 
specificity of Spanish film practices, literature, and storytelling. 35 The films of this 
                                                
33 Box office data via boxofficemojo.com 
34 Pedro Uriol, Morena Films, interview by author, 28 January 2011, Madrid, España. 
35 Yet, Spanish filmmakers have to deal with the local problem of their films categorized as a genre on to 
themselves. Despite the genre, story, style, or scope of a film, many times audiences segregate all local 
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period exemplify “the fact that the idea of national cinema has increasingly become a 
decentered concept, working within a variety of transnational networks of production, 
distribution, and exhibition in the entertainment field.”36 This is nowhere more evident 
then in a redefining of Spanish commercial cinema through the boundaries of language. 
While Spanish films may range from Castellano (Spanish-language) to Catalan, 
English-language Spanish productions are becoming more common.37 As Anne Jäckel 
suggests, “every significant film-producing country where English is not the first 
language is now making films in the English language. In many cases, the state is both 
directly and indirectly supporting the development of internationally oriented cinema.”38 
For example, Amenábar’s English-language co-production Los Otros (The Others, 2001) 
starred Nicole Kidman as a British post-war widow living in the English countryside with 
her children in a house of spirits. The film benefited from national production subsidies 
                                                                                                                                            
language films into a broad category simply known as Spanish cinema; Pablo Noguerones, Warner Bros. 
Spain, interview by author, 28 January 2011, Madrid, España interview. 
36 Vicente Rodríguez Ortega, “Trailing The Spanish Auteur: Almodóvar’s, Amenábar’s and de la Iglesia’s 
Generic Routes In The U.S. Market” in Contemporary Spanish Cinema and Genre. eds. Jay Beck and 
Ortega. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008): 52. 
37 The dominant Spanish film language is highly debated issue within the national and local cultural 
industries today. The majority of films are produced in the most widely spoken of Spain’s official 
language, Castellano,as opposed to the country’s three other official languages of Catalan, Basque, and 
Galician. In the case of the Catalan region (one of the most thriving media capitals in Spain right now), the 
local film industry and commission recently passed a law requiring all films (Spanish, European, or 
international) to be dubbed into the local dialect. This makes Catalonia one of the only regions with legally 
enforced local language dubbing whereas in other regions around the world it is up to the distributors’ 
discretion when, how, and if to dub. Many in the national Spanish industry (both MPA members and 
independent producers) are fighting this rule for fear of further fracturing an already weak national market; 
Olivier Dock, MPA Europe, interview by author, 3 February 2011, Brussels, Belgium; Pablo Noguerones, 
Warner Bros. Spain, interview by author, 28 January 2011, Madrid, España interview. 
38 Jäckel, 63; This practice is reminiscent of the English-language European co-productions of the 1960s 
and 1970s as discussed in Peter Lev’s Euro-American Cinema and Thomas Guback’s The International 
Film Industry. 
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and attracted over six million Spanish spectators.39 Other English-language Spanish 
thrillers include Álex de la Iglesia’s Oxford Murders (2008), Rodrigo Cortés’s Buried 
(2010), and Amenábar’s Ágora (2009), the top grossing local film of 2009. With posters 
placed strategically around the ICAA office and multiple references to it from staff 
members, Ágora is held as a recent successful, albeit bloated, case of contemporary 
commercial cinema. Shot in Malta with an international cast, and filmed in English, the 
film continuously came up in my field research and conversations about the fluidity of 
“Spanish” cinema to be big budget, transnational, and commercial.40 Vicente Rodríguez 
Ortega explains, “the Spanishness of [Amenábar’s] films is a marketing strategy to 
function productively in both the national and international markets. His use of different 
generic discourses acts as the ultimate facilitator to accomplish such as goal.”41 
Amenábar’s flexible use of genres such as gothic horror, thriller, and historical drama as 
well as English and Spanish language marks a fluid shift in the narrative and industry 
practices of this trans/national cinema that I emphasize throughout this chapter. 
                                                
39 ICAA, “Cine Español Tendencias 1996-2003” (2003) accessed online (10 January 2011). 
http://www.mcu.es/cine/IN/estadisticas/index.html 
40 This is a change from the early 1990s when Spanish filmmakers at the conference Audiovisual Español 
93 “urged the government and, more specifically, the current minister of culture, Jordi Solé Tura, to 
introduce a new audiovisual law to protect it from the total domination of Spanish screens by Hollywood 
movies and by North American multinational distributors and from the ‘europuding’ [sic] coproductions of 
the new European community that threaten to erase the cultural specificity of Spain and its diverse 
autonomous regions” Marsha Kinder, Blood Cinema: The Reconstruction of National Identity in Spain 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 441. as quoted in Betz, 18-19. 
41 Ortega, 52. 
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While Spanish filmmakers are increasingly embracing internationally 
recognizable genres, Amenábar’s individual success does not reflect the overall health of 
the industry during the late-2000s. The market share for Spanish films has fluxuated from 
9 percent in 1996, over 17 percent in 2001 and back to 9 percent in 2010. I conducted my 
fieldwork during a particularly tenuous period in the Spanish film industry. As I tried to 
understand the position of Columbia Español and its partnerships, the declining health of 
the industry colors the history of the 2000s. Struggling Spanish film institutions and 
individuals struggling with the economic recession, technological transformations, and 
shifting national audiences should mark a break from earlier discussions of brand name 
filmmakers and protecting a particular Spanish film culture. The reality for most 
independent film companies is different. For independent producers and distributors, 
even with expanding subsidies and co-production options, local private financing, 
productivity, and distribution bottlenecks have presented challenges over the past decade. 
Manuel Monzon, executive producer at Vertice Cine, describes local financing in terms 
of: “even when you have a good project that is interesting to the international market, 
you’ve already gained approval from the government for the national subsidies, sold the 
rights to TV, and set up co-production agreements, most of the banks are still not willing 
to discount the financing” or provide favorable credit lines for film production.42  
                                                
42 In the current period, Spanish filmmakers are forced to apply for credit directly from banks. Chris Evans. 
“The New Face Of Spain.” Screen Daily (10 February 2011) accessed online (1 February 2011). 
http://www.screendaily.com/reports/territory-focus/the-new-face-of-spain/5023317.article 
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Furthermore, if a producer manages to find the financing for a film, there are no 
guarantees the company can plan for a next one. On average an independent production 
company may make one film per year or one film every five years. Due to difficulties 
producing subsequent films, many producers claim Spanish film does not even constitute 
an “industry.” Pablo Noguerones, the Warner Bros. General Manager based in Madrid, 
explained:  
Often times you have a guy make one movie and then you don’t see him for five 
years . . . to raise money to make another movie. And this guy is only living out of 
the executive production paying his salary and overhead. There is no industry as 
such. You can count it with your hand the producers [such as Morena Films and 
Mod Producciones] that are active and have in production a production 
structure.43 
 
Independent films have to fight for release dates and distribution deals. Where 
there was once a selection of independent distributors outside the international options of 
Warner Bros., Universal, Columbia, etc., today many of the largest independent 
distributors currently are filing for bankruptcy, and smaller local production companies 
cannot find adequate funding due to the recent global economic recession.44 As this 
chapter suggests, this unpredictable industry climate shaped the short period of Columbia 
Español’s production operation. 
 
                                                
43 Pablo Noguerones, Warner Bros. Spain, interview by author, 28 January 2011, Madrid, España 
interview. 
44 Chris Evans. “Hollywood Dominates Spanish Box Office In 2011.” Screen Daily (7 January 2011) 
accessed online (1 February 2011). http://www.screendaily.com/news/europe/hollywood-dominates-
spanish-box-office-in-2010/5022090.article 
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A HISTORY OF COLUMBIA ESPAÑOL 
As Sony Pictures Entertainment refocused its international operations through 
localized production strategies, their participation in the Spanish film industry shifted 
across its various divisions. From a domestic perspective, Columbia/SPRI began 
strategically to distribute more Spanish films in the 1990s for local audiences such as 
Airbag (1997, dir. Juanma Bajo Ulloa), El Abuelo (The Grandfather, 1998, dir. José Luis 
Garci), and El Palo (The Hold-up, 2001, dir. Eva Lesmes).45 On a transnational level, 
specialized arthouse distribution divisions and independent distribution began to exploit 
the international profile and appeal of many of these directors. Sony Pictures Classics, the 
“foreign” and arthouse distribution division of Sony Pictures Entertainment, established a 
relationship with Almodóvar and has distributed many of his films internationally such as 
the Academy-Award winning Todo Sobre Mi Madre (All About My Mother, 1999), Habla 
Con Ella (Talk to Her, 2002), and, more recently, La Piel Que Habito (The Skin I Live In, 
2011). 
As Sony’s production and distribution strategies succeeded in other territories 
such as Brazil, the international division began to expand its LLP model. Madrid was 
chosen as a new location for a LLP operation due to the strong domestic box office 
around 2000 and successful acquisition and distribution of Spanish films by other SPE 
divisions such as Sony Pictures Classics. Sony Pictures Entertainment executives brought 
                                                
45 ICAA website. “Peliculas Españolas con mayor numero acumulado de copias comercializadas” accessed 
online (10 January 2011). http://www.mcu.es/cine/CE/Actualidad/Actualidad.html 
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de Macedo, then Vice President of Production for Columbia TriStar International 
Television in Latin America, to open a film production office in Spain in 2001. 
Instrumental in reorganizing local language productions for film and television in Brazil, 
she became the President of Columbia Films Producciones Españolas based in Madrid. 
Sony expanded LLP operations to Spain because, according to de Macedo, “at the time, 
Spain was a very dynamic market . . . there were a lot of subsidies and [Sony tried] to 
replicate the marriage of talent and distribution we had in Brazil.”46  
Strength of the market included the local performance of Spanish films. Between 
2001 and 2003, five local films achieved more than 1 million admissions.47 According to 
Columbia TriStar Motion Pictures Group President at the time, Gareth Wigan, “our 
financial goal is for the films to show a profit in their own territories . . . we are not here 
to steal Spanish talent but to support it and give it work here.”48 Columbia Español 
structured their production strategy in order to partner with leading Spanish production 
companies within the local industry.  
As I will outline in the remainder of the chapter, the original business model for 
Spain changed over time. Initially, Sony planned to finance fully the Columbia Español 
projects, identify film projects, and work with independent producers from the local 
office. This strategy produced Columbia Español’s first film, Di Que Sí (2004, dir. Juan 
                                                
46 Iona de Macedo, former VP Production for Latin American and President of Columbia Films 
Producciones Españolas, interview by author, 17 January 2011, Madrid, España. 
47 ibid. 
48 Pamela Rolfe, “Next Stop On SPE Co-production Journey: Spain,” Hollywood Reporter (25 September 
2001) accessed online (15 February 2011). 
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Calvo). However, by 2005, Sony international altered and expanded their production 
model in Europe. The Madrid office expanded to become Sony’s European production 
headquarters for the region with de Macedo and her office overseeing co-productions in 
Spain, France, and Italy. Then, by 2007, the production model in Spain changed again as 
Columbia Español co-produced Salir Pitando (Blinkers, 2007, dir. Álvaro Fernández 
Armero) as a minority producer with Morena Films. The same year Sony Pictures 
Entertainment consolidated its international production offices under one division, Sony 
International Motion Picture Production Group, located in Los Angeles. Shortly after, this 
international division closed the Spain office and moved the European production 
headquarters back to Germany. Today, the Spain Sony operation remains solely as a 
distribution arm of the Sony Pictures International group, acquiring and distribution two 
to five local pictures per year within the Spanish market.49 In contrast, Sony’s Spanish 
distribution operation releases twenty to twenty five English-language films annually. 
The remainder of this chapter will explore Columbia Español’s LLP operations in 
Spain against the backdrop of a changing trans/national film industry through three 
sections: 1) co-production practices and film subsidies in contrast to Columbia Español’s 
first LLP, 2) the role of regional and national policies and television broadcasters in local 
productions in relation to Columbia Español’s second Spanish LLP, and 3) reasons why 
the division left against the context of the declining distribution windows, online piracy, 
                                                
49 Ivan Losada, Sony Pictures Releasing Spain, interview by author, 18 January 2011, Madrid, España. 
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and internal conflicts. Overall, between 2001 and 2007, Sony Europe production 
headquarters co-produced two films in Spain, two films in France, and one film in Italy 
under the watchful eye of Los Angeles executives.50 This chapter explores the reality of 
national/regional cross-border movements through specific policies, funding, co-
production practices, and examples of media convergence in relationship to Columbia 
Español’s nationally-bound LLP strategy. 
 
SUBSIDIES AND “PATCHWORK” FUNDING PRACTICES 
As illustrated by the various European industry professionals I interviewed, Spain 
is a highly subsidized film industry dependent on funding flowing from multiple 
geographical spaces across 1) city and state institutions, 2) national institutions, and 3) 
regional institutions. Independent producer, Christiaan Weiland, describes the situation in 
most EU countries as assembling “a patchwork of small sums of money” that add up to a 
€3-10 million film budget.51 Patchwork is an apt descriptor for financing Spanish cinema. 
The majority of the funding for development and production originates from various 
local, national, and regional public institutions with the intent to stimulate and grow the 
Spanish industry.  
                                                
50 Iona de Macedo, former VP Production for Latin American and President of Columbia Films 
Producciones Españolas, interview by author, 17 January 2011, Madrid, España; Pedro Uriol, Morena 
Films, interview by author, 28 January 2011, Madrid, España. 
51 Christiaan Weiland, Independent Producer, interview by author, 4 February 2011, Brussels, Belgium. 
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This section will provide an overview of the funding mechanisms and co-
production practices standard for commercial filmmaking today in Spain. However, when 
Columbia Español opened in the early 2000s the operation chose not to adapt to local 
models and initially developed a different production model. In general, a tension exists 
between mixed industry practices and Sony’s initial LLP strategy exemplified through 
the films Di Que Sí, Melissa P, and the “Hollywood process.” 
Thus, the purpose of this section is to outline production systems and trends 
available within Spain and, more generally, in Europe. As the size, scale, and location of 
these local and international co-productions continue to blur a number of industrial 
borders, increased tensions develop between definitions of local on the policy level and 
the conditions of the increasingly globalized industry. Whether defined by financing 
sources, geography, or language, the category of “local” production is becoming more 
and more flexible as both English-language films or international co-productions among 
four different European countries are classified as Spanish. From the view of a company 
like Columbia Español as a division of SPE, this is a complicated and contradictory 
media climate.  
Anne Jäckel describes the various sources of private and public support available 
to European productions. Private sources can include corporate finance (private investors 
and banks), equity finance, pre-sales of distribution rights, co-production finance, and 
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sales of television and home video rights.52 Public sources of financing include direct 
investment through grants, soft loans or credits, and lines of credits and advances secured 
against box office receipts. While a number of academic sources have examined these 
various mechanisms in detail, for the purposes of this project, I will focus on the funding 
sources most relevant to the period of Columbia Español LLPs and the ones that came up 
most often in my field interviews.53 In this section, I will focus on examples of public 
sources available to European producers for co-production financing, while the following 
two sections will examine private sources of funding such as television pre-sales and 
investment as well as home video rights. 
A financing and creative co-production system is central to producing small, 
independent or large budget, commercial Spanish films. Local and international co-
productions have been a common practice within Spain, and more generally Europe, 
since the end of World War II. Thomas Guback argues that by 1966 “the purely national 
film had been eclipsed by the co-production in the largest markets of Spain, France, Italy, 
and Germany.”54 For example, the Spanish industry produced 133 films in 1965 and over 
half were international co-productions. By the time Sony opened a production office in 
                                                
52 Jäckel, 44. 
53 For more detailed discussion of European film financing see: Guback; Jäckel; Alejandro Pardo, The 
Europe-Hollywood Coopetition: Cooperation and Competition in the Global Film Industry (Pamplona: 
Universidade de Navarra Press, 2007); Mary P. Wood, Contemporary European Cinema (London: Hodder 
Arnold Press, 2007). 
54 Guback: 182. 
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Madrid around 2001-2002, 37 to 41 percent of films produced annually were classified as 
co-productions funded by multi-nation entities.55   
The central film subsidy comes from national, Spanish institution, ICAA, and is 
divided into two types of support: 1) selected support – granted before the film is 
produced, and 2) automatic support – based on box office performance and given after 
the film is released. According to Rosario Alburquerque, Director General of Promotion 
and International Relations, a committee allocates the funds “based on quality of script, 
curriculum of director, track record of producer, viability of the production, and other 
considerations such as if written or directed by a woman.”56 At the time Sony entered the 
Spanish market in 2001, selective support did not exceed $300,000 and automatic support 
ranged from 15-25 percent of “the gross revenue generated by the film in Spanish 
cinemas in the first two years after its release.”57 Released in the form of an amortization 
subsidy, these funding awards are given directly to the banks who granted loans to the 
production company. The automatic award depends on other support it has received from 
ICAA while the selected support is given before the film is produced. Ultimately, the 
total amount received from ICAA could not “exceed 75 percent of the production 
                                                
55 Anne Jäckel suggests “co-production is a much abused term: it may refer to any form of co-financing (a 
pre-sale to a television channel, theatrical distributor or foreign territory) or creative and financial 
collaboration between various producers (including broadcasters)” 58-9. Typically when the Spanish film 
board, ICAA, uses the term “co-production” it signifies a production involving more than one country with 
financial involvement. I am using the term co-production more loosely to indicate a film produced with 
more than one production company, whether only located in Spain or an international mixture.  
56 Rosario Alburquerque, ICAA, interview by author, 25 January 2011, Madrid, España. 
57 Susanne Nikoltche, “National Film Production Aid: Legislative Characteristics and Trend” IRIS Plus 
Legal Observations of the European Audiovisual Observatory Issue 2001, 4 (April 2001): 6. 
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company’s investment nor 50 percent of the overall cost of the film.”58 In 2011, subsidies 
can average up to €1.2 million per film production.  
In order to find the rest of the funding, Spanish producers may look to other 
support from local film commissions or regional European institutions. City or state 
support is just as important as national subsidies offered by ICAA in assembling a 
patchwork of funding. On the local level, state film commissions such as Catalonia and 
Valencia have tax credits ranging from 10 to 20 percent of a film’s budget.59 In recent 
years, both states received attention for attracting Alejandro González Iñárritu’s Biutiful 
(2010) or English-language Spanish productions such as Rodrigo Cortés’s Buried (2010) 
and Woody Allen’s Vicky Cristina Barcelona (2008). Because public subsidies and 
support operate around the growing media capital Barcelona, Catalonia is considered the 
healthiest media region in Spain.  
Furthermore, regional institutional funds such as the European Union’s MEDIA 
program and Council of Europe’s Eurimages provide another layer of public support. 
Director of the EU’s MEDIA program, Aviva Silver, describes these regional, national, 
and local subsidies as “corrective measures” necessary for independent production 
companies to balance inequality of resources of well-established international studios and 
conglomerates (Sony, Warner Bros., etc.). For Silver, the effort behind these funding 
                                                
58 ibid. 
59 Pedro Uriol, Morena Films, interview by author, 28 January 2011, Madrid, España; Chris Evans, “Co-
Producing With Spain,” Screen Daily (10 February 2011) accessed online (17 February 2011) 
http://www.screendaily.com/reports/territory-focus/co-producing-with-spain/5023318.article 
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mechanisms is to protect local film in Europe in which many smaller countries would not 
have an industry without these subsidies. Unlike the tax incentive system in Brazil, 
Columbia Español as part of a major international media company is not eligible for 
MEDIA or Eurimages program funding. While many of these companies argue “their 
films are local,” as discussed in Chapter Three, Silver contends they are not “local” due 
to their vast financial power and historical presence. Disputes over what counts as a local 
or Hollywood co-production reflect, for example, a battle between the MEDIA program 
and The Weinstein Company. For a U.S./German co-production, the Weinsteins co-
financed The Reader (2008, dir. Stephen Daldry) with Studio Babelsberg. The Weinsteins 
are still fighting their eligibility for MEDIA funds and disagree with the EU’s definition 
over what constitutes a local and independent film production.60  
Dating back to “Film Europe” in the 1920s, these “patchwork” sources for private 
and public funding were created to protect the local cultural content and expand the 
market share. The multi-layered nature of these funding schemes reveal the complex 
nature of film production within the European Union and how underlying battles between 
definitions of commercial and art, Hollywood and local, national and international 
borders still drive many of these programs and industry professionals. Instead of 
engaging with these protectionist and developmental mechanisms mostly due to 
ineligibility, Sony’s strategy involved sidestepping these European systems completely in 
                                                
60 Aviva Silver, MEDIA program, interview by author, 3 February 2011, Brussels, Belgium. At this point, 
it is not clear whether Harvey Weinstein and company plan to sue the MEDIA program over the subsidy. 
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order to undertake producing local commercial content. What resulted was Columbia 
Español’s first Spanish LLP produced within the industry but emerging in contrast to 
“patchwork” funding practices. 
 Former head of Columbia Films Producciones Españolas, de Macedo emphasized 
many of the Spanish production practices and how Sony decided to operate its Madrid 
office differently stemmed from an attempt “to replicate the marriage of talent and 
distribution that we had in Brazil but now fully financed by Sony.”61 Instead, the business 
model led Columbia Español to rely on its Los Angeles headquarters for financial and 
creative support. Columbia Español did not have the flexibility nor need to access these 
various financial sources as part of this co-production system available to their creative 
partners. First, Columbia Español does not qualify for many of the subsidies available to 
independent producers in the local industry nor was it interested in fighting to secure 
those subsidies. Second, the company was not accustomed to the subsidized co-
production partnerships in Europe or, as de Macedo describes, “dealing with subsidies is 
so foreign to the legal structures of the studios.”62 At that point in 2001, the LLP model 
was 1) studio financed films and 2) based on one fixed territory.  
Di Que Sí, an opposites-attract romantic comedy, was the first Spanish film under 
this division and co-produced with partner, Zebra Producciones. Run by three Spanish 
                                                
61 Iona de Macedo, former VP Production for Latin American and President of Columbia Films 
Producciones Españolas, interview by author, 17 January 2011, Madrid, España. 
62 ibid. 
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producers and screenwriters, Zebra Producciones is an independent film and television 
production company with facilities in Madrid and Gijón.63 For the project, Columbia 
Español contributed financing and prints and advertising costs. Sony Pictures Releasing 
distributed the film in theaters and Sony Pictures Home Entertainment released the DVD. 
In order for de Macedo and her office to produce Di Que Sí, they had to participate in 
what she calls “a Hollywood process.”  
SPE executives gave notes on scripts and how to polish and style the  
set design. They also relied on a “bloated” prints and advertising budget to market the 
film (overspending in respect to Spanish industry marketing standards) and a studio 
chain-of-command greenlight process.64 Specifically, de Macedo recalled having to visit 
the film set and make prop changes that would make the production set look more 
expensive, more “Hollywood,” and more like a Sony product.  
This “Hollywood process” is apparent in two ways. First, the relationship with the 
Spanish subsidiary from the financial and contractual side of the productions remained 
highly micro-managed by Sony’s international production headquarters in Los Angeles. 
For example, in order to receive approval or to “greenlight” the project, the head of 
Spanish production (de Macedo) and the local Sony general manager traveled to Los 
Angeles to pitch the business plan including budget, package, and talent to SPE CEO 
                                                
63 Unfortuntately, I was not able to secure an interview with a Zebra Producciones professional. 
64 Although produced in Spain with local talent, many in the industry, such as the lead actress Paz Vega, 
considered the film to be a “Hollywood” film. Iona de Macedo, former VP Production for Latin American 
and President of Columbia Films Producciones Españolas, interview by author, 17 January 2011, Madrid, 
España. 
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John Calley and various SPE division heads including Accounting, Distribution, 
International Production (Gareth Wigan), and Television.65 Much of the decision-making 
occurred outside of Madrid by a number of executives not actively working in the local 
industry. Second, in working with Zebra Producciones, the Madrid office not only had a 
central management and financial role but also a creative role. In decision-making, as 
both co-producer and distributor, Columbia Español had complete access to the editing 
room with de Macedo exercising final editing rights or “final cut.”  
 
Fig. 5.1 Di Que Sí (2004) Theatrical Poster 
                                                
65 Speaking with the General Managers of Warner Bros. and Universal in Madrid, I have learned that they 
have a similar centralized greenlighting process. This appears to be an industry LLP standard in Europe. 
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Part of this particular financing model involves how Columbia Español imagined 
LLPs as defined by one language within one national industry. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, Sony defines a local language production as fixed within one industry or media 
territory such as Spain. In all of its LLP operations until this point, European or 
otherwise, SPE’s international division maintained this LLP strategy despite the industry 
norm within Europe for local co-productions between two or more different national 
industries or territories as Sony calls them. Columbia Español’s one territory/one 
language original production strategy changed slightly when de Macedo was promoted to 
Senior Vice President of Production for European and Madrid became the new 
headquarter for SPE’s European film production. After the relative commercial success 
of Di Que Sí, Columbia Español’s co-production operation was expanded to include Italy 
and France.66 The Madrid LLP division then encompassed other European productions, 
offices, and territories. The first project produced under the newly organized regional 
operation, a feature length adaptation of the bestselling Italian novel based on the memoir 
of a teenage girl, Melissa P also challenged the earlier LLP strategy. The opportunity 
arose to combine resources between the Spanish and Italian locations to co-produce the 
project. Furthermore, the Italian director requested casting a Spanish actress as lead, 
                                                
66 Part of this expansion into France was due to a joint venture between Gaumont, the independent French 
production and distribution company, and Columbia TriStar in Europe that lasted from 2004 to 2007. 
Rebecca Leffler, “Separate Checks For Sony, Gaumont,” The Hollywood Reporter (3 July 2007) accessed 
online (24 May 2011). http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/separate-checks-sony-gaumont-141611 
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which would allow the production to be eligible for classification (and subsidies) within 
both industries. de Macedo recalls:  
It was not because we were trying to look for money in two territories; we know 
that [Sony] can finance the whole thing. But why not take €600,000 from Spain 
since it is a creative need of this director . . . All you have to do is put in another 
secondary actor and two heads of department [to qualify for a Spanish-Italian co-
production]. That’s it. And do some of the post-production in Spain which will be 
cheaper.”67  
 
In this case, the changed approach for LLP was not a necessity of financial resources but 
a creative request. However, one of the biggest issues in producing Melissa P was the 
legal and financial work involved in pursuing co-production status in both Italy and 
Spain, something that was seen as foreign and unnecessary to the overseeing Sony 
executives in Los Angeles. 
While Columbia Español ultimately co-produced Melissa P, the American-based 
greenlighting committee fought the decision because it did not fit with the company’s 
official LLP strategy. For Sony’s International Production division, a local language film 
is produced/distributed in one territory not two. To approve a LLP production in any 
territory, de Macedo asserts, “you have to get one GM [distribution General Manager] 
committing to numbers in a territory and can you imagine involving two? Studios are not 
a co-production kind of structure.”68 In other words, SPE’s corporate procedure for 
approving distribution was incompatible with common local industry practices such as 
                                                
67 Iona de Macedo, former VP Production for Latin American and President of Columbia Films 
Producciones Españolas, interview by author, 17 January 2011, Madrid, España. 
68 ibid. 
 228 
international co-production and patchwork financing that relied on multiple territories. 
Sony’s Hollywood management oversight imagined or constructed “local” film 
productions differently from the European conditions involving multi-industry 
participation, financing, and audiences. Not only was there a disconnect between 
Columbia Español and local conditions but also within Sony’s corporate structure and 
LLP vision. The unwillingness to alter distribution practices for the LLP directly from the 
Los Angeles offices and not the Madrid production office. Many of the “local” Columbia 
Español staff in Madrid, made up of Spanish producers and professionals, had to 
convince the SPE executives in Los Angeles about what could work in Spain and other 
European markets. On-the-ground executives such as de Macedo served as an 
intermediary between the Hollywood process directed from SPE’s American 
headquarters and the local practices of their “home” industry and production partners.  
 Similar to earlier industrial and academic understandings of film industries 
outside the United States, Columbia Español’s concept of the LLP/local was tightly 
bound in national models. This reveals the rigidity of legal and financial structure of 
Sony’s international operations and the difficulty for them to adapt to local co-production 
conditions. Columbia Español approached local production differently than the 
patchwork financing adopted by most Spanish filmmakers. This is in contrast to the 
Brazilian operation that relied mostly on incentive money instead of the SPE international 
production group investing their “own” money. Although the Columbia Films 
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Producciones Españolas operation expanded in 2005 to include the European territories 
to Italy, France, and Germany, their regional operation still functioned with a national 
market mindset or target, which was influenced by SPE executives. With the Spanish-
Italian Melissa P treated as a one-off exception, Columbia’s European productions were 
solely based in Spain as LLPs or France as co-ventures that targeted local audiences. For 
Columbia Español, local language production equaled Spain; local language production 
equaled a clearly defined national border. Local language did not translate as regional, 
European, or across nationals borders.  
 
MEDIA WITHOUT FRONTIERS:  
TELEVISION BROADCASTERS AND SPANISH COMMERCIAL PRODUCTION  
Another important dimension within Spain and across Europe filmmaking since 
the 2000s is the participation of television broadcasters as co-producers. Since 
deregulation and funding mechanisms introduced in the late-1980s and early-1990s such 
as Television Without Frontiers, Spanish television broadcasters have become major 
producing partners for local film projects. Broadcaster participation reflects the 
deregulation and convergence of Spanish media industries and marks a shift or blending 
of commercial media models similar to Globo in Brazil. Due to Spanish broadcasters 
contributing over $500 million into film financing since 1999, Variety reporter Emiliano 
de Pablos calls the public broadcaster Televisión Española (TVE) and private 
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broadcasters Telecinco and Antena 3 “Spain’s new majors.”69 In 2010, then ICAA 
Director-General Ignasi Guardans claimed “without TV funding there would be no 
Spanish cinema.”70 Today, broadcasters are financially involved in the majority of 
Spanish films that attract over 1 million spectators. Columbia Español’s second, and 
final, LLP produced in Spain included Telecinco Films as a significant partner and 
signaled a change in their local production model from full financing to minority status 
producer. Considered another facet of the patchwork financing discussed in the previous 
section, this section will discuss the role of television companies in Spanish film 
production and distribution over the past decade. 
While traditionally an institutional model for European media development 
centered on state-owned media operated by heavily subsidized institutions, new regional 
and national directives introduced during the 2000s reshaped Spanish production 
partnerships to be cross-media and interdependent. A neoliberal wave of deregulation, 
privatization, and convergence policies swept Spain, and more broadly Europe, in the 
late-1980s and 1990s.71 A couple of key legislative directives were passed during this 
period that would directly impact the contemporary Spanish film industry and Columbia 
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Español’s production partnership, namely commercialization of the television industry 
and the requirement for television companies to invest directly in local film production 
through the EU’s Television Without Frontiers. In returning to Columbia Español, I will 
examine the second (and final) Spanish LLP, Salir Pitando (Blinkers, 2007, dir. Álvaro 
Fernández Armero), produced under the Madrid operation with private broadcaster 
Telecinco and independent producer Morena Films. Overall, this reveals the interrelated, 
convergent nature of the European media industries and Columbia Español’s somewhat 
shifting LLP strategy to adapt to changing industry conditions. 
In terms of privatization, the Spanish government opened broadcasting options 
beyond the state company Radio Televisión Española (RTVE) in order to allow for 
commercial television alternatives. Founded in 1956, RTVE operated as the central 
television and radio source for Spaniards under Franco and later through the 
democratization in the 1970s. In 1988, the government passed the Private Television Act 
granting three commercial television licenses to Telecinco, Antena 3, and pay satellite 
channel Canal +.72  
While Telecinco and Antena 3 have grown into two of the largest media 
conglomerates in Spain each with holdings in radio, television, cinema, and publications, 
the European Community (EC) and alongside the Spanish government encouraged this 
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media convergence. The year following the Private Television Act, the EC (now 
European Union/EU) passed the Television Without Frontiers Directive. Based on the 
1984 Green Paper of the same name, the goal of the directive was for member states to: 
1) integrate “broadcasting laws in order to facilitate the development of a single market 
for broadcasting within the Community” and 2) protect local media by ensuring “where 
practicable and by appropriate means” that broadcasters reserve transmission time for 
European works.73 Yet, the implementation of parts of this directive continues to vary by 
Commission/Union member nation. While television quotas and the debates on media as 
a cultural exception became the most cited aspects of this directive due to the 1992 
GATT debates, a number of other measures resulted from Television Without Frontiers, 
particularly on a more localized level. For example, Italy and Spain require investment in 
local film financing while today other members, like United Kingdom, do not. In terms of 
encouraging media convergence, Spain’s version of Television Without Frontiers went 
into effect in 1999 and required local broadcasters such as Telecinco, Antena 3, and TVE 
to direct 5 percent of annual revenue to finance Spanish and European film projects and 
television movies.74  
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As a result of the Television Without Frontiers and Spain’s localization of this 
directive, television broadcasters are now key players in television and film production, 
investing around €150 million per year.75 Since Columbia Español’s partner for their 
final LLP was Telecinco, I will focus on this broadcaster. Under Telecinco’s division, 
Telecinco Cinema invests in around ten projects per year ranging from one or two big 
budget pictures (€7.5 million and up) directed by major Spanish or international 
filmmakers to eight or nine lower budget films (€3-4.5 million), possibly directed by a 
new filmmaker.76 Telecinco’s higher profile, big budget pictures include Celda 211 (Cell 
211, 2009, dir. Daniel Monzón), Ágora, and El Orfanato.77 According to the Telecinco 
Cinema head, Alvaro Augustin, “we make big-budget films with significant international 
profile, and movies under $4.5 million, which recoup from Spain.”78 While investment 
requirements and strategies vary by company, television involvement can range from co-
production, pre-sales, or acquisition rights. In addition to investment in a film production, 
Telecinco typically acts as an equal co-producer and shares copyright.79  
Columbia Films Producciones Españolas’s last Spanish LLP (and Columbia’s last 
European local production under this operation), Salir Pitando, reflects a co-production 
system that relies heavily on local television broadcasters and transnational partners. A 
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comedy about soccer, Salir Pitando tells the story of a depressed referee and his 
comeback. The film represents a mix of state-supported and private investment that 
characterizes contemporary commercial cinema in Spain and many other European 
industries. With a €3 million budget, Telecinco served as the majority co-producer 
providing 50 percent alongside Columbia covering 30 percent and the production 
company, Morena Films, bringing in the remaining 20 percent.80 Columbia/SPRI also 
distributed the film and paid for prints and advertising costs. In addition to participation 
by a television broadcaster, the film received an automatic national subsidy based on box 
office potential from ICAA. According to the policies and institutional structures 
discussed so far in this chapter, this is an extremely common division of funding among a 
local subsidy, Spanish broadcaster, major producer/distributor, and independent producer. 
However, field interviews revealed a more nuanced view of the relationship among the 
local, national, and transnational players. 
Morena Films is an independent Spanish production company run by one general 
manager and three executive producers—Pedro Uriol, Juan Gordon, and Álvaro 
Longoria. The company is unusual due to its size and productivity. In an industry 
characterized by smaller companies producing one film every four to five years, Morena 
develops each year on average two to three majority productions, one to two minority 
productions, and one documentary. While a majority producer invests the most 
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financially and maintains most of the creative direction over a project, a minority 
producer typically invests thirty percent or less in the production costs and serves as more 
of a collaborator. For Salir Pitando, Morena developed the idea in-house and offered 
participation and collaboration to Telecinco and then Columbia.  
 
Fig. 5.2 Salir Pitando (2007) Theatrical Poster 
For Sony’s European production operation that began with a fully-financing 
strategy, the project was a major shift in the company’s financial and creative role in 
LLPs. de Macedo identifies this shift from full-financing to minority producing as 
moving to a “more intelligent model” within the Spanish context. Columbia Español 
invested 30 percent of the cost plus prints and advertising, which producer Uriol 
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described as “very reasonable for [Columbia Español] and no huge risk.”81 According to 
Uriol, “Iona [de Macedo] and her [Madrid] team and Sony LA understood what we were 
looking for . . . we brought them the project at a very early stage. They gave us some 
comments on the script and they really participated on the casting, which was vital. In a 
way they felt it was one of their movies.”82 This development input from the local 
production division is extremely common for Sony’s strategy. Yet, in terms of final 
creative decision-making, Morena, Telecinco, and Columbia had collective final 
decisions with the editor.83  
The Columbia Madrid operation and other major studios working with Spanish 
television broadcasters tend to view this relationship from two perspectives. First, as 
emphasized above, Telecinco, Antena 3, and TVE are central to any successful 
commercial film in Spain today.84 Warner Bros. General Manager Pablo Noguerones 
explains:  
if you happen to have a film with either Telecinco or Antena 3 and they like the 
film then they will support the film on their television channels and in the media 
they own. That gives you a huge plus. Because you have the marketing campaign 
that can buy you 500 GOPs [Gross Operating Profits], then you throw in Antena 3 
or Telecinco, and, boom, the film goes from being a mid-size film to being a 
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82 Pedro Uriol, Morena Films, interview by author, 28 January 2011, Madrid, España. 
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While Spanish producers and distributors insisted no formula exists for a successful 
Spanish blockbuster, part of the security in working with broadcasters comes from their 
cross-media marketing resources and experiences that can almost guarantee bigger 
audiences. 
 Second, companies such as Columbia and Warner Bros. view the relationship as 
beneficial since it utilizes the broadcasters’ strengths, experiences, and built-in audiences 
in the local market as well as saves them on an expensive cross-media marketing 
campaign similar to Globo in Brazil. Telecinco and Antena 3 prefer to work with 
transnational studios due to their established, albeit controversial, position and available 
resources in the Spanish film market. Off the record, one Spanish producer criticized how 
broadcasters allocated their production funds: “wearing the Columbia shirt or Universal, 
walking into the television network for funding makes a difference.”86 Columbia’s brand 
reassures its co-producers of a “certain level” of quality and guaranteed theatrical 
distribution that can make or break the final financing process. 
Yet, industry discourse surrounds the broadcasters as film producers. It is well-
known in the Spanish industry that private television broadcasters Telecinco and Antena 
                                                
85 Pablo Noguerones, Warner Bros. Spain, interview by author, 28 January 2011, Madrid, España. 
86 Independent film producer, interview in Madrid. 
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3 are “reluctant producers.” 87 Film involvement is mandated under European and 
Spanish directives and generally viewed as a fruitless obligation. Ghislain Barrois, CEO 
of Telecinco Cinema, argues “given the choice, we would not invest in film at all. We 
have only really made our money back on a few titles.”88 While they may be some of the 
most successful producers of Spanish cinema, television is the priority for these 
companies.  
Overall, Columbia Español’s last LLP reveals the changing role of television, the 
convergence and interdependence of media production in Spain, and a portrait of 
exchange and negotiation among major media conglomerates and various local partners. 
It also emphasizes the importance of regional policies and practices in shaping local 
media industries in Europe. Overall, two key implications of Salir Pitando exist in 
relation to the Spanish film industry. First, along with the previous example of Melissa P, 
this film reflects changing notions of national cinema for Morena, Columbia Español, and 
broadcasters. For one, most Spanish local language productions are produced in or 
outside of Spain with multi-partners and an international target audience. This idea of a 
simultaneous and borderless national/regional cinema stems back to Spanish and EU 
policies intended to foster open media markets and develop local content. For another, to 
some extent SPE still categorizes the LLP as produced in Spanish with Spanish money 
                                                
87 Pablo Noguerones, Warner Bros. Spain, interview by author, 28 January 2011, Madrid, España; Estela 
Artacho, FEDICINE, interview by author, 18 January 2011, Madrid, España. 
88 Chris Evans, “The New Face Of Spain” accessed online. 
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for a domestic audience. Yet their second Spanish project reveals a more flexible 
approach to financial and creative arrangements. Of all of Columbia Español’s (and later 
as Columbia Europe) LLPs, Salir Pitando emerged as the most sustainable model by 
depending on national television broadcasters to take the brunt of financing and cross-
media marketing.  
Upon its release, the film was a modest theatrical success locally. Yet, within 
months of Salir Pitando’s release, the Columbia Español office was closed. In the past 
decade, Spain has emerged as one of the markets most prone to piracy in the world 
coupled with a declining theatrical attendance and dwindling DVD sales. In the following 
section, I will explore Sony’s official and unofficial reasons for closing the Madrid office 
in light of declining distribution windows, subsequently moving the European operation 
to Germany. 
 
SHRINKING SPANISH DISTRIBUTION WINDOWS AND SONY’S GRAND LLP EXIT 
 This final section examines the practices and problems with the distribution 
system and box office in Spain for local productions since the mid-2000s. From a broader 
level, the health of the industry in the 2000s can be connected to declining theatrical 
attendance, a dying DVD market, and online piracy. Today, an increasing reliance on 
theatrical distribution as the central domestic source of revenue affects how local 
producers imagine their audiences and, in turn, produce their films. In the case of 
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Columbia Español, shrinking distribution platforms were reported as the official reason 
for closing the Madrid production office in 2007. Yet, other problems plagued the local 
operation. Internal conflicts with the Sony local distributor and a different vision emerged 
from their Spanish producing partners regarding the scope of the intended market for 
“local” productions. Overall, this section explores the state of online piracy, DVD sales, 
and national/regional distribution strategies in relation to Columbia Español’s LLPs and 
its reasons for leaving the territory. 
Death of the DVD and Rise of Piracy 
While government subsidies and broadcaster financing are vital to producing 
Spanish films, the industry is losing a key revenue source—the DVD market. In 2000, 
DVD sales became a centerpiece of home video divisions for major film studios like 
Sony. DVD earnings in Europe accounted for more than 50 percent of home video sales 
in the region.89 Today, as DVD sales decline worldwide and video stores close in records 
numbers, the home video market is a less profitable distribution format, and Spanish sales 
are almost 10 percent of the level in comparable European markets such as the UK and 
Germany.90 
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Furthermore, growing online piracy and declining domestic audiences for 
theatrical releases have destabilized the Spanish film industry. Between 2006 and 2008, 
illegal movie downloads in Spain grew from 132 million to 350 million per year.91 The 
international film and television industry reportedly lost an estimated €900 million in 
2008 in the domestic market.92 Not surprisingly, piracy has emerged as a central issue for 
LLPs since the mid-2000s. In every interview I conducted, whether with a major 
international distributor, the MPA Europe, or a small independent producer, piracy and 
the future of film distribution were their biggest concerns. In worldwide illegal 
downloads for the top ten films in 2010, Spain accounted for 20 percent.93 There are still 
no other viable streaming options such as iTunes available in Spain like in other large 
European markets and only recently has the government tried to pass anti-piracy 
legislation.94 Sony Pictures Entertainment’s co-chair, Michael Lynton, predicts “people 
are downloading movies in such large quantities that Spain is on the brink of no longer 
being a viable home entertainment market for us.”95  
Numerous former Columbia Español professionals and partners cite piracy and 
the crash of the DVD market in the mid-2000s as a leading cause for scaling back 
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production and distribution operations. Yet, the piracy also hurts local independent 
distributors and producers. Until 2001, local producers relied on the DVD market to pay 
advances which by 2010 have disappeared almost completely.96 These advances were a 
reliable and central source of revenue beyond theatrical income. Distributors also see the 
effects. Head of acquisitions at the independent distributor Alta Films, Enrique Gonzalez 
Kuhn, recounts: “The situation with the local market is critical, I’ve never seen it so bad. 
Piracy is tearing the industry apart and the TV stations are picking up almost nothing. 
We’re buying fewer films and paying more money for them.”97 
According to Morena producer Uriol 
I think the DVD market is basically destroyed and the new online market 
(streaming, downloading that operates in the U.S. like Hulu, iTunes) are still not 
working. There is a huge loss in profit for distributors and producers. This gap is 
basically there. This is one of the crucial issues here: the piracy and the change in 
the business model.98  
 
With rising piracy, the dead DVD market, and a lack of viable streaming or pay services, 
the home video market affects how and in what local language productions are made. A 
change in the business model without a strong domestic market forces local productions 
to refocus on international markets in order to recoup costs where home video used to be.  
 
                                                
96 Iona de Macedo, former VP Production for Latin American and President of Columbia Films 
Producciones Españolas, interview by author, 17 January 2011, Madrid, España. 
97 Fritz, accessed online. 
98 Pedro Uriol, Morena Films, interview by author, 28 January 2011, Madrid, España. 
 243 
Imagining Audiences and Domestic vs. International Distribution Models 
European co-production practices and the subsidy system lend themselves to this 
transnational strategy, where as Spanish producers are increasingly exploring distribution 
options outside of their domestic market. Since 2008, Spanish films make more outside 
Spain than in the domestic market.99 Ágora producer Fernando Bovaira argues: “Either 
you make films with a clear, universal (theme) or for Spain, which occasionally throws 
out box office miracles. But you can’t base a business model on miracles.”100 Spanish 
films do not have the luxury of relying on the Spanish market. Spain may be one of the 
larger markets in the region but the majority of European national markets are too small 
to sustain medium to big budget commercial products. In turn, SPE quickly discovered 
Spanish LLPs could not gross the same numbers and draw the same audiences that they 
continued to capture in larger markets like Brazil and or its new European LLP 
headquarters in Germany. 
Many producers with whom I spoke emphasized the way they select projects is 
changing. In an effort to appeal to Spanish, European, and other international audiences, 
genre, broad themes, and Spanish-, English-, or multi-language films have come to 
characterize many local commercial projects. Noguerones, General Manager of Warner 
Bros. Spain, explains that:  
                                                
99 In 2008, Spanish productions earned €104.3 million domestically versus €140.7 million in 18 
international territories. Emilio Mayorga, “Spain Boost Pics Exports: Overseas Gross Up To $174 Million 
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100 Hopewell, accessed online. 
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[local films] cannot rely heavily on theatrical unless you have some international 
sales. It becomes difficult for a film to make any money. For the most part 90 
percent of the films or more just break even or not break even. Because they don’t 
make any movies since the producers made the films with subsidies, loans, pre-
sales and the little money they got from international. But they don’t make a 
profit on the film.101  
 
International distribution, especially within Europe and Spanish-speaking Latin America, 
is a necessary part of the business plan for any Spanish film.  
Due to market conditions, Morena Films positions its company as a Spanish 
operation working globally. Many of its projects are either international co-productions 
with partners across Europe, Latin America, and North America or local language 
productions intended for audiences beyond the Spanish, domestic market. While most are 
Spanish-language, some projects are English-language or multi-lingual like Bon appétit 
(2010, dir. David Pinillos) with a mix of French, German, Spanish, and English. Morena 
producer Longoria asserts “the idea of small-scale craftsmanship in cinema is very 
romantic, but this is an industry. It operates like one and it shouldn’t be what it isn’t.”102 
While perhaps reminiscent of the big budget international co-productions of the 1990s, 
known as “Euro-pudding,” Morena Films’s perspective reflects what Tim Bergfelder 
describes as the “dissolving boundaries” of cinema in Europe. As discussed throughout 
this chapter, the contemporary LLP must cross financial, linguistics, and cultural 
boundaries in order to find an adequate audience.  
                                                
101 Pablo Noguerones, Warner Bros. Spain, interview by author, 28 January 2011, Madrid, España. 
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However, Columbia Español had a difficult time with moving beyond national 
borders. In addition to piracy and declining domestic audiences, an inability to adapt to 
international distribution models was another reason cited for Columbia Español’s 
closure or “failure” as many industry professionals described it. In other words, there was 
a major incompatibility of the domestically-focused production and distribution LLP 
strategy with the realities of the Spanish market. By 2007, Columbia Español’s reliance 
on the local audiences to recoup the complete costs was impossible, especially 
considering local films make more outside of Spain then they do domestically. At this 
point, the new Co-Chair of SPE already had decided the European operation was not 
profitable enough in relation to its English-language numbers. de Macedo recalls: “The 
idea was that the films would pay for themselves in the local market with a margin  . . . 
[the films should] pay for themselves. Then Michael [Lynton] came, and [LLPs were 
expected to earn back its cost plus] a margin of 10 percent and covering overhead as 
well.”103 While the LLP strategy in Spain slowly adapted to fit production practices and 
partnerships within the local context, de Macedo’s remark illustrates a tension between 
Columbia Español’s and SPE’s expectations of a Spanish local language film. SPE 
executives like Lynton began to expect higher returns akin to how Sony’s English-
language films performed in that market. However, as Lynton and SPE expected a better 
return from LLPs like Salir Pitando in Spanish theatrical performance, the health of the 
                                                
103 Iona de Macedo, former VP Production for Latin American and President of Columbia Films 
Producciones Españolas, interview by author, 17 January 2011, Madrid, España. 
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Spanish domestic market was declining and losing audience members. By keeping LLP 
distribution bound within the Spanish market and not opening up to other European 
markets, these expectations were not sustainable nor attainable.     
Therefore, this was a central issue with Sony’s LLP corporate vision and strategy 
in the European context, namely local could not mean international audiences. Many of 
the Spanish and European producers interviewed cited the lack of attention to 
international sale for LLPs as a major criticism of working with Sony and other 
international distributors.  In the case of Morena and Salir Pitando, Sony Releasing 
International offered limited international distribution for its LLPs. Uriol explains the 
deal: “[Sony] has large packages that they sell. [Salir Pitando] would be with 100 other 
films. The figures they give you are very small [because] of the huge overheads.”104 
Because of the way Sony and other studios package films in bulk for international sales 
to the rest of Europe, Latin America, or other regions, they receive little individualized 
resources or prints and advertising attention. A personalized, word-of-mouth marketing is 
needed for many smaller Spanish films, and that marketing strategy does not easily fit 
into Hollywood wide-scale genre marketing schemes. By trying to sell Salir Pitando in 
bulk through general Hollywood marketing conventions, Uriol describes that Sony was 
imagining or “looking for a different audience” than its local partners.105 
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SPE’s Internal Division Relations 
Furthermore, Columbia Español had internal issues or “friction” between their 
distribution and production divisions both within Spain and between Los Angeles. In this 
situation, both the Spain distribution operation and Sony Pictures Releasing International 
in Los Angeles had to sign off, greenlighting any European LLP. Most of this tension 
within Sony European distribution and production came from the structure of the two 
operations. The General Manager for distribution in Spain operated from a different 
office, unlike in Brazil where production and distribution are the same staff. Spanish 
LLP’s were distributed from the same process as English-language films. de Macedo 
describes the situation:  
in this model, we could never make a film without the blessing of our colleague 
the distributor . . . so distributors were invited to participate actively in the 
production process when their job is really to look at a finished film and release it. 
Problem number one. They were not only invited to participate in the process but 
also the greenlight only came like in the U.S. if the numbers closed. It was so with 
the American films as well, they all have to send in their numbers on a movie but 
the movie is already made and the U.S. has already guaranteed the domestic 
market and the percent that the film is not going to lose money and break even. 
[Local distributors] were expected to act like the U.S. domestic market without 
ever having done that.106   
 
Many of former Columbia Español employees expressed dissatisfaction and 
frustration with the Madrid-based Sony distribution operation (SPRI) being active 
decision-makers in both of the local language films they produced. One former Columbia 
Español creative executive recalled: “the two films that we did [in Spain], if you would 
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ask me would you make those films if the distribution didn’t say, then I wouldn’t 
have.”107  
Further input on project selection and marketing choice came from Sony 
headquarters in Los Angeles. Another former Columbia Español production employee 
also criticized interference from Los Angeles: “Sony LA was not on board with films the 
Madrid office wanted to develop. LA would not greenlight certain projects” that did not 
meet their LLP formula.108 While it is not clear exactly what these certain projects were, 
numerous Spanish professionals described a dissonance between perceptions of the local 
market by Spanish producers and the Sony headquarters in the U.S. that made the LLP 
process more time consuming, complicated, and less efficient.  
The historical context and industrial challenges for Spanish commercial cinema in 
the late-2000s outlined in this section provide the backdrop to Columbia Español’s short-
lived production unit. When the home video sector of the industry collapsed and 
Columbia Español was forced to rely on theatrical release, this served as a major turning 
point for the LLP strategy leading to Sony’s departure. This internal conflict is also one 
of the most revealing aspects of the Spanish LLP operation and the battles between 
Hollywood and European or studio and independent models for distribution. 
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Conclusion: Sony’s Changing European Regional Network 
In May 2007, Sony consolidated European LLP headquarters under the newly 
formed Sony International Motion Picture Production. That Fall Sony closed Columbia 
Español in Madrid and moved its production division to Berlin, Germany, in light of the 
declining domestic theatrical market share averaging between less than 10 to 13 percent 
and dwindling distribution windows. Despite official or unofficial reasons for leaving, the 
move signaled that the days of Western Europe as a stable and lucrative film market were 
changing for Sony. Due to lucrative tax incentives, increased runaways productions, and 
an ever-growing theatrical market, Sony repositioned its LLP operations within the 
growing German and East European markets such as Russia. Yet, a number of Sony’s 
competitors, namely Warner Bros. and Universal, have kept their Madrid LLP operations 
open and still produce two to three films per year. In 2010, Spanish Warner Bros. 
dominated the local market with five films making up 33 percent of the market share for 
local productions.109 In contrast, Sony’s current local strategy includes distributing two to 
five local films, typically picked up during development, as well as distribution of twenty 
to twenty five English-language films per year in Spain.  
 In conclusion, the history of Columbia Pictures Producciones Española reveals a 
different LLP operation than the one I described for Brazil. Unlike the Latin American 
market, national and regional policies, funding practices, and reliance on multi-territory 
audiences largely shapes the Spanish film industry. With Columbia Español, Sony 
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entered the Spanish market with a model to fully finance studio films aimed at domestic 
distribution and audiences, such as its first project, Di Que Sí. Interestingly, after the 
modest box office success of this film, the Madrid operation was expanded to cover other 
key territories in Continental Europe. This resulted in the widely successful Italian-
Spanish co-production, Melissa P. As de Macedo and others involved at Columbia 
Español claimed, Melissa P was merely a one-off and had no chance of changing the LLP 
strategy for Europe beyond a one-territory model. A key reason cited was the European 
legal and financing models that conflicted with SPE’s institutional conventions. The 
multiple territory contracts, treaties, and subsidies involved in producing Melissa P 
seemed “foreign” and overly complex to the Columbia Español LA-based legal advisor. 
Furthermore, working with more than one local Sony production and/or distribution 
division such as Italy and Spain involves more employees offering input and requires 
multiple General Managers to sign off on the LLP in various stages. Instead of a 
streamlined decision-making and development process between one territory such as 
Madrid and the international division LA headquarters, the process includes a larger 
network of Sony employees across a regional space. This is not exactly the Sony LLP 
strategy as originally imagined. 
An attempt to expand the Madrid office to encompass a regional scope did not 
alter its LLP strategy beyond the local market clearly defined as one nation and one 
language. Until its last Spanish LLP, Salir Pitando, and even today with its German 
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productions, Sony still focuses on local, domestic production and audiences from this 
same national model. Although Columbia Español managed to stretch the highly micro-
managed LLP strategy to accommodate one international co-production and one local co-
production, ultimately it was not enough to save or alter the operation. Overall, the major 
implication of the Spanish example is the micro-managed nature of its operation and the 
ultimate inflexibility of its LLP model. 
When engaging in contemporary discussions about power and production 
partnerships across national/regional/transnational networks in Europe, there is no simple 
picture or formula. It depends on who is asked, where they operate in the film industry, 
what their goals/intentions are, and what they consider to be the best strategy. I did not 
find the overt hostility toward Sony and Hollywood that I expected from the decades of 
academic literature focusing on the battle between commerce and art. Many of the 
individuals I spoke with in the Spanish film industry are producers, distributors, 
lobbyists, or state cultural workers. Most film professionals interviewed maintained a 
formal, reserved distance, particularly in discussion of Hollywood’s position in Spain and 
European industries. They are well-connected with commercial track records, access to 
development and production resources, and a benefit from their relationship with Sony 
and other major international studios. This obviously altered the information I received, 
particularly in the case of the more successful LLPs. Yet, the most critical of their 
practices and internal structure were former employees of Columbia Español, many of 
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whom were past their two-year post-employment privacy clause. Former employees were 
the most outspoken, unguarded, and quickest to point to why the local production unit 
failed. Opinions on the division’s failure and closure range from Los Angeles executives 
not allowing its Columbia Español team enough creative control in picking projects and 
selling them the way they wanted to the internal conflicts between the separate Madrid-
based production and distribution divisions. Yet, as de Macedo argues, given the 
declining health of the Spanish industry, Sony pulled out at the right time. 
Although the state of the Spanish film industry and internal “friction between 
motion pictures and home video divisions” greatly factored into Sony’s exit from Spain, I 
want to suggest another reason was Sony’s inability to respond quickly to changing local 
industry conditions and reimagine their nationally-fixed models for LLPs with the 
Columbia Español division. In other words, how they operated and produced Spanish 
local language productions was not an effective business model in this cultural 
geographical context during this period of time. Part of this may be due to the massive 
size of their operations and slow pace of corporate change. Yet, the dissonance and 
tension between these divisions, either locally (in Spain) or transnationally (with LA) 
reveal a disconnect among SPE’s international executive reliance on older studio models 
and the on-the-ground staff dealing with the realities of local independent practices and 
conditions.  
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In turn, the case of Columbia Pictures Producciones Española raises larger 
question about the future of Spanish commercial cinema and local audiences. Today’s 
Spanish cinema transverses cultural, geographical, linguistic, institutional, media-
specific, and technological boundaries. As this chapter illustrates, whether defined by 
financing sources, geography, or language, the category of “local” production is 
becoming more and more blurred as English-language films or international co-
productions between four different European countries are classified as Spanish. Due to 
continuously shifting notions of borders, space, national identity, and community, trying 
to fix the idea of “local” cinema or a “local language production” strategy is a slippery 
and messy task. Ultimately, Sony was unable to monetize, measure, and adapt their ideas 




Conclusion: “Like The Portuguese With The Conquistas, [Sony] Was 
The First In And The First Out” 
Overall, this study represents a focused institutional history of Sony’s local 
language production from the mid-1990s to 2010, one of Sony’s key international 
production and distribution strategies. What emerges is a multi-faceted and cross-media 
history of local language film co-productions across a complex institutional and industrial 
transnational network. In conclusion, I want to revisit my research questions as well as 
the larger implications and limitations of this dissertation project. 
In the mid- to late-1990s, Sony Pictures Entertainment actively began a 
widespread local language production strategy that by the late-2000s had slowed down 
and scaled back. As described by former Sony Senior Vice President of European and 
Spanish production: “Like the Portuguese with the Conquistas, [Sony] was the first in and 
the first out.”1 At its height around 2006, SPE’s international production divisions were 
producing LLPs in eleven locations.2 A shift in economic conditions, industry practices, 
corporate structures, and personnel factored into downsizing and restructuring LLP 
operations. In 2007, SPE consolidated all of their local language offices under one 
division, International Motion Picture Production Group (IMPPG). The same year, 
IMPPG’s then president, Deborah Schindler, closed the Hong Kong and Madrid offices. 
                                                
1 Iona de Macedo, former VP Production for Latin American and President of Columbia Films 
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Most industry sources credit causes for this as shifts in corporate vision and higher 
management including SPE’s CEO, worldwide economic conditions, and changing 
notions of the local audience. The European production headquarters was moved back to 
Berlin in order to refocus regional effort on central or eastern European countries such as 
Germany and Russia. Furthermore, IMPPG has refocused its efforts in Asia such as 
expanding satellite television and developing local language productions in India.  
SPE’s LLP restructuring and relocations indicates more of a corporate shift than 
industry wide movement away from local operations. Scaling back local language 
productions from Hong Kong, Spain, and Mexico came at a moment when Sony’s peers 
(Warner Bros., Fox, Universal, Disney, and Paramount) were expanding their own 
international divisions into Europe, Asia, and Latin America to respond differently to 
these rapidly changing market conditions. Instead, Sony’s late-2000s shift in their LLP 
strategy suggests more of an institutional restructuring and less of an industry-wide 
decline. There appears to be a company wide shift from away from systematic co-
production strategy like the LLP back to one-off deals. Furthermore, SPE is continuing a 
division specific process for acquisition and distribution of local language films. For 
example, Sony Pictures International Releasing distributes a handful of Spanish films 
within Spain each year or Sony Pictures Classics picks up Spanish-language films, such 
as Pedro Almodóvar’s La Piel Que Habito (The Skin I Live In, 2011), for distribution in 
North America. 
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND REVELATIONS 
In the end, the core research questions for this project included: 
• What is Sony’s local language production strategy? How is this strategy imagined 
and adapted? How does it operate differently depending on the location?  
• What is the international division’s (both from SPE headquarters and the local 
territories) relationship with their local production and distribution partners?  
• What level of participation or agency do these partners hold?  
• What negotiations or tensions arise in imagining “local” films (such as competing 
ideas of commercial film, national or regional media, audiences, and production 
practices)? 
As discussed in Chapter Three, institutional language and industry discourse 
indicates how Sony constructs and imagines the LLP strategy as a “global,” centralized 
local language strategy. Statements and documents from the 1990s show that Sony 
leaders specifically pursued that broad definition of the firm’s reach and role. The 
production strategy was developed and mobilized to be flexible, mobile, and able to work 
in diverse European, Latin American, and Asia media industries. Sony originally 
developed this local strategy to open up cultural regional markets, starting in one large 
European or Latin American market hopefully to open other opportunities in the region. 
In terms of centralized control, the initial LLP offices in Brazil, Hong Kong, and 
Germany were designed to be autonomous and managed by local SPE executives. Gareth 
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Wigan assembled the local teams, greenlit each LLP, and, on occasion, advised the local 
producers on development and script changes. Yet, as my research reveals, these are 
localized products as produced by Sony’s territories and their partners within a specific 
culture of production. The participation of local General Managers and Production 
executives such as Iona de Macedo ranged from developing scripts and visiting the sets to 
helping the filmmakers pitch their finished film to a Sony distribution division. However, 
the LLP strategy should not be considered as a completely top-down, institutionally 
enforced production and distribution operation. The interviews and field research show 
how these co-productions are locally bound through industry practices, policies, and 
conditions.  
However, how Sony imagined the strategy differently within its various divisions 
and how it ended up operating are two different stories. What resulted in both of my 
locations are very “national” definitions of “local language” film as monolingual, fixed, 
hegemonic notions of a Brazilian or Spanish commercial cinema. How Sony do Brasil 
and Columbia Español adapted the LLP to local audiences, industries, and cultural 
practices varied considerably between these two locations. This is where SPE’s industrial 
logic failed in creating a broad yet local production strategy. From the perspective of my 
two locations studies, Sony’s LLP story reads like a scoreboard—Brazil as the success 
story and Spain as the failure. 
 258 
On the one hand, this nationally bound strategy continues to work well in Brazil. 
Sony do Brasil has almost no risks with Article Three tax incentive money funding most 
of the productions, the large built-in mono-lingual national audience, the developing 
theatrical infrastructure, and the growing box office amid the overall economic growth of 
the country. Brazil proved to be an ideal setting for co-producing local language films 
because Sony do Brasil makes almost all decisions in-house, can focus on the growing 
national audience and theatrical market, and does not worry if the films travel 
internationally. It also does not worry whether Sony Releasing International agrees to 
bankroll an international release or not.  
On the other hand, the overwhelming opinion from former Columbia Español 
employees and others was that the Spanish experiment was a failure. While the two 
Spanish LLPs were modest box office successes and the Spanish-Italian co-production 
was a financial triumph, ultimately the overall strategy was unsustainable. Columbia 
Español began with the LLP model to finance fully each project and eventually adapted 
to a minority co-production model, which showed some institutional flexibility. 
However, IMPPG still shuttered the Spanish and Western European production offices. 
My research observations revealed an incompatibility between a regional integrated 
model for filmmaking that relies on international co-productions and a patchwork of 
subsidies and funding. Many Spanish films also rely on a multi-territory distribution 
approach, particularly due to the fact that the small domestic audiences available to most 
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European nations are not enough to sustain a medium to big budget commercial product. 
SPE executives in Los Angeles influenced Sony’s European production division’s model, 
resulting in a more nationally-focused strategy for co-productions, financing, and 
audiences. One of the problems was how SPE’s corporate notion of the LLP did not 
account for destabilizing pressures from city/state media culture and practices nor the 
European/regional media market system. Spanish cinema is not something produced and 
consumed solely within national Spanish borders. It operates through the city and state, 
such as Catalonia’s growing resources as production center, and regionally, with complex 
European rules and incentives for production for a regional market. 
This is a significant reality for which the local language production strategy did 
not account for. Ultimately, the failure of Sony’s LLP strategy was due to removing 
decision-making power from its local territory offices, which led to internal conflict and 
competing notions of Spanish commercial cinema. Distribution outside of Spain was not 
a priority and, in turn, this local-as-nationally-contained strategy did not work with 
Spanish and European practices nor with Sony’s central Spanish distribution model of 
English-language films. 
My mid-level analysis of Sony’s LLP strategy and location studies reveals less of 
a global strategy and more of a contradictory approach that really functions as a national 
production model that was unsustainable outside of a large market with a healthy box 
office like Brazil unless SPE is willing to make the necessary investment or adapt its 
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strategy. So a global strategy also has to be flexibly national, which Sony was prepared to 
deal with, and regional, as in Europe, which Sony did not really manage to adjust to. 
Although a major portion of this project discusses the workings of Sony’s institutional 
structure, operations, and LLP logic, I found the relationships with local producers and 
distributors to be the most illuminating perspective of transnational media networks and 
practices. Ranging from small independent companies such as Downtown Films or 
Morena Films to the media conglomerates such as Globo or Telecinco, local production 
and distribution partners maintained an active position and participation in the decision-
making process from development to distribution. In the Brazilian case, the production 
company holding all final creative decisions and rights to the projects is exceptional. 
Sony do Brasil is a partner, not a boss. What I found in the European case is a more 
traditional understanding of clashing Hollywood models and European creative 
sensibilities, particularly in terms of funding schemes, prints and advertising, and 
distribution models. Columbia Español’s creative executives like de Macedo or Jordi 
Gasull were involved from script development to the editing room. Yet, most Spanish 
producers I spoke with described their relationship with Columbia Español as one of 
negotiation and compromise, not force or oppression. Many of these Madrid-based 
companies and creative workers admitted to picking and choosing their participation with 
Sony or others and were incredibly reflexive on the pros and cons of working within the 
confines of a “Hollywood process.” Overall these mid-level professionals and processes 
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offered a more nuanced understanding of the complex relationship between a 
transnational media company and local production partners. 
 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
By asking “what is a local film?”, in no way did I expect a simple answer, 
particularly in the case of co-productions. My project contributes to conversations about 
transnational media corporations, global production strategies, and local media practices, 
specifically key theories of media imperialism, deterritorialization and space/place, 
Global Hollywood, convergence, and circuits of culture. In relation to Schiller and 
Guback’s earlier discussions about media imperialism, Sony Pictures Entertainment was 
able to development and maintain a LLP strategy over 1990s and 2000s due to their 
access to capital and resources as well as a strong distribution system. Because the 
majority of the Brazilian and Spanish LLP financing did not come from SPE but from 
local institutions, incentives, and partners, it is important to question a mentality to 
“follow the money” or attribute all financing to SPE equals all power and decision-
making. While Brazilian partners had unprecedented creative control, however, as 
Spanish Columbia employees informed me, SPE executives based in Los Angeles 
considerably influenced many of the final decisions to participate in the film or creative 
changes to the script. Furthermore, no matter how invested Sony executives were in 
localizing production strategies, marketing and distributing English-language films is the 
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main business strategy in local markets. In Brazil, Spain, and other Sony LLP operations, 
the English-language content received the majority of the financing, resources, and 
personnel involved. Even when SPE invested simultaneously in developing a local co-
production strategy, it was always apparent that Sony is in the business of English-
language blockbusters. 
 Miller et. al’s defines the institutions of Global Hollywood as simultaneously 
“border erasing” and “border defining,” yet both case studies are location-specific and 
shaped significantly by competing ideas of space/place as well as realities of local 
conditions. While SPE employees describe a centralized, global strategy, in reality it 
operated as nationally and regionally-bound but influenced in each case study by 
different transnational, regional, national, and local factors. On the one hand, the 
Brazilian and Spanish LLP operations problematize the nation and earlier conceptions of 
national cinema such as Andreas Hepp and Nick Couldry’s criticism of “container 
thinking.” A film like Chico Xavier (2010) requires a number of professionals 
participating and providing input from the decision-making in Culver City to Sony do 
Brasil in São Paulo to producers, filmmakers, and crews located across Rio de Janeiro 
and the Northeast of Brazil. On the other hand, national (or also regional in the case of 
Spain) cultural policies, audiences, and production practices shaped these Sony LLPs. 
Because of these conditions, the Sony’s local language strategy tends to operate more 
nationally than globally. 
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 du Gay’s “circuit of culture” serves an integrative way to understand the complex 
nature of the local language production strategy. By allowing the local conditions and 
interview-based research to guide my analysis, I was able to consider the different 
political, economic, cultural, regulatory, technological, and ideological processes 
affecting co-productions between a local Sony office and independent producer in Brazil 
or Spain. The interaction between the local player and various levels of this transnational 
media company presents films as fluid cultural products and offers a new interpretation 
of national cinema as simultaneously operating as local and global, as a product of SPE 
and independent company.  
My research adds to literature about conglomeration and convergence. One of my 
key theoretical contributions, adapted from Havens, Lotz, and Tinic, is the decision-
making and negotiation that takes places at the “mid-level” between local operations and 
SPE executives. My field research provided rich details of the LLP process and allowed 
me to interact and observe the mid-level management and executives working for SPE in 
their international or local operations. In the case of SPE, the company’s attempts to 
converge international production practices and other production and distribution 
divisions sometimes worked and sometimes did not. Since there is no singular corporate 
plan or method for producing these local films, the multiple voices involved did not 
always agree. This resulted in what Henry Jenkins describes as a “dysfunctional family” 
situation of contemporary convergence practices. Particularly, the inconsistent oversight 
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of LLP operations and internal conflict with European production and distribution 
divisions present more of a disorganized and contradictory picture of Sony strategies for 
production and releasing these films.  
The larger thematic and theoretical implications of my project discussed so far 
can apply more generally to contemporary local co-productions and industry conditions 
beyond Brazil and Spain, particularly to understanding factors such as subsidies, 
participation of television companies, competing distribution models, and the BRIC 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as part of regional media markets. First, 
subsidies are a critical device for sustaining local media industries as well as attracting 
and supporting the local language initiatives of companies like SPE. They also reflect 
larger cultural industry debates about media policies developed from state support and 
market-driven initiatives. As my research reveals, cultural policy studies need a more 
nuanced conversation about how subsidies and incentives are not created equal. For 
example, Brazil’s main support system Article Three resulted from the taxed income of 
Sony do Brasil and other international distribution companies whereas most of the 
subsidies in Spain originated from national government agencies and regional 
institutions. The flexibility of and access to these funding schemes and connotations of 
following the money in relation to the layers of creative agency and control held by 
Brazilian producers illustrates a more complex picture of “core-periphery” media 
partnerships than earlier media imperialist research suggests.   
 265 
Second, television broadcasters maintain a principal role and position in local 
language film. Grounded in the recent global trends of convergence, cross-media 
integration, and changing cultural policies, my SPE institutional history and my location-
specific research further confirms the blurring of traditional media boundaries 
particularly in more trans/national industry settings. The entire LLP strategy in Latin 
America emerged from a failed local television production model. Not only are the 
creative executives and territory offices flexible to move across television, film, home 
video, and digital technology but the production models are as well. Additionally, local 
television broadcasters (now media conglomerates) are key co-producers and marketers 
of these Brazilian or Spanish films, ranging from a full-scale operation with Globo 
Filmes contributing to marketing or a “reluctant,” legally obligated investor in the case of 
Spanish broadcaster government who provides legally required or enforced financing. 
LLP divisions, like SPE’s, look to established knowledge media companies such as 
Globo and Telecinco which are familiar with the domestic market and can deliver the 
popular mainstream audiences that Sony desires as well as ease financing and distribution 
costs. In the case of both location studies, Sony’s local production division must 
negotiate its participation and rely on resources of major nationally-based media 
conglomerates to help produce and release its local language films. Instead of perceiving 
Sony do Brasil or Columbia Español as merely an agent of a Hollywood studio imposing 
institutional, industrial and cultural practices onto a Spanish film co-production, the 
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participation of these local media giants complicates monolithic ideas of institutional 
power coming from the United States.  
On the one hand, my study challenges Toby Miller et. al’s totalizing view of the 
power of floating Hollywood capital as well as border-erasing and border-crossing nature 
of the co-production. Sony maintains a powerful position but is not the only agent of 
power in these production partnerships. On the other hand, from a cultural studies 
perspective and methodology, my field research did not diminish or relinquish any of the 
institutional power Global Hollywood attributes to Sony Pictures Entertainment. Instead, 
it reveals how the agency and power associated with media producers and the content 
they produce takes many forms and shapes across these LLP partnerships.  
My research clearly illustrates how films produced from Sony subsidiaries cannot 
be classified as completely Hollywood (as some academic scholarship may suggest) or 
solely national media products (as some academic work from national cinemas tradition 
or SPE’s discourse around the LLP strategy may argue). In the case of Brazil and a film 
like Chico Xavier, the film co-production operates as a translocal media product bound 
by trans/national partnerships, national industry and cultural practices, and local Rio 
production cultures in which it was created. With the case of Columbia Español, its first 
LLP, Di Que Sí, represents a more centralized and micromanaged process by LA-based 
SPE international executives, or, as Spanish film professionals described, “a Hollywood 
process.” Yet, even with Di Que Sí, and especially with the Spanish LLP Salir Pitando 
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that shifted Sony’s participation from major to minor producer, these are not solely Sony 
products. Instead, these films reflect Spanish industry practices from popular genre to the 
central position of subsidies and regional policies such as Television Without Frontiers.  
Although defined and constructed as a production strategy, local language 
productions cannot be understood outside of local distribution practices and windows or 
SPE’s institutional strategies. Most of the debates and clashing cultures of production 
revolved around distribution models including theatrical, home video, and online. While 
the opening weekend discourses and wider releases represent the current debates around 
Brazilian LLPs, declining DVD sales and online piracy factor into the closing of the 
Madrid division. On a broad level, LLP distribution is symptomatic of how the local 
territory office and SPE imagine local audiences for non-English-language films and 
Sony’s dominant position as a domestic distributor of English-language content. 
Particularly, distribution should be situated within Sony’s (and Columbia’s) historic 
dominant position within international film markets as a Brazilian distributor kept 
reminding me. In both industrial contexts, most of the tension and friction between the 
producers and Sony emerged from distribution strategies. In both cases, SPE signed off 
on the number of prints produced and distributed theatrically. This averages as a 
conservative 250-300 copies despite the argument by local Sony do Brasil or Columbia 
Español executives of the films’ potential for a wider release within domestic or 
international markets. However, this decision process varied greatly between the two 
 268 
locations. In the case of Sony do Brasil, various sources claimed SPE left them alone and 
let them produce all of the advertising and marketing materials in-house. However, 
decisions were managed from another general manager and office in Spain and the local 
Sony distributor in Spain had a say in creative and marketing decisions and distribution. 
Finally, this LLP study signals a shift from a traditional view or strategy for 
international markets characterized by Western European audiences to growing 
economies and markets within the BRIC regions (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). 
While earlier studies by Thomas Guback, Kristin Thompson, Colin Hoskins et al., and so 
on focused on the interdependent relationship between Hollywood and Europe, currently 
Europe largely is portrayed as a stagnant regional film market. Over the past decade 
companies like SPE, Warner Bros., and Universal Pictures are aiming their international 
production and distribution operations at a different audience. By 2006, SPE CEO 
Michael Lynton claimed that the markets in Brazil, India, and Russia “will become more 
and more important to us”3 due to their position as large, national markets with economic 
growth, audiences, and infrastructure such as the increase in multiplex theaters. As 
discussed in the Chapter Four, Brazil is one of the fastest growing economies in the 
2000s and 2010s. SPE and other filmed entertainment companies betting the next phase 
of growth within international operations on countries like Brazil with an expanding 
middle class population and theatrical infrastructure that should reach close to 2,500 
                                                
3 Eric Pfanner, “Hollywood learning Hindi and Russian Profits Sighted in New Film Markets,” 
International Herald Tribune 3:1 (17 May 2006). 
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screens by 2012. As evidence of the SPE’s refocused efforts on the BRIC region, Sony’s 
international production division is again retooling the LLP strategy and reimagining a 
new set of audiences within a different local, national, regional, and transnational 
dynamic.4  
My location-specific research shows how a generalized theory to explain Sony’s 
local language productions is counter-productive and not my intention. Particular 
political, economic, technological, and cultural forces shape the Brazilian division as was 
the case with the short-lived Spanish operation. Instead, what emerges are different and 
competing perspectives from SPE executives, local Sony creative executives, and their 
production and distribution partners from what constitutes local media or distribution 
models in Brazil and Spain. Brazilian and Spanish LLPs reveal the unstable and 
contradictory practices involved in producing national cinema. Yet, to some extent, the 
persistence of the national cinema model continues as Sony’s international production 
strategy still relies heavily on a contained, monolingual idea of national cinema and 
audiences. Furthermore, my location studies present an even more unstable view of 
competing visions within media conglomerates. From the disagreements between Sony 
do Brasil’s creative employees and executives about what constitutes Brazilian 
blockbusters to Columbia Español’s battles with the Madrid-based Sony Pictures 
International Releasing general manager over signing off on projects, SPE’s institutional 
                                                
4 Scott Galup, “Giving the World What It Wants: Does Hollywood’s Hunt for New Markets Dumb Down 
Films?” The Washington Times D01 (11 May 2007). 
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practices and LLP application are not organized, neat, or linear decision-making 
processes. The local language film production strategy simultaneously is both a success 
and failure, flexible and static, location-bound and deterritorialized. Overall, my 
expansive project challenges theories of media globalization for an organization like 
Sony. 
LIMITATIONS 
Ambitious in scope, size, and methodology, the main objective of my dissertation 
project was to explore one international strategy within one institution operating across 
multiple locations. Yet, due to accessibility issues, time, resources, and general 
linguistic/cultural/industrial knowledge, the nature of my project has its limitations. 
Primarily, because I focused on one division within SPE, I was not able to address the 
other media divisions and their relationships to Brazilian or Spanish LLPs. For example, 
division Sony Pictures Classics emerges as a minor player in the story of Sony do Brasil. 
Iona de Macedo recalled her and the director and producer of Eu, Tu, Eles, Andrucha 
Waddington, putting together promotional materials in order to pitch the project to Sony 
Pictures Classics to receive gap funding and an international distribution deal. To explore 
fully a complete internal structure and international operations, the complex relationship 
between the local LLP office and various SPE media divisions is an element that needs to 
be developed as I expand this project. 
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Additionally, I was unable to interview the key executives working within the 
local television conglomerates, Globo or Telecinco, or their film divisions. Even with 
multiple references and connections, it came down to an access problem and lack of 
understanding about how to penetrate the massive organizations. Interestingly, it was 
easier to contact and interview multiple Brazilian Sony employees than to schedule a 
meeting with an employee of Globo Filmes. In this instance, I was expected to submit a 
research proposal to Globo Universidade, one of their representatives would evaluate my 
request, and I might or might not receive access to speak to an employee within a six- to 
nine-month period. In the future, I will conduct follow-up interviews in both Brazil and 
Spain in order to speak with employees working in these film divisions. This will allow a 
clearer picture of their participation in LLPs through marketing and financing as well as 
their relationships to a Sony LLP division. By expanding on the role of these local 
conglomerates in the local film industries, my research will offer a more complex picture 
of Rio de Janeiro or Madrid as a media capital and central hub for a regional media 
market. 
Finally, due to time, accessibility, and my own cultural knowledge and fluency, I 
chose to focus on Madrid as the center of European LLP production between 2001-2007. 
However, as discussed in Chapter Three, the Spanish LLP trajectory is a regional one 
framed by Germany from its initial “failure” between 1990s-2001 and operational rebirth 
2007 to 2010. I want to expand my Spanish analysis to consider a more regionally-
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focused history of Sony LLP operations to understand the central position of Germany in 
Sony overall LLP’ strategy and trajectory. I plan to conduct further industrial field 
research in order to examine the German LLP operation and the interview the executives, 
producers, and distributors who will offer a more nuanced analysis of the national 
operations within a larger European LLP strategy and industrial conditions. 
 
THE FUTURE OF LLPS 
My project speaks to Sony Pictures Entertainment’s institutional history, strategy, 
and relationships during the period between the late mid-1990s to 2010, yet this part of 
Sony’s history is also symptomatic of where the film industry is moving on a larger level. 
Since 2007 when SPE consolidated its international production operations under IMPPG, 
a number of its media company peers followed suit. Warner Bros., Fox, Universal, and 
Paramount are expanding and consolidating their own international film production 
activities within newly created divisions. For example, Fox International Productions 
(FIP) launched in 2008. Its LLP expands beyond Sony’s focus on developing content 
locally to include remaking 20th Century Fox’s English-language films such as Bride 
Wars (dir. Gary Winick, 2009) and Fox Searchlight’s Sideways (dir. Alexander Payne, 
2004) in India and Japan, respectively. According to FIP’s President Sanford Panitch: 
We’re trying to produce local-language films all over the world. We’re using the 
synergy between our distribution operations in all of these territories to tie up with 
the local production division. There is a shift in the market toward local content. It 
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validates what we’re trying to achieve with these projects.5 
 
FIP operates in the markets of Brazil, Russia, India, and Japan in a manner similar to 
Sony’s move away from traditional Western European audiences to a recent focus on 
BRIC LLP strategy. Increased economic growth and changing industry infrastructure in 
these countries have led to SPE, FIP, and others to reimagine how they prioritize and 
value their “global” audiences. An expansion into the BRIC regions has overtaken a 
historical strategy for international operations bound in traditional geographical regions. 
This is happening industry-wide and needs further research and discussions that move 
beyond the position of these film divisions and their international operations as exporting 
English-language films. 
 LLP operations and strategies are not just relegated to these transnational film 
studios. Other prominent regional and national companies are expanding towards local 
language co-productions. One of the largest and best-known production companies in 
Brazil, Conspiração Filmes, has expanded its operations beyond São Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro with an office in Hamburg, Germany, since 2008. Run by one of the producing 
partners, Leonardo Monteiro de Barros, the German office is involved in English- and 
Spanish-language films such as the Spanish-Brazilian co-production Lope (dir. Andrucha 
Waddington, 2010) and other recent European-Brazilian co-productions. In return, 
European production companies are looking to work with industries such as in Brazil due 
                                                
5 Sanford Panitch as qtd. in Ali Jaafar, “Fox Offers Local-language films” Variety (25 March 2009) 
accessed online (15 April 2010). 
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to their lucrative incentives and large domestic box office. As resources and audiences in 
Spain and other European countries decrease and fragment, a number of Spanish 
producers in Madrid predict a rise of Latin American-European co-productions in the 
future to take advantage of financing, cheaper shoots, and crews. 
 Therefore, Sony’s (or Fox’s or Warners’s) international production division is not 
the only institution reimagining national media, audiences, and film practices beyond 
traditional borders. Sony do Brasil’s or Columbia Español’s production and distribution 
offices played a major part in developing, producing, and releasing these local language 
co-productions. Part of my project was to acknowledge their cultural work and 
understand how to imagine the films, local industry, and audiences. While Sony’s 
international production group alongside its partnering SPE divisions may maintain a 
more dominant position through their capital and resources, film companies such as 
Brazil’s Conspiração or Spain’s Morena are expanding their operations beyond a 
geographically, linguistically, or culturally fixed idea of Brazilian or Spanish national 
cinema.  
Even though the history of Sony’s local language division represents a unique 
case study or institutional history, it is also symptomatic of a key change within 
trans/national film industries in the 2000s. In a period where increased flows of media 
images, talent, resources, and capital are becoming more flexible, localized, and 
borderless, the local language film strategy either will be adapted successfully to 
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changing local markets such as Brazil or unable to cross cultural-industrial conditions as 
in Spain. What will be important to observe is how Sony and other transnational media 
companies deal within countries such as India which have strong domestic industries, 
regional state cultural identities, and multiple competing languages. The real question is 
whether the LLP strategy is a product of this industrial moment or a sustainable 
production model able to adapt to the growing media cultural markets and favorable 
cultural, political, economic, and technological conditions. 
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